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The debate over both domestic and international climate policy continues to evolve each year, adapting to broader global politics and ever changing current events. Today, 
at the forefront of everyone’s mind is the global financial crisis. 
In both the financial crisis and the climate crisis, the unknown 
factors are the most frightening. While the immediacy of the 
financial crisis impacts each of our lives, we must not forget 
the longer term and potentially much more severe and lasting 
impacts of the climate crisis. As Australian professor Ross Gar-
naut recently noted, the unprecedented “financial crisis—no 
matter how severe—will be short-lived and should not stand in 
the way of action on global climate change.” 
Perhaps it is because the world’s global policy focus is on 
the financial industry that so many of our submissions focused 
instead on local, regional, and to a lesser degree, national cli-
mate issues. It is encouraging to see the real progress outlined 
in many of our articles—as one of our authors says, local and 
regional governments are, in some situations, particularly well 
poised to deal with climate adaptation measures. 
While the 2009 Copenhagen climate negotiations are loom-
ing only months away, the global climate debate continues. 
The United States is finally beginning to not only to take steps 
towards reducing its own carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions but 
also is poised to reengage in the dialogue and move towards a 
post-Kyoto framework. This new energy and resolve is exempli-
fied by President Obama’s commitment, during his first address 
to a joint session of Congress, to placing a “market-based cap 
on carbon pollution” and driving domestic renewable energy 
production. 
Despite other world events, it is most certainly time for all 
countries to engage in the global dialogue and seriously com-
mit to binding CO2 reductions. As this issue illustrates all too 
well, the potentially catastrophic effects of global warming are 
not only appearing in the data and statistics but also becoming 
visible in the daily lives of many people around the planet. And 
as we have heard all too many times, it is not those of us who 
are most responsible for the greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions 
that are feeling the heat; it is those of us who have the fewest 
resources to adapt that are most severely impacted. 
We hope you enjoy this fifth annual edition of Sustain-
able Development Law & Policy’s (“SDLP’s”) Climate Law 
Reporter. In these five years, we have seen the discourse evolve. 
Five years ago, many still questioned whether to act. Today the 
debate is no longer whether or when to act; the debate is focused 
how and where to act. This issue covers a wide range of top-
ics from addressing climate change in a human rights context 
to using legal tools to help Indigenous populations deal with the 
climate impacts for which they are not responsible. 
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As is evidenced by our diverse authors, we have become 
an important international venue in the global climate debate. 
We hope this issue of SDLP helps push the discourse beyond 
debate and towards action, because our future and our liveli-
hoods depend on it.
Lisa Novins Addie Haughey
eDitoR-in-chief eDitoR-in-chief
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an oveRview of thiS iSSue: climate change in 2009
by Professor Perry Wallace* 
“Climate change has long since ceased to be a scien-tific curiosity,” observes the recent United Nations Environment Programme’s World Year Book 
2009.1 Indeed, climate change is “the major, overriding environ-
mental issue of our time, and the single greatest challenge facing 
decisionmakers at many levels.”2 So powerful and overarching 
is this global phenomenon that its destructive potential com-
prises economic, health and safety, food production, security, 
and other dimensions. This includes such problems as: shifting 
weather patterns threatening food production; ice loss and ther-
mal expansion creating rising sea levels that contaminate fresh-
water reserves and threaten catastrophic flooding; and warming 
atmospheres spreading pests to new terrain.
Moreover, successive assessments indicate that global 
warming, with its associated effects on climate, is a greater 
threat than predicted in earlier evaluations. Particularly disturb-
ing are recent predictions that climate change will not evolve 
in a slow, linear pattern. In fact, we may have already reached 
certain important “tipping points,” which portend irreversible 
changes in major Earth systems and ecosystems. In response to 
these developments, governmental and private actors around the 
world have begun the monumental work of creating mitigative 
and adaptive mechanisms for this equally monumental problem. 
Emerging at a pace that has accelerated with the similarly 
growing certainty about the reality and the effects of climate 
change, a comprehensive network of regulatory regimes is finally 
beginning to occur. At the international level, negotiations for a 
post-Kyoto Protocol climate treaty have already begun.3 Further, 
this activity reflects ongoing commitments of nations around the 
world to address climate change. 
In the United States, in addition to earlier action by private 
actors and state and local governments, all branches of the federal 
government have now addressed climate change in some impor-
tant way. The United States Supreme Court, in Massachusetts v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, held that greenhouse gases 
(“GHGs”) fit well within the Clean Air Act’s definition of “air 
pollutant” and that the federal Environmental Protection Agency 
possesses authority to regulate GHGs.5 Additionally, the U.S. 
Congress is also considering legislative proposals to address 
the subject. Finally, the turnaround by the American Executive 
Branch, from doubt and resistance toward acknowledgement 
and determination to address the problem, is perhaps the most 
significant development. President Obama’s vow to address cli-
mate change as a serious and urgent matter is widely seen as a 
key element in the quest for global consensus and action. 
Nevertheless, these important developments portend-
ing positive action on climate change must be viewed against 
a background of both structural and current realities of a geo-
political and economic nature. Thus, while developed countries 
* Perry Wallace is professor of law at American University, Washington College 
of Law. He specializes in Environmental Law, Corporate Law, and Finance. He is 
a member of the National Panel of Arbitrators, National Association of Securities 
Dealers Dispute Resolution, and has recently been elected to the Board of Direc-
tors of the Environmental Working Group.
of the North, the historic GHG emitters, are generally favorable 
toward taking assertive, binding action, developing countries 
of the South have raised concerns about many of the proposed 
models. One major concern of these latter countries holds that 
while they were not the culprits, they are the most adversely 
affected by climate change. Further, they possess insufficient 
economic and technological resources for taking action. Another 
concern, they argue, is that implementing such measures could 
stifle their continuing development. China and India, with the 
most prodigiously emerging economies today, are major actors 
in this debate. 
Another major dynamic that will affect progress in address-
ing climate change is the state of the global economy. A seri-
ously recessionary global economy only makes for scarce 
governmental and corporate resources, and this in turn places 
limits on the abilities of those key actors to embark upon the 
massive project of creating a new, carbon-constrained world. 
Further, significantly decreased energy demand has reduced the 
prices of oil and other traditional sources of energy, thus tak-
ing away a previous source of pressure (high energy prices) to 
explore alternative energy sources. Decreased production during 
this period has also had unfortunately negative effects on a bur-
geoning emissions trading market. Thus, lower production has 
led to decreased GHG emissions and thereby lowered demand 
for emissions credits. Emissions credit prices have dropped pre-
cipitously, and, as with other market drops in an ailing economy, 
confidence in the larger system has suffered. 
Nevertheless, these challenges will at best only slow down 
or complicate the evolution of the global movement to control 
and manage climate change. The urgency of the threat is well-
documented at this point in history, and public and private actors 
around the world have resolved to travel the path towards a 
carbon-constrained planet. The articles in this edition of SDLP 
well reflect that resolve. These articles report on particular 
developments in as diverse set of governments as Mongolia, 
Australia, the European Union, and the small island states. They 
also encompass a range of crucial aspects relative to building 
regulatory effectiveness and institutional capacity, such as strat-
egy, policy, technology, legal tools, and financial mechanisms. 
Together, they present an impressive treatment of the current 
state of affairs in developments relative to climate change.
Endnotes: An Overview of This Issue continued on page 65
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Sustainable Development Law & Policy (ISSN 1552-3721) is 
a student-run initiative at American University Washington 
College of Law published three times each academic year, 
with occasional special editions and two annual foreign lan-
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ume I and Volume II, Issue 1 are published as International 
and Comparative Environmental Law.
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ReSolving the climate waRS 
by Dr. Alan D. Hecht*
Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or polices of the EPA. Mention of trade 
names or commercial products does not constitute Agency endorsement or recommendations for use.
InTroDucTIon
From 2001 through 2008 the United States experienced a period of climate wars: politics vs. science, business vs. government, and states vs. the federal government. 
By early 2009 some of these conflicts started to move toward 
resolution through legal action, 
scientific advances, and shifts 
in business strategies. Deci-
sions made today will deter-
mine whether a new era of 
climate protection begins or 
the climate cold wars continue. 
Business as usual is not in our 
nation’s best interest and every 
effort must be made to end the 
period of continued infighting 
between business and govern-
ment, federal-state conflicts, 
and denial of the root causes of 
climate change. This paper reviews several of the climate wars 
from 2001 to 2008, describes their historic context, and looks at 
lessons learned for the future. 
oRigin of the climate waRS
For decades scientific uncertainty and the cost and regula-
tory approach of addressing global climate change have been at 
the root of the climate debate. When in 1983 the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a report evaluating 
the effectiveness of specific energy policies to reduce green-
house emissions (“Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming?”), 
responses from Congress, business, and federal agencies were 
highly polarized.1 A sense of urgency among some Congressio-
nal leaders emerged in 1986. “Deeply disturbed” by the implica-
tions of published reports on carbon dioxide (“CO2”)-induced 
climate change, Senators Chafee, Stafford, Bentsen, Duren-
berger, Mitchell, Baucus, Leahy, and Gore began to pressure the 
White House to take action on climate change. 
While the United States wavered on actions to address 
climate change, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(“UNEP”) was committed to initiating international and domes-
tic actions to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. UNEP 
had a clear sense of purpose and in 1985 called for a legal con-
vention on climate change and began to lead international sci-
entific efforts to establish the foundation for negotiating such an 
agreement. As discussed later, this effort had a major impact on 
the U.S. climate debate.
When candidate George H.W. Bush took office in 1988, 
he declared: “Those who think we’re powerless to do anything 
about the greenhouse effect are forgetting about the White House 
effect. As President I intend to do something about it.”2 But Pres-
ident Bush may have underestimated the underlying economic 
challenges. After EPA Adminis-
trator William Reilly briefed the 
cabinet on climate change and 
the prospect for an international 
climate convention, he reported 
to EPA officials3 what he had 
heard at the briefing. Despite 
growing agreement among cli-
mate modeling groups, White 
House chief of staff John Sununu 
declared that the climate models 
were fundamentally flawed and 
that the best atmospheric scien-
tists had yet to become involved 
in climate research. Office of Management and Budget direc-
tor Richard Darman called the concept of a climate convention 
“clean air for the whole world.” Council of Economic Advisors 
(“CEA”) chairman Michael Boskin advised the president that an 
international treaty on climate change was a “bet-your-economy 
decision.”
Listening to the above advice would scare anyone worried 
about destabilizing the U.S. economy. But, in the end, President 
Bush supported the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”) as a way to address the division among 
scientific viewpoints. Later he also supported the development 
of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (“FCCC”) 
that in turn led to the development of the Kyoto Protocol.
In the 1990s and during the Clinton Administration simi-
lar debates over science and economics continued. During the 
subsequent Bush Administration (2001–2009) these debates 
became more of a series of wars between politics vs. science, 
business vs. government, and states vs. the federal government. 
*Dr. Alan D. Hecht is the Director for Sustainable Development, Office of Research 
and Development of the U.S. Environment Protection Agency (“EPA”). From 
2001 to 2003 while on detail from EPA, Dr. Hecht served as Associate Director 
for Sustainability at the Council of Environmental Quality (“CEQ”). Previously 
he was director of the U.S. National Climate Program from 1982 to 1989 where 
he was instrumental in launching the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(“IPCC”).
Decisions made today will 
determine whether a new 
era of climate protection 
begins or the climate cold 
wars continue.
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My review of several of the confrontations during this period 
suggests a written or unwritten strategy aimed at: 
 • Avoiding new federal legislation and regulations. This 
meant not allowing CO2 to be identified as a pollutant under 
the Clean Air Act or as an endangerment to human health. 
One approach used to prevent legislation was to emphasize 
the uncertainty in the science of climate change.
 • Doing nothing to hamper economic growth. The sluggish 
economy didn’t need extra burdens on business. Instead, 
federal actions promoted voluntary programs on climate 
change, many of which have 
helped to slow the growth of 
greenhouse gases.
 • Doing nothing until China, 
India, and other developing 
counties commit to reduce 
GHG emissions. The United 
States walked away from 
both the intention of the 2002 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol largely based on eco-
nomic considerations. 
At the beginning of 2009, 
many of the conflicts surrounding 
climate change are moving toward 
resolution and the time may be 
at hand to resolve long-standing 
conflicts over regulations and economic impacts and launch a 
new era of energy-climate policy. While legitimate policy dif-
ferences remain, as evidenced by different approaches advanced 
by leading economists like Sir Nicholas Stern4 who argues for 
immediate action on climate change and William Nordhaus who 
proposes a modest and slower response,5 steps to resolve differ-
ences must be based on a different federal-business and federal-
state-local government model. Business as usual is not in our 
nation’s best interest. 
This paper will examine several of the most significant 
recent climate wars and their historic roots and suggested future 
actions. Given the current economic recession, now more than 
ever new government and business partnerships and close coop-
eration with non-government conservation, environmental, and 
economic groups are needed to help the public understand the 
economic and social costs of dealing with climate change, stim-
ulate the economy, create a broader energy portfolio, mitigate 
and adapt to climate change, and advance a new business and 
foreign policy agenda. 
resIsTIng ghg regulaTIons:  
The 2001 g-8 meeTIng
During the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate George 
W. Bush promoted legislation to “require the mandatory reduc-
tion in U.S. of emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, 
mercury and carbon dioxide from power plants.” 6 Many observ-
ers saw this as a significant departure from past history and 
were optimistic that a new era of climate change would begin. 
Unfortunately, the campaign promise in 2000 was reversed in 
March 2001 following an international conference among the 
G-8 countries. The reversal, a surprise to the newly appointed 
EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, was a clear indi-
cation of behind-the-scene concerns about energy policy, eco-
nomics, and government regulations. 
At a meeting of the G-8 industrial countries in Trieste, Italy, 
Governor Whitman announced that the United States was com-
mitted to regulation of GHG emissions. Whitman assured her 
counterparts that the United States wanted a mandatory cap on 
CO2 emissions. The Joint Com-
muniqué expressed an inter-
national commitment to “take 
the lead by strengthening and 
implementing national pro-
grams and actions, to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, as 
well as to promote and dis-
seminate environmentally 
sound technologies and prac-
tices and renewable energy 
sources.”7 
Unfortunately, Adminis-
trator Whitman was unaware 
of a behind-the-scenes effort 
led by Senators Chuck Hagel, 
Jesse Helms, Larry Craig, and 
Pat Roberts to reverse this commitment. In a letter to the presi-
dent, these senators made clear their view that the commitment 
was unwise. The letter attracted the attention of Vice President 
Cheney who, according to Barton Gellman, embarked on a plan 
to “walk the president away from his promise.”8 Cheney’s staff 
prepared a four-page memo “that would put the White House 
on record against the collective judgment of the world’s climate 
scientists.”9 The memo said Bush should be nudged toward the 
position that the “current state of scientific knowledge about 
causes of and solutions to global warming is inconclusive. 
Therefore it would be premature at this time for the president 
to propose any specific policy or approach aimed at addressing 
global warming.”10
The President accepted this approach and signed a letter 
responding to the senators that was prepared by Cheney’s staff 
and given to the President (by Cheney) without any consultation 
across the government, especially with Governor Whitman. In a 
White House press release the president said: “I do not believe, 
however, that the government should impose on power plants 
mandatory emissions reductions for carbon dioxide, which is not 
a ‘pollutant’ under the Clean Air Act.”11
Chief of Staff Josh Bolten ultimately assumed respon-
sibility for the president’s reversal, asserting that he had been 
in error: the intended designation for CO2 was “emission” not 
“pollutant.”12 Underlying such a distinction was fear of estab-
lishing a legal basis for regulating CO2. After Bolten’s admis-
sion, Vice President Dick Cheney agreed, arguing that putting a 
cap on CO2 “was bad energy policy.”
13 
Underlying the opposition 
to CO2 regulation was 
the critical issue of the 
supposed economic 
impacts that would result 
from regulating CO2 and 
who would pay for it.
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Underlying the opposition to CO2 regulation was the criti-
cal issue of the supposed economic impacts that would result 
from regulating CO2 and who would pay for it. The Bush admin-
istration’s priority for economic growth was clearly evident in 
all policy actions. A key chapter of the Economic Report of the 
President submitted to Congress in 2002 focused on the cost of 
environmental regulations. Recognizing the significant achieve-
ment of the past decades in reducing the most obvious risks 
to health and the environment, the report states, “there is evi-
dence that further improvements in air quality would improve 
health and reduce mortality, but these improvements might be 
extremely expensive.”14 
Risk and cost-benefits analyses were key factors driving 
public policy in 2001 through 2008. Regulating emissions that 
affect climate change was recognized as potentially very valu-
able but not as an immediate priority in light of the cost and 
questions about the potential risks. “We are uncertain about 
the effect of natural fluctuations on global warming. We do not 
know how much the climate could or will change in the future. 
We do not know how fast climate change will occur, or even 
how some of our actions could affect it. Finally, it is difficult 
to say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of 
warming that must be avoided.”15 
Fearing the economic impact of any climate legislation, 
promoting scientific uncertainty and denying global warming 
became the operating plan for many business and government 
leaders. 
promoTIng scIenTIFIc uncerTaInTy: 
challengIng The 2001 anD 2007  
Ipcc assessmenTs
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 
has become the world’s preeminent scientific body assessing 
the impacts of and proposing options for responding to climate 
change. A key element of its 2001 assessment was its statement 
on the growing evidence for human-induced climate change.16 
And one specific diagram—later termed the “hockey stick”—
was ultimately to cause considerable angst among policy mak-
ers. What is the IPCC? What are its assessments? And how does 
this relate to domestic energy policy?
In 1985 UNEP, in cooperation with other international 
organizations and non-government organizations, organized a 
conference and prepared a scientific assessment of the impacts 
of climate change.17 UNEP Executive Director Moustafa Tolba 
sent the report to then Secretary of State George Schultz urging 
the United States to take appropriate policy actions on climate 
change and to launch negotiations on a climate convention. The 
State Department passed the letter to the National Climate Pro-
gram Office (“NCPO”) and its senior interagency policy board 
to draft a response. (The NCPO, created within NOAA by Con-
gress as a coordinating body among all federal agencies, was 
mandated to develop a climate action plan. From 1982 to 1989 I 
was the director of NCPO, which was later replaced by the inter-
agency Global Change Research Program.) 
The NCPO policy board, which included all relevant fed-
eral agencies, vigorously debated the merit of the report. The 
U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) representative argued that 
it was inadequate, in part because it had no government sanc-
tion. DOE vocally insisted on a government-led international 
scientific assessment. At the same time, EPA and the Depart-
ment of State representatives supported the idea of a convention 
on climate change and suggested that perhaps it was timely for 
governments to prepare an international scientific assessment, 
especially in light of conflicting scientific evidence. During the 
debate, I offered a consensus proposal where the United States 
would support an international government-led scientific assess-
ment and would agree to international negotiations if the serious-
ness of the problem were affirmed. For different reasons, each 
agency agreed to the proposal. At a time when it was difficult to 
get interagency agreement on any action, there was agreement 
around the concept of an international scientific assessment. 
The action of the NCPO Policy Board eventually led to the 
U.S. proposal for “an intergovernmental mechanism” to conduct 
a government-led, scientific assessment of the climate change 
issue.18 This “mechanism” later became the IPCC, which con-
tinues today as the preeminent global scientific court on climate 
change. In the end, the IPCC report confirmed the seriousness of 
the climate problem and triggered the beginning of negotiations 
for a climate convention. 
Back to the climate wars—because of their relevance to 
policy, the 2001 and 2007 scientific assessments came under 
intense scrutiny. One figure in the 2001 report triggered par-
ticularly intense reaction. This report drew on data from a 1998 
publication by Michael Mann, Raymond Bradley, and Malcolm 
Hughes that reconstructed temperature patterns over the past 
1000 years (“MBH98”).19 The controversial graph depicted a 
sharp rise in temperatures over the past 100 years, which the 
authors attributed to human activity. The graph, with its “hockey 
stick” pattern, was a key piece of supporting evidence in the 
2001 IPCC report. 
Mann, who has been an author of the IPCC report, testi-
fied before Congress in 2003 that: “It is the consensus of the cli-
mate research community that the anomalous warmth of the late 
20th century cannot be explained by natural factors, but instead 
indicates significant anthropogenic, that is human influences.”20 
Nevertheless the underlying scientific methods used by MBH98 
were criticized by other authors who challenged the evidence 
that the sharp rise in global temperature was being caused by 
human activities.21 
The hockey stick became an element of the climate war 
when, in June 2003, Representative Joe Barton of Texas, the 
Republican chairman of the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, requested that Mann provide responses to eight detailed 
questions related to his credentials and past work.22 The Sub-
committee ultimately asked the National Academy of Science 
(“NAS”) to review the issue, and NAS formed a committee of 
twelve scientists to assess the main areas of uncertainty, the prin-
cipal methodologies used, any problems with these approaches, 
and how central the debate is to the state of scientific knowledge 
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on global climate change. In the end, the NAS report agreed that 
there were statistical shortcomings in the analysis but concluded 
that the conclusions were in fact correct. 
Considering that the essence of the scientific process is peer 
review and reproduction of results, why was this an issue for a 
Congressional oversight subcommittee? Who or what was the 
real focus of this debate? Two objectives seemed to underlie this 
debate: to dispute any claim of human-induced climate change 
and hence any need for legislation; and to challenge the IPCC 
process and its current and future credibility by showing it relied 
on publishing flawed papers. 
In 2001, the IPCC assessment scientists concluded that it 
was “likely” (which it defined as with a greater than sixty-six 
percent probability) that climate change was caused by human 
activities.23 Six years later, the 2007 report raised the probability 
of human influences on climate to “very likely” (indicating a 
probability greater than ninety percent) and detectable in obser-
vational records.24 This stronger conclusion reflected a great 
deal of scientific progress made over the intervening years, both 
in direct observations of the impacts of climate change, and in 
computer modeling. Nearly all scientists have concluded that 
current trends could not be explained without including human-
related increases in greenhouse gases. While the 2007 report 
strengthened the consensus among most scientists and govern-
ments, a number of critics argue either that the report was too 
conservative or too alarming. 
Using scientific uncertainty to undermine support for cli-
mate legislation was further advanced by reliance on an obscure 
law known as the Federal Data Quality Act (“FDQA”).
regulaTIng scIence by lawsuITs on  
DaTa QualITy
FDQA, a little-known rider to the 2001 Consolidated Appro-
priations Act, directed the director of the Office of Management 
and Budget (“OMB”) to issue government-wide guidelines that 
“provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies 
for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, 
and integrity of information (including statistical information) 
disseminated by Federal agencies.”25 The law requires that any 
scientific document issued by the government include clearly 
supportable data and any uncertainties related to the topic. It was 
approved without any congressional hearings. Many businesses 
supported the Act as a means to reign in regulation perceived to 
be unsupported by science. Environmentalists criticized its pas-
sage and predicted it would be used to stop regulations aimed at 
protecting public health and the environment.
The first lawsuit to be filed under the FDQA asked the gov-
ernment to cease dissemination of the 2000 U.S. National Assess-
ment of the Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and 
Change. The 2003 suit filed by the Competitive Enterprise Insti-
tute (“CEI”) against President Bush asked the federal courts to 
order the White House Office of Science Technology and Policy 
(“OSTP”) to withdraw the assessment report. The suit asserted 
that data in the Assessment was derived from “demonstrably 
inaccurate computer models, and dissemination of historical 
temperature data that it modified to inaccurately omit the occur-
rence of recognized climatic periods. This Act prohibits Defen-
dant from disseminating data failing to meet its standards.”26 
The CEI claimed that the assessment failed to meet the DQA’s 
scientific standards for objectivity and utility, because two of the 
models used “are incapable of providing reliable predictions.”27 
Understanding this morass requires some history. In 1990, 
Congress enacted the Global Change Research Act that required 
the preparation of national climate assessments.28 The Act 
established the United States Global Change Research Program 
with the aim of understanding and responding to global change, 
including the cumulative effects of human activities and natural 
processes on the environment, to promote discussions toward 
international protocols in global change research, and for other 
purposes. The Act requires “on a periodic basis (not less fre-
quently than every 4 years)” the preparation of an assessment 
report to the President and Congress that among other things 
“analyzes the effects of global change on the natural environ-
ment, agriculture, energy production and use, land and water 
resources, transportation, human health and welfare, human 
social systems, and biological diversity,” and “analyzes current 
trends in global change, both human-induced and natural, and 
projects major trends for the subsequent 25 to 100 years.”29
The National Assessment Synthesis Team (“NAST”) a 
federal advisory committee, consisting of experts from govern-
ment, universities, industry, and non-governmental organiza-
tions prepared the first of these assessments completing it in late 
2000. Using results from two different climate models, the team 
developed two different but plausible scenarios of future climate 
change and evaluated their environmental impacts. 
Considering the potential impact of climate change on the 
United States, NAST leader Michael MacCracken’s staff sent 
the report to every state governor. Ironic as it may be, then Texas 
Governor George Bush responded, “Thank you for your letter 
and the enclosed copies of your assessment about the potential 
consequences to the U.S. of a climate change. I appreciate the 
work that went into preparing this information.”30
The 2000 Assessment Report, completed before the enact-
ment of the FDQA, became the foundation for the U.S. annual 
report to the UN on climate change required under the 2002 
UNFCCC. The third U.S. report in 2002, based on the 2000 
assessment report, concluded: “Greenhouse gases are accumu-
lating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, 
causing global mean temperature and subsurface ocean tempera-
tures to rise. While the changes observed over the last several 
decades are likely due mostly to human activities, we cannot 
rule out that some significant part is also a reflection of natural 
variability.”31
This conclusion, which seemed at odds with federal policy, 
prompted The New York Times science writer Andrew Revkin to 
report (June 3, 2002) “[i]n a stark shift for the Bush administra-
tion, the United States has sent a climate report to the United 
Nations detailing specific and far-reaching effects that it says 
global warming will inflict on the American environment. In the 
report, the administration for the first time mostly blames human 
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actions for recent global warming. It says the main culprit is the 
burning of fossil fuels that send heat-trapping greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere.”32
Perhaps recognizing that the U.S. Report to the UN inter-
preted in this manner was setting a foundation for possible future 
regulatory action, President Bush dismissed the U.S. report by 
saying it had been put “out by 
the bureaucracy.” 33 Recogniz-
ing the potential legal impli-
cations of the U.S Report, the 
rationale for the CEI lawsuit 
becomes clearer. On August 
6, 2003, CEI filed a lawsuit 
against the Administration to 
invalidate the 2000 National 
Assessment of the Potential 
Consequences of Climate Vari-
ability and Change that formed 
the basis for many of the con-
clusions in the Climate Action 
Report. 
Amid Congressional inves-
tigations of possible White 
House promotion of the initiation of the lawsuit, the lawsuit 
was ultimately withdrawn after the White House Office of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) acknowledged that the 
National Assessment on Climate Change had not been subjected 
to the FDQA guidelines.
The use of the FDQA as a tool in the war on science is not 
over. In August 2008 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce asked the 
government to withdraw the Second National Climate Report 
that argued that it is “likely that there has been a substantial 
human contribution to surface temperature increases in North 
America.”34 The Chamber argued that the report contained 
unpublished data that made it difficult to assess its scientific reli-
ability. The Bush Administration settled the dispute by inserting 
a disclaimer that the National Report was not subject to FDQA 
guidelines.
The war on science is likely to continue, but specific actions 
could go a long way toward restoring the independence and 
integrity of scientific assessment by rescinding the FDQA and 
any executive orders that provide political oversight of science, 
such as the controversial Executive Order 13422, which requires 
that “[f]ederal agencies should promulgate only such regula-
tions as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, 
or are made necessary by compelling public need, such as mate-
rial failures of private markets to protect or improve the health 
and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of 
the American people. In deciding whether and how to regulate, 
agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regula-
tory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.” On 
February 4, 2009, President Obama repealed EO 13422.35 
Peer review—not lawsuits—is the underlying framework 
for evaluating science. This traditional process allows critical 
examination of new ideas and theories and forces scientists to 
defend their work. One critical element of peer review needed 
for policy makers is estimating scientific uncertainty. Translat-
ing science into policy is well illustrated by the IPCC. While 
the IPCC reports are designed to reflect scientific consensus, an 
IPCC policy summary is a document prepared for policy mak-
ers. Reflecting governments’ concerns, the IPCC process was 
designed to allow governments 
to review and approve a sum-
mary for policy makers while 
being faithful to the underlying 
science. Although a good deal of 
climate change science is funda-
mental physics, a large portion 
of the impacts of climate change 
reflects modeling that may 
include uncertainties in extent 
and timing.
Although the negotiations 
and approval of the policy sum-
maries by governments can be 
torturous, the IPCC process has 
been successful in both preserv-
ing integrity and forging consen-
sus among governments and scientists. This process underscores 
that there is some discretion in how scientists and policy makers 
can communicate the significance and the need for action. The 
situation was less clear in 2003 when EPA was finalizing its first 
Draft Report on the Environment (“RoE ”). 
eDITIng epa’s 2006 DraFT reporT on  
The envIronmenT
The EPA RoE, launched in 2001 by Governor Whitman 
aimed to give the public a snapshot of the quality of the U.S. 
environment and to establish a set of indicators or metrics to 
measure improvements (or declines) over time. One contentious 
issue was the chapter on climate change. Initially, the Chairman 
of the White House Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) 
argued that such a chapter was not needed since so many other 
climate reports were available. It was later recognized that an 
EPA RoE without a chapter on climate change would not be 
credible. 
The interagency review of the chapter on climate change 
was heated. (From October 2002 to June 2003 while on detail 
as CEQ Associate Director for Sustainable Development, I was 
given the task of helping resolve interagency disagreements.) 
Flagging the chapter’s section on climate change, White House 
staff noted: “This section should be thoroughly reviewed for 
content and usefulness of that content. The section ‘What are 
the contributions to climate change . . .’ is not balanced and 
virtually ignores any mention of natural variability . . . . If this 
cannot be balanced, it needs to be removed.” Office of Manage-
ment and Budget staff commented to CEQ Chief of Staff Philip 
Cooney on March 4, 2003, “Phil, I don’t know whether you have 
reviewed the Climate Section of the EPA report, but I think you 
and Jim [Connaughton] need to focus on it before it goes final. 
The war on science is 
likely to continue,  
but specific actions could 
go a long way toward 
restoring the independence 
and integrity of  
scientific assessment.
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Even though the information is generally not new, I suspect this 
will generate negative press coverage.”36 
While the review was underway, CEQ’s chief of staff was 
promoting a new paper by Willie Soon and Sally Baliunas that 
contradicted published accounts of historic climate trends. The 
Soon-Baliunas paper asserted that it was an authoritative review 
of the literature and concluded: “that the 20th century is prob-
ably not the warmest nor a uniquely extreme climatic period of 
the last millennium.”37 Shortly thereafter, thirteen of the authors 
of papers cited by Soon and Baliunas refuted the Soon-Baliu-
nas interpretation of their work and contradicted “thousands of 
papers that go into a document like the IPCC report.”38
Four versions of the RoE climate change chapter went back 
and forth between CEQ and EPA, which was finally instructed 
to take the changes or leave it. On May 23, 2003, after several 
days of internal EPA discussions, EPA Administrator Whit-
man yanked the chapter from the report. This war is one of sev-
eral described in the House Oversight Committee’s review of 
 science editing. Two years later on June 8, 2005, a similar inci-
dent of heavy CEQ editing of a NOAA report was described in 
The New York Times. On March 19, 2007, Chairman Connaugh-
ton and Chief of Staff Cooney of CEQ testified before Congress 
and defended their editing as necessary to make the final report 
consistent with published literature. The hearing highlighted the 
role of policy-makers distorting or asserting their own interpre-
tation of scientific results. In the IPCC policy-makers summary 
that governments negotiate, all scientists must agree with the 
changes thus preventing any government from distorting the 
results.
The hearing failed to invite the one key witness whose 
judgment ultimately decided the fate of the report. In the end it 
was the EPA administrator (and former Republican governor of 
New Jersey) who decided that the revised chapter should not be 
included. Administrator Whitman said in effect that the chap-
ter—as edited—would diminish EPA’s credibility as an envi-
ronmental agency. EPA staff advised Whitman that the benefits 
of removing the chapter “were that it would provide little con-
tent for attacks on EPA’s science and that it may be the only way 
to meet White House and EPA needs.”39 
sTaTes vs. FeDeral governmenT:  
a supreme courT DecIsIon
In 1999 the International Center for Technology Assess-
ment, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and other environmental 
groups petitioned the EPA to regulate and set limits for CO2 and 
other GHGs emitted from new motor vehicles, arguing that such 
action was EPA’s duty under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act. 
The petitioning groups’ central argument was that CO2 was a 
pollutant and that its impact on global warming was negatively 
affecting human health and the environment. EPA failed to 
respond to the petition within three years, leading to a lawsuit 
brought by the environmental groups in 2002.40 
Subsequently, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine filed 
a petition in June 2003 arguing that by failing to regulate CO2 
EPA was violating its mandatory duty under Section 108 of the 
Clean Air Act. EPA denied the petition arguing that the Clean 
Air Act did not authorize the agency to issue mandatory regula-
tions to address global warming, and that even if the EPA did 
have such authority, the agency believed it would be neither 
“effective or appropriate” to establish GHG emissions standards 
for motor vehicles at this time.41
After EPA denied the petition to regulate CO2, a coalition 
of twelve states led by Massachusetts; the cities of New York, 
Washington, DC, and Baltimore; and thirteen environmental 
groups filed appeals in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in October 2003.42 The three-judge panel 
faced three issues: the standing of the petitioners, EPA’s author-
ity to regulate GHG emissions, and the agency’s decision not to 
establish GHG standards for new vehicles. On July 15, 2005, the 
court of appeals issued three opinions in the case. Two of the 
judges agreed, although on differing grounds, to let stand EPA’s 
position that it lacked the requisite authority. However Judge 
David Tatel issued a lengthy dissent, agreeing with the Mas-
sachusetts position on all grounds. Following the petitioners’ 
request, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari direct-
ing the Appeals Court to forward the case record for its review; 
The Supreme Court heard arguments on November 29, 2006. 
Two important criteria are required to have standing to sue 
the federal government: that at least one petitioner must be able 
to show injury from an actual or imminent action traceable to a 
federal agency and that the injury is one that a court can address.43 
Hence the real underlying issue was whether the impacts of cli-
mate change on a state serve as justification for a suit in federal 
court. A positive finding on this question would mean any state 
could petition the federal government for national action.44
The Supreme Court decision affirmed that, “The harms asso-
ciated with climate change are serious and well recognized.”45 
Massachusetts declared that its harm includes prospective loss 
of coastline that would be caused by the rise in sea level result-
ing from global warming. Because EPA “does not dispute the 
existence of a causal connection between man-made gas emis-
sions and global warming,” and “EPA’s refusal to regulate such 
emissions ‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’ injuries,” the Plain-
tiffs satisfied the traceability requirements.46
Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens summa-
rized three important holdings: (1) As quasi-sovereigns, states 
are entitled to an elevated level of deference on standing issues; 
(2) CO2 and other GHGs are “air pollutants”; and (3) EPA’s 
reasons for not regulating GHG emissions were insufficient.47 
Four justices dissented (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito), 
arguing that states did not have any special rights of status and 
that nothing the Court could do would address the injuries com-
plained of because “any decrease in emissions here will be over-
whelmed many times over by emissions increases elsewhere in 
the world.”48
In his assessment, Justice Stevens quoted climate scientist 
Michael MacCraken who argued that the harms associated with 
climate change are serious and well recognized. Also citing a 
National Research Council assessment, which EPA itself regards 
as an “objective and independent assessment of the relevant 
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science,” a number of environmental changes that have already 
inflicted significant harms were identified, including:
. . . the global retreat of mountain glaciers, reduction in 
snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of rivers 
and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels 
during the 20th century relative to the past few thou-
sand years [and] petitioners allege that this only hints 
at the environmental damage yet to come. According 
to the climate scientist MacCracken, “qualified scien-
tific experts involved in climate change research” have 
reached a “strong consensus” that global warming 
threatens (among other things) a precipitate rise in sea 
levels by the end of the century, and severe and irre-
versible changes to natural ecosystems.49
The Court’s decision changed the legal and political land-
scape. President Bush issued an Executive Order in May 2007 
that directed EPA and the Departments of Transportation, 
Energy, and Agriculture to coordinate in developing possible 
regulatory actions to address emissions from mobile sources 
contributing to global climate change.50 This is a complicated 
process requiring that the EPA assert that the carbon emissions 
endanger public health and welfare under the Clean Air Act. 
While it might seem that this federal-state battle is over, that 
is not the case. Battles between federal agencies, again reflect-
ing economic concerns, were clearly evident in an agency pub-
lic comment on the proposed greenhouse gas rulemaking under 
the Clean Air Act. Comments received from the Secretaries of 
Energy, Agriculture, Commerce, and Transportation—under-
scoring economic concerns—noted:
The EPA staff now has prepared a draft suggesting the 
Clean Air Act can be both workable and effective for 
addressing global climate change by regulating emis-
sions from stationary and mobile sources of virtually 
every kind. Our agencies have serious concerns with 
this suggestion because it does not fairly recognize the 
enormous—and we believe insurmountable—burdens, 
difficulties and costs and likely limited benefits of using 
the Clean Air Act to regulate GHG emissions.51
Consequently OMB advised EPA Administrator Johnson 
that: “The issues raised during interagency review are so signifi-
cant that we have been unable to reach interagency consensus 
in a timely way, and as a result, this draft cannot be considered 
Administration policy.” 52 EPA action to implement the Supreme 
Court decision has been deferred to the new Administration.53 
resolvIng The clImaTe war
The climate wars of the past decades between business and 
government and between federal and state governments have 
inhibited the convergence of four critical factors needed to 
address climate change: (1) advances in science and technology; 
(2) effective application of government regulations and policies; 
(3) adoption of green business practices; and (4) new foreign 
policy initiatives. Overcoming these conflicts requires a differ-
ent government and business approach. Federal interactions with 
business should include GHG regulations, market incentives, 
and collaborative programs; cooperation with state and local 
governments should focus on promoting alternate energy sys-
tems and mitigation and adaptation to climate change; and new 
foreign policies should highlight the need for an energy-climate 
economy, especially with China. 
The use of science as a tool in fueling the climate wars must 
end. Scientific consensus on human-induced climate change is 
now stronger than ever and efforts to undermine, edit, or oth-
erwise discredit scientific reports should end. The focus should 
be on the value of science in helping decision-makers make the 
right decisions. Now more than ever the interface of physical 
and behavior science and economics will be needed to rebuild 
the economy and move society toward more sustainable energy 
systems. Anticipating the importance of this goal, the 1998 
House Committee on Science argued in the report Unlocking 
Our Future: 
While acknowledging the continuing need for science 
and engineering in national security, health, and the 
economy, the challenges we face today cause us to pro-
pose that the scientific and engineering enterprise ought 
to move towards center stage in a fourth role: that of 
helping society make good decisions. We believe this 
role for science will take on increasing importance, 
particularly as we face difficult decisions related to the 
environment.54
Preparing for the presidential election in 2008, dozens of 
organizations prepared hundreds of recommendations for action 
by the new Administration. Overall all of these actions should be 
judged on how well they advance a consensus among business 
and government and end the climate wars of the past decades. 
Three strategic directions for future actions stand out and are 
detailed below.
new buSineSS anD goveRnment appRoacheS on 
Regulating gReenhouSe gaS emiSSionS 
Effective national climate regulations and policies are needed 
to mitigate GHG emissions. A key challenge for the new 
administration will be to launch a new era of government-
industry partnerships. 
Historically, industry has met every new proposed environ-
mental or health regulation with declarations of impending eco-
nomic disaster. In remarks following EPA’s creation in 1970 the 
director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce warned of the poten-
tial collapse of entire industries from pollution regulations.55 
Given the current economic crisis in the auto sector, it is ironic to 
recall Lee Iacocca’s 1972 prediction (quoted by Thomas Fried-
man) that, “If EPA does not suspend the catalytic converter rule, 
it will cause Ford to shut down and would result in reduction of 
GDP by $17 billion, increase unemployment by 800,000, and 
decrease tax receipts of $5 billion all levels of government.”56 
U.S. electric utilities claimed that the cost of meeting the 1990 
Clean Air Act would reach $4–5 billion per year. But by 1996, 
utilities were actually saving $150 million per year due to the 
act. When EPA announced a phase-out of substances that dam-
age the ozone layer, many industries claimed that alternative 
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substances did not exist or were too expensive. In 1993, auto-
mobile manufacturers warned that regulation of chlorofluorocar-
bons (“CFCs”) would increase the price of new cars by up to 
$1,200. Just four years later, the industry admitted that costs of 
following the new rules had declined to as little as $40.57 More 
recently, studies by Roland Hwang and Matt Peak (as quoted by 
Thomas Friedman) “found that the target industries dramatically 
and consistently overestimate the costs that regulations would 
impose on them and dramatically underestimate the innovation 
they would inspire.”58 
In all of these cases the costs of complying with environ-
mental regulations were far lower than industry—and even 
government—estimated that they would be. More recently a 
second perspective on regulations has emerged emphasizing 
potential economic advantages. General Electric’s (“GE’s”) 
2005 “ecomagination” initiative launched the notion that “green 
is green.”59 The GE initiative is part of a broader greening of 
industry as demonstrated by interviews with dozens of key 
industrial leaders60 and a convergence of government and busi-
ness policies moving toward more sustainable behavior.61 For 
example, GE is one of a number of large companies that for the 
first time are energetically advocating national legislation to 
address GHG emissions.62 
The formation of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership 
(“USCAP”) and its proposal for GHG controls further illus-
trate the change of some company attitudes. USCAP mem-
bers include dozens of the world’s largest companies who now 
argue for a mandatory cap-and-trade program and market based 
incentives.63 
Broader support from industry for the USCAP’s business 
approach will depend on exactly how GHG regulations are for-
mulated and implemented. Many companies will want credit for 
their past carbon-reducing actions, many others will be looking 
for incentives before moving forward and many will want equi-
table economic impacts across all business sectors. USCAP’s 
member support for mandatory approaches to GHG reduction is 
at odds with historic business models. Smart business strategies 
will be needed to achieve that goal.
The costs of GHG reductions—and who will bear them—
have always been a concern for policy makers. In 2002, the Bush 
administration saw an economy with a meager 1.6% growth rate 
in GDP as the nation struggled to recover from bursting of the 
high tech bubble and the 9/11 attacks. Even by 2007 the U.S. 
GDP growth rate was only 2.2%. In response to declining hous-
ing markets, GDP growth projections of just 1.9% per year pre-
vailed in 2007. Today in 2009, with the U.S. and international 
economies adjusting to financial collapse in many financial sec-
tors, any scheme for taxing or capping carbon emissions will 
need to include energy-economic models such as those envi-
sioned by green business advocates. But despite a significant 
downturn in the economy, the time is right to launch a new era 
of government-business cooperation whereby GHG regulations 
and green energy initiatives both stimulate the economy while 
reducing GHG emissions, and protect human health and ecosys-
tems for ecological services. 
The new government-business strategy must include 
advancing new technologies, setting carbon limits, facilitat-
ing implementation of other new regulations, and creating 
new incentives for industry. Corporations must put aside tired 
refrains of resisting federal regulations as inherently anti-busi-
ness. Strong federal support to regulate existing GHG emissions 
and to support Research & Development on new technologies 
to reduce GHG emissions is essential. Incentives to do both can 
enhance economic competitiveness and protect the environ-
ment. Both government and business must see the role of envi-
ronmental regulations in a new light recognizing the fallacies of 
past actions. Both government and business, with support from 
non-government organizations and the public, must agree on the 
sense of urgency and work together to implement a new busi-
ness strategy. 
Given today’s economic downturn, former CEA chair 
Michael Boskin’s comment (cited earlier) that an international 
treaty on climate change was a “bet-your-economy decision” 
might in fact be right if viewed as a step toward economic recov-
ery and the launching of a new era of a green economy. 
feDeRal-State coopeRation on ReDucing ghg anD 
aDapting to climate change 
States and cities have been in the lead in developing policies 
to reduce GHG. Past federal-state conflicts need to end and 
new partnerships developed. 
Worldwide power generation is the largest GHG emitter 
generating nearly 10 billion tons of CO2 per year.
64 With over 
8,000 power plants (out of more than 50,000 globally), the U.S. 
accounts for about 2.8 billion tons of CO2 annually—about 
25% of worldwide emissions.65 The U.S. power plants that 
produce the most CO2 are all coal-fired and are located in the 
states with the largest GHG emissions (including the top five of 
Texas, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana).66 These states 
(and many others), through the use of renewable portfolio stan-
dards (“RPS”), are on the front lines in efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions.
Around the country many states are requiring utilities to 
provide specific amounts of power from renewable energy 
sources. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia estab-
lished RPSs by mid-2007.67 By the same time, forty-seven states 
were engaged in state or regional energy planning, forty-one 
had established standards to allow rooftop solar systems and 
other distributed-generation technology to connect to the elec-
tric grid, ten had created energy-efficiency portfolio standards, 
and sixteen had implemented public benefit funds to support 
clean energy programs.68 According to a Pew Center review of 
state RPS  programs, while these standards range from modest 
to ambitious, “the use of renewable energy does deliver sig-
nificant GHG reductions. For instance, Texas is expected to 
avoid 3.3 million tons of CO2 emissions annually with its RPS, 
which requires 2000 megawatts of new renewable generation by 
2009. Increasing a state’s use of renewable energy brings other 
 benefits as well, including job creation, energy security, and 
cleaner air.”69 
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Public and investor support for renewable energy is growing 
as is evident by the 2007 $32 billion buyout of the Texas power 
company TXU Corp. by private equity firms Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts & Co. (“KKR”) and the Texas Pacific Group. TXU had 
been battling environmentalists and others who had been work-
ing to prevent the company from 
more than doubling its fleet of 
coal-fired power plants in Texas. 
Opponents to the expansion 
claimed the new plants would 
drastically increase emissions of 
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, 
mercury, and carbon dioxide. 
As part of their plan to purchase 
Texas electricity provider TXU 
Corp., Texas Pacific Group and 
KKR have agreed to terminate 
the applications for eight of 
TXU’s eleven proposed coal 
plants in Texas and will adopt a 
platform of initiatives that will 
significantly reduce the com-
pany’s environmental impact in 
Texas.70
A short time after the TXU buyout, Kansas became the first 
state to reject a coal-fired power plant solely because of poten-
tial impacts of climate change. Since then, the state has become 
ground zero for a nationwide battle pitting environmental con-
cerns against powerful economic and political interests. Kansas 
now faces legal actions to reverse this decision.71 
Initiation of RPS programs is not the only way that states are 
seeking to reduce GHG emissions and expand economic devel-
opment. Many states have petitioned the federal government for 
action on transportation fuel standards. On the basis of federal 
Clean Air Act provisions that allow California, subject to EPA 
approval, to set anti-pollution standards stricter than those of the 
federal government, the state petitioned EPA for a Clean Air Act 
waiver so that it could require stricter automobile regulations for 
carbon emissions. In December 2007, after the passage of fed-
eral legislation establishing national automotive fuel efficiency 
at 35 mpg, EPA denied the California petition.72 California and 
other states plan to appeal the EPA decision; more legal battles 
are likely in 2009 and beyond. 
Other actions by California underscore the business side 
of GHG reductions. Because of its early commitment to energy 
efficiency and renewable energy, California expected to develop 
nearly 95,600 new jobs and $21 billion in investment to manu-
facture the components of renewable energy systems.73 While 
such forecasts may be delayed by the current economic crises, 
they are nonetheless inevitable as the economy rebounds. Cit-
ies (in the United States and around the world) are also leading 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions. Members of the C-40 group 
of the world’s largest cities are committed to tackling climate 
change and have committed to investing over $1 billion to 
finance energy-saving measures in municipal buildings.74 
Looking ahead, federal-state cooperation must build on two 
key factors: (1) passing appropriate legislation and policies to 
coordinate and reduce GHG emission and (2) developing strat-
egies needed to adapt to climate change. These city and state 
actions highlight shifting environmental and economic base that 
is pushing the United States 
toward “a de facto national 
RPS through a tapestry of 
state-based programs.” 75 
These state actions are chal-
lenging the federal govern-
ment to find constructive and 
supportive ways to help. It is 
therefore not surprising that 
the bipartisan Presidential 
Climate Action Project has 
recommended the creation 
of “a federal-state partner-
ship with $1 billion annual in 
grants to states and commu-
nities to implement climate 
action plans, reform utility 
rates to encourage energy effi-
ciency, and adapt to climate 
change.76 Anticipating the need for federal-state cooperation, a 
new think tank has been launched at Georgetown University’s 
Law Center to develop policies and positions and recommenda-
tions related to state-federal issues. 
Federal-state partnerships must also focus on giving state 
and local leaders the information they need to anticipate and 
adapt to impacts of climate change. A better understanding 
of regional and local impacts of climate change is critical for 
effective decision-making. Given the projected IPCC business 
as usual scenarios for CO2 emissions and recognizing how long 
it might take to implement new mitigation strategies to reduce 
GHG emissions, adaptation may be the most immediate need to 
avoid potential serious impacts. Recognizing this, the National 
Research Council (“NRC”) in 2007 evaluated the many federal 
climate assessments and emphasized the need for better under-
standing of local impacts, better communication of scientific 
results, and more focus on social science issues.77 
These are important conclusions and should impact the 
scope and direction of federal research programs. As the NRC 
evaluation noted, “only $25 million to $30 million of CCSP’s 
[U.S. Climate Change Science Program] $1.7 billion annual 
budget is devoted to such research.”78 “In addition, few social 
scientists are in leadership positions at the participating federal 
agencies, making it difficult for CCSP to increase emphasis in 
this area or to establish links with the academic social science 
community.”79
The NRC report recognized the importance of communi-
cating scientific results to decision makers and urged a closer 
examination of the impact of climate change at regional and 
local scales.80 “More accurate models, better regional observa-
tions, and the development of impact scenarios will be required 
Federal-state cooperation 
must build on two key 
factors: passing appropriate 
legislation and policies to 
coordinate and reduce GHG 
emission and developing 
strategies needed to adapt 
to climate change.
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to improve predictions of how climate change will affect smaller 
spatial scales.”81 The preparation by CCSP of twenty-one sepa-
rate assessment reports prompted Pew Center Director Eileen 
Claussen to note that everything is fragmented “so we never 
get a clear picture.”82 Anticipating the extra financial burden on 
states, cities, and the general population necessary to regulate 
greenhouse emissions, decision makers at all levels are going to 
need a clear understanding of potential impacts.83
One recent EPA study highlights the economic impact on 
states of anticipating and adapting to climate change. Mun-
dane as it might be, wastewater-collection systems or combined 
sewer systems (“CSSs”) are major systems designed to collect 
municipal wastewater and storm water runoff. These systems 
are prevalent in older cities, particularly in the Midwest, the 
Great Lakes, and the eastern United States. These systems can 
overflow if they lack adequate capacity to transport the com-
bined volume of municipal wastewater and storm water during 
extreme or frequent storm events, resulting in combined sewer 
overflow (“CSO”) events. Current regulatory standards allow 
for four CSO incidents per year.84 With predicted enhanced pre-
cipitation patterns in the Great Lakes, this number of overflow 
events is likely to be exceeded. This is important because today 
states face the issues of how to strategically invest billions of 
dollars into developing more robust and sustainable urban water 
and wastewater systems. The answer is clearly related to devel-
oping an integrated urban sustainability approach that includes 
climate-change scenarios. EPA is currently assessing how such 
climate change can impact future urban water and wastewater 
systems. This kind of analysis is essential to help decision mak-
ers at state and local levels make better decisions. The above 
example underscores the impact of climate changes at state 
and local levels and highlights the need for a major infusion of 
research to better quantify potential impacts and the most appro-
priate adaptation measures. 
inteRnational coopeRation anD a new uniteD 
StateS-china paRtneRShip
Overcoming historical barriers between developed and 
developing countries will require new ways of identifying 
those barriers and proposing solutions. The timing may be 
right for a U.S.–China initiative targeting specific reductions 
of GHG emissions. Such a bilateral agreement would change 
the international landscape for climate negotiations.
The negotiations that led to the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change in 1992 were tortuous, as the developing nations 
blamed the rich nations for the existing problems and demanded 
compensation. But in the end an agreement was reached based 
on the principle of differential responsibilities among nations: 
each country would act according to its own needs but indus-
trial countries would do more than developing ones. The Kyoto 
Protocol set binding GHG emission reductions targets for thirty-
seven industrialized countries and the European Community. 
These targets averaged five percent below 1990 levels over the 
five-year period 2008–2012. Arguing that China, India, and 
other critical emitters should make firm commitments as well 
as the more industrialized countries, the United States did not 
sign the protocol, contributing to a stalemate that still exists. In 
a 2008 policy paper, China reiterated its position that developed 
nations have done the most damage to the planet historically 
and should therefore bear the most responsibility.85 Recogniz-
ing that its reliance on coal for energy makes GHG emission 
reductions especially difficult, China argues for the transfer to 
developing nations of high-technology equipment for reducing 
GHG emissions. 
While its economy today is in turmoil, China is expected to 
possess the world’s largest economy by 2050, followed by the 
EU, the United States, and India.86 As economic forces drive a 
good deal of the climate debate, it is clear that the United States 
and Chinese economies will shape future international agree-
ments. China already surpasses the United States as the greatest 
GHG emitter.87 Since more than fifty percent of global GHG 
emissions are produced by the United States, China, and the 
EU—with another fifteen percent coming from Russia, India, 
and Japan—these countries can effectively determine future 
global energy and climate policies.
Although the United States and other industrialized coun-
tries bear historic responsibility for existing GHG concen-
trations, as Joshua Bushy notes, China “will be increasingly 
fingered as a climate culprit in the future,” potentially creating a 
common interest between the United States and China in avoid-
ing global condemnation as “climate villains. Today’s economic 
and environmental stresses present an opportunity for mutually 
reinforcing, positive outcomes if the United States and China 
help each other tackle immediate environmental problems and 
longer-term GHG emissions. A creative U.S.-China energy and 
security policy could benefit both countries.” 88
China’s leaders know that their nation’s current path is not 
sustainable and are keenly aware of the need to advance science 
and technology and to develop a green economy. China recog-
nizes the public health benefits of reducing GHGs and air pollut-
ants (such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and fine particles). 
Citing data obtained from Chinese officials, Elizabeth Economy 
and Kenneth Lieberthal report that environmental degradation 
and pollution cost the Chinese economy the equivalent of ten 
percent of its GDP annually—as much as US$36 billion from 
lack of water to run factories, US$13 billion from the degrada-
tion of health impact of acid rain, and US$6 billion from the 
spread of desert regions.89 
It is also apparent to China’s leaders that the impacts of cli-
mate change within China could exacerbate internal political and 
social stresses and hence tend to undermine the nation’s political 
stability.90 Not only is China in transition from being a develop-
ing to becoming a developed nation, but it is also moving from 
a centrally directed economy to one strongly driven by market 
forces. In the words of Economy and Lieberthal, Chinese offi-
cials have the daunting task of shifting “from a planned socialist 
economy to an entrepreneurial market economy while maintain-
ing one-party rule.”91 
For the United States, a bilateral agreement with China 
could serve to foster other cooperative actions among developed 
14wInTer 2009
and developing nations while helping to avoid potential trade 
and other economic conflicts. But if not handled wisely, climate 
change could be a source of serious U.S.-China conflict. Joshua 
Busby has pointed to relevant strategic issues: “A climate bill 
currently before Congress would allow the president, if he or she 
deems a country’s climate efforts to be inadequate, to impose 
tariff-like fees on carbon-intensive imports such as steel begin-
ning in 2019. Such legislation, if passed, would probably be used 
against China, adding to existing frictions over trade, intellectual 
property, and the level of China’s currency.”92 
Given the available benefits for both the United States and 
China, what strategy would best serve the United States? Jona-
than Wiener has recently argued that the United States should 
appeal to China’s national interest as the best way forward in 
advancing a new partnership.93 Wiener argues that demanding 
that China fulfill a perceived moral obligation to limit its GHG 
emissions would be ineffective, and that the United States would 
be wiser to emphasize China’s own interests—the possibility of 
reducing climate change damages to itself and its allies, securing 
public health benefits from reducing air pollution, and avoiding 
domestic political upheaval that may be associated with extreme 
climate events.94
A new U.S.-China partnership should therefore first focus 
on actions and new technologies that address a broad range of 
gases and pollutants that are both short-lived (days to weeks) 
and long-lived (years and decades) in the atmosphere and of gas-
ses that will likely contribute to greenhouse warming. Different 
GHGs impact the environment in different manners: for exam-
ple, the impact of methane on global warming is 62 times the 
impact of CO2 and that of nitrous oxide is 116 times that of CO2. 
Regulating these gases must therefore be a crucial aspect of any 
climate change strategy, especially for China. Based on data in 
EPA’s Global Anthropogenic Emissions of Non-CO2 Green-
house Gases report, in 2005, China’s estimated anthropogenic 
methane emissions ranked first in the world. Approximately 
twenty-five percent of its anthropogenic methane emissions—
209.9 MMTCO2E—come from agriculture (manure manage-
ment), coal mines, landfills, and natural gas and oil systems.95 
China is also the world’s biggest emitter of sulfur dioxide. 
According to China’s own data, coal and oil-fired power stations 
were responsible for twenty-five million tons sulfide dioxide that 
it discharged in 2005, contributing to acid rain that affected a 
third of the country.96 
Wiener suggests that these considerations point to an 
 ongoing shift in Chinese climate policy and to the possibility 
that an international climate treaty could offer positive incen-
tives to engage China in cooperative action. The United States 
thus has an opportunity and an imperative to engage China in 
what Wiener describes as “effective action on climate change 
through realist persuasion—appeal to global and national 
 interests, and global and national net benefits.”97 In political and 
 environmental terms, a new U.S.–China initiative with objec-
tives of developing and testing new technologies to control a 
wide range of pollutants and GHGs could advance new alter-
nate technologies, sharing the economic costs and benefits of a 
new strategy for climate and energy. With both countries poised 
to invest hundreds billions in economic recovery, the timing 
is right for mutually re-enforcing efforts on promoting green 
infrastructure. 
concluSionS
Future GHG emission and climate change scenarios are not 
optimistic. Global emissions of carbon dioxide grew at a rate 
of about 1.4% per year in the 1992 to 2002 time period. Recent 
data show an acceleration of emission: 3.3% in the 2000 to 2006 
period. China’s major expansion of its coal-fired power genera-
tion capacity has been the key factor in this unexpected accelera-
tion in growth rate. Looking ahead it is impossible to have an 
effective global mitigation program without a serious commit-
ment by the major economies like the United States and China.
If current emission trends continue at three percent per year 
for the next twenty-two years, the projected warming will yield 
a best-guess average warming, relative to 1990, of 1.8°C in 
2050 and 4.4°C in 2100. Since it is too late to prevent substan-
tial additional warming, the world community has no alternative 
other than to pursue both mitigation and adaptation approaches 
aggressively.
Effectively pursing a mitigation and adaptation strategy 
requires resolution of past climate wars. Fortunately many if 
not all of the climate wars of the 2001–2008 period are moving 
toward resolution. To be sure, the cost and methods of reduc-
ing GHG emissions will continue to raise contentious questions, 
especially in the current stage of global financial and economic 
distress. However, a positive vision of the future is possible: it 
would include enhanced support for technology research and 
development, collaboration between government and business, 
cooperation among different levels of government, and foreign 
policy initiatives that combine environmental concerns and 
economic goals to build an innovative and resilient economy. 
By taking such actions and ending the climate wars, the United 
States can lead the way to protect the world’s environment and 
stimulate the global economy. 
The author is grateful to Michael MacCracken, Rob Brenner, 
Frank Princiotta, Gordon Binder, Jonathan Wiener, and Edward 
Fallon for their helpful comments. 
Endnotes: Resolving the Climate Wars
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poznan´ climate confeRence 2008
by Kyle Ingram* & Matt Irwin**
*Kyle Ingram is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, and **Matt Irwin is a J.D. candi-
date, May 2009, at American University, Washington College of Law.
The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Poznan´, Poland (“Poznan´ Conference”) lasted from December 1–12, 2008. The Poznan´ Conference included the fourteenth Conference of the Parties (“COP 14”) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) and fourth Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(“COP/MOP 4”).1 The Conference was intended to be a significant milestone in global cooperation on climate change, marking the 
progress between the start of negotiations in Bali in 2007 and the conclusion of negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009.2 These 
negotiations are meant to develop a framework for the international community to combat climate change in the post-Kyoto Protocol 
world, as Kyoto expires in 2012.3 Commentators have given varying accounts of the degree to which the Poznan´ Conference solidified 
the chance for a successful climate agreement in Copenhagen. Some argue that the Poznan´ Conference was a productive point in the 
negotiation process, while others contend that it signified a failure of the developed world to take a serious step towards lowering green-
house gas (“GHG”) emissions and cooperate with the developing world.4
Endnotes: Poznan´ Climate Conference 2008 continued on page 67
aDaptation funD
The Adaptation Fund negotiations are considered the 
only concrete achievement to come out of the Poznan´ Con-
ference.5 The Adaptation Fund distributes money to poorer, 
developing countries for use to guard against the adverse 
effects of climate change.6 The Adaptation Fund has been 
considered a success because developing countries will have 
access to funds by the next year.7 However, at $80 million the 
fund is currently too small to fully accomplish the imposing 
task of protecting poorer countries from the harmful environ-
mental and economic impacts of climate change.8 
To increase the size of the Fund, developing countries 
proposed that money should be added to the fund not only 
from the current two percent levy on carbon trading under 
the UN Clean Development Mechanism, but also other forms 
of carbon trading not currently covered by the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism.9 Developed and developing countries 
could not reach a compromise to increase funding sources for 
the Adaptation Fund at the Poznan´ Conference, so the issue 
remains for resolution in Copenhagen.10 
emiSSionS ReDuction anD DefoReStation
Parties came to Poznan´ with hopes of advancing the 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degrada-
tion Plan, or REDD.14 Unfortunately, no official agreement 
on the subject was reached.15 There were, however, several 
promising statements made by individual countries regard-
ing both emissions reduction and reducing deforestation. For 
example, Mexico agreed to cut emissions fifty percent below 
2002 levels by 2050; Brazil promised a seventy percent cut in 
its annual deforestation rate by 2017; South Africa initiated a 
program to cap its carbon emissions by 2025, and the Euro-
pean Union said it will increase its commitment to cut GHG 
emissions from a twenty percent reduction to a thirty percent 
reduction by 2020 if a global agreement is reached.16
technology tRanSfeR anD finance
Delegates adopted the Global Environment Facility’s 
Poznan´ Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer for 
developing countries, which will be funded by C= 50 million 
from the UN Global Environmental Facility.11 This program 
will increase the level of investment by leveraging private 
investments necessary for developing countries to implement 
both mitigation and adaptation technologies.12 Without tech-
nology transfer programs such as this, the developing world 
would not be able to afford meaningful advances in meeting 
the climate change challenge.13
founDation foR copenhagen
Many important issues that could have been resolved in 
Poznan´, including the division of responsibilities to cut GHG 
emissions between rich and poor nations, tropical defores-
tation, and sharing clean technology with developing coun-
tries, were left to be decided at the Copenhagen Conference 
of the Parties.17 Thus, the negotiations in Copenhagen will 
have no firm basis from Poznan´ to build upon. Despite the 
lack of concrete agreements or achievements resulting from 
the Poznan´ Conference, it remains vitally important to create 
a global commitment to combat climate change in Copen-
hagen later this year. The urgency of such an agreement can 
be best summarized by Amjad Abdulla, a delegate from the 
Maldives in Poznan´, “We are really disappointed with the 
progress we are seeing in Poznan´ . . . . We are drowning, and 
there is this huge gap in commitment.”18
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InTroDucTIon
Carbon capture and sequestration (“CCS”) is receiv-ing new and intense focus globally, driven by climate change and potential economic benefits. At an energy 
symposium this past December, the Australian Government 
announced its $100 million commitment to the Global Carbon 
Capture and Storage Institute.1 
In so doing, Australia noted 
that by 2030, global energy 
demand is estimated to rise by 
fifty-five percent, with emis-
sions of sixty-two gigatons 
(“GT”) globally, thus empha-
sizing the need for an increase 
in CCS efforts worldwide.2 
Echoing these sentiments, 
a number of research initia-
tives have begun in the United 
States, highlighted by the Regional Carbon Sequestration Part-
nerships, sponsored by the Department of Energy (“DOE”).3 
President Barack Obama has also emphasized the need for 
CCS, including in his energy plan the intent to “instruct DOE 
to enter into public-private partnerships to develop 5 ‘first-of-a-
kind’ commercial scale coal-fired plants with carbon capture and 
sequestration.”4 While this research is identifying effective tech-
nologies to make CCS a practical reality, it has not yet broached 
the legal and regulatory challenges associated with large-scale 
CCS projects to substantively reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions.
That these questions remained unanswered reveals the com-
plicated legal truths regarding CCS—any project must navigate 
a complicated web of state and federal property rights issues, 
address public safety concerns, and develop risk mitigation 
measures to ensure long-term efficacy. Thus far, no one in the 
United States has taken the lead to establish a legal and regula-
tory framework for CCS.
As one of the largest producers of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) 
emissions in the United States, California is prominently posi-
tioned to lead the way in setting CCS precedents on a regional 
basis. Given California’s historical position on the vanguard of 
environmental issues, it is likely that its involvement in the CCS 
discussion will also have a formative effect on establishing the 
national legal and regulatory framework necessary for efficient, 
effective, and successful geologic CCS (“GCCS”).
aSSeSSing the challengeS of geologic caRbon 
captuRe anD SequeStRation: 
a califoRnia guiDe to the coSt of ReDucing co2 emiSSionS
by Les Lo Baugh* & William L. Troutman**
*Les Lo Baugh (llobaugh@fulbright.com) is the head of Fulbright & Jawor-
ski L.L.P.’s West Coast Environmental Practice Group, based in Los Angeles. He 
advises clients on energy, environmental, and corporate matters. **William L. 
Troutman (wtroutman@fulbright.com) is an associate in the Environmental Prac-
tice Group of Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P. in Los Angeles. His practice focuses on 
a wide range of environmental regulatory, transactional, and litigation matters.
Accordingly, this article considers the legal risks inherent 
in CCS projects through the lens of California law, focusing 
on GCCS.5 Because the law of GCCS is undeveloped, many of 
the considerations discussed are directly applicable to assessing 
legal risk in other jurisdictions. Ultimately, surveying the many 
issues that impact such risk may help eliminate barriers to large-
scale, commercially viable GCCS 
projects that are necessary to 
meaningfully reduce GHG emis-
sions, regionally, nationally, and 
internationally.
First, the article provides a 
brief overview of the mechanics 
of GCCS. Then the article iden-
tifies and discusses one of the 
fundamentals to assessing GCCS 
risk—ownership. Next, it analyzes 
potential liabilities confronting 
any GCCS project in California, drawing on legal principles that 
are readily analogous to other jurisdictions. Finally, it proposes 
some mechanisms to manage the risks associated with GCCS.
The basIcs oF geologIc carbon capTure  
anD seQuesTraTIon
As the name implies, GCCS involves the capture and 
sequestration of CO2 for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. 
Simply put, CO2 must first be captured, pre-combustion, post-
combustion, or by oxy-firing combustion.6 It then must be stored 
permanently (in contrast to enhanced oil recovery (“EOR”), in 
which CO2 is not sequestered permanently).
Three basic forms of CCS exist: (1) terrestrial sequestration, 
involving trees, grasses, soils, or algae; (2) deep-sea sequestra-
tion, involving containment and dissolving in deep oceans; and 
(3) geologic CCS. GCCS utilizes underground reservoirs, such 
as depleted oil and gas fields, saline aquifers, and un-mineable 
coal seams. Research efforts thus far show that GCCS in saline 
formations has the greatest near-term potential to reduce GHG 
emissions, although the legal and regulatory challenges are 
California is prominently 
positioned to lead the way 
in setting CCS precedents 
on a regional basis.
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great.7 However, geologic sequestration is not new. Millions of 
tons of CO2 are injected each year. Projects such as Statoil at 
Sleipner, BP at In Salah, and the EnCana EOR project have been 
operating for years.
The process of GCCS begins with capturing CO2 from fossil-
fuel power plants, cement plants, petroleum refineries, etc.8 The 
gas stream is then scrubbed, resulting in virtually pure CO2.
9 It 
is then compressed and cooled to 
a supercritical state, during which 
it exhibits characteristics of both 
liquid and gas.10 Once supercriti-
cal, the CO2 is transported to the 
injection site by truck (pipelines 
are expected once commercial 
projects get started).11
Once at the injection site, 
the captured, purified, and com-
pressed CO2 is injected through 
wells into “pore space” deep 
below the surface of one or more 
cap rock formations.12 Pore space 
consists of porous sedimentary 
rock layers, formed from sand, 
mud, or ancient shells, that allow 
the passage of fluids.13 Sedimen-
tary rock occurs in layers, flanked 
by other layers of impermeable rock, such as mudstone and 
clay.14 These impermeable layers trap water, oil, and gas beneath 
and between them.15 Depths of between 3,000 and 15,000 feet 
are generally considered ideal for GCCS because pore space 
at that depth is often comprised of saline aquifers, containing 
ancient, trapped saltwater with high levels of dissolved solids.16 
The water in these deep saline reservoirs is considered com-
mercially “useless” because of its depth and contamination.17 In 
deep saline formations, it is theorized that supercritical CO2 will 
flow as a distinct liquid on top, displacing and compressing the 
saline water below it.18 When injection ceases, scientific mod-
els predict that the CO2 will remain hydro-dynamically trapped 
at the top of the aquifer by the cap rock or other impermeable 
layer, remaining in place for thousands of years.19
Estimates put the geologic storage capacity in saline forma-
tions in the United States at a vast 3,300 to 12,000 billion metric 
tons.20 In California alone, DOE estimates the storage space in 
deep saline formations to be between 76 and 303 billion metric 
tons.21 To put this in perspective, California emits an estimated 
104 million metric tons of CO2 per year.
22 Thus, the poten-
tial impact on reducing these emissions into the atmosphere is 
great—but not without legal challenges.
gccs ownershIp Issues
Because of the long-term nature of GCCS, ownership issues 
regarding real property interests and long-term liability are criti-
cal and unique, centered on the question of pore space.23 In many 
regions, the law of ownership regarding subsurface mineral and 
water rights is well developed. However, no clear answers exist 
as to the ownership of pore space.24 This issue is slowly being 
addressed at the state level, as Wyoming, Texas, and Illinois 
have recently enacted statutory provisions regarding pore space 
and liability, but only for specific CCS purposes.25 The appli-
cation of the concept of the “negative rule of capture,” and its 
associated statutory provisions, are also untested in the GCCS 
context.26
In California, the surface 
owner generally owns the 
rights to property below the 
surface, “to the center of the 
earth, and above the surface 
to the heavens.”27 Thus, if the 
surface and subsurface rights 
have not been severed, the pore 
space should remain with the 
surface owner. However, cir-
cumstances exist in which the 
perceived public interest is sub-
stantial and the potential prop-
erty use is limited by practical 
considerations. For instance, 
airplanes enter airspace above 
property at a safe altitude with-
out it constituting a trespass. 
Access to navigable water 
and shorelines is treated similarly. As such, the public interest 
aspects of GCCS may affect ownership as GCCS becomes a 
more integral part of climate change solutions.
Similarly, the issue of ownership of pore space for CCS 
purposes has not been determined by either legislative action 
or express judicial decisions. The recent report and model rules 
released by the Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Commission, as 
well as numerous statements by various parties, including Cali-
fornia state entities, have taken the position that the ownership 
of such pore space, particularly in saline formations as opposed 
to hydrocarbon formations, is undetermined.28
While no California court has explicitly vested pore space 
ownership in the surface owner of a severed estate for CCS pur-
poses, absent legislative action or “judicial activism,” it appears 
that the better argument is that pore space ownership resides 
with the surface owner and generally remains so even if mineral 
rights are severed. A surface owner who has conveyed its min-
eral rights and severed the estate, 
own[s] nearly all rights in the land except for the exclu-
sive right to drill for and produce oil, gas and other 
hydrocarbons. The owners of the mineral estate . . . 
typically hold only the very limited right . . . to drill 
and capture subsurface oil and gas, and the incidental 
rights necessary to accomplish this. Thus . . . the les-
see generally obtains only a nonpossessory interest in 
real property to capture such substances, which is in the 
nature of an easement.29
Accordingly, absent express language in the mineral grant, 
pore space ownership “should” likely remain with the surface 
Because of the  
long-term nature of GCCS, 
ownership issues 
regarding real property 
interests and long-term 
liability are critical  
and unique, centered on 
the question of pore space.
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owner despite severance; however, the wording of the opera-
tive agreements must be evaluated to determine whether or not 
a broader conveyance occurred than is typical. This conclusion 
is supported by a number of cases in other jurisdictions address-
ing ownership of storage space for natural gas.30 Gas storage 
cases in Texas, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Mich-
igan have all stated that the surface owner, and not a mineral 
rights holder, retains ownership of pore space.31 Nonetheless, 
even assuming a court of first instance applied the above logic 
to GCCS, a risk of tort liability remains on severed estates if the 
mineral rights are not also acquired prior to injection, as migrat-
ing or escaping CO2 could allegedly interfere with the mineral 
rights, as discussed below.
rIsks oF ownershIp anD operaTIon oF a  
ccs projecT In calIFornIa
The focus of the experimental and pilot GCCS projects is 
the validation of the scientific models. While awaiting this vali-
dation, however, various risks must be evaluated. The first con-
cern for a developer, for obvious reasons, is what happens if it 
is alleged that injected CO2 does not remain sequestered in the 
manner expected. At the same time, a number of non-release 
legal risks also exist, even if captured CO2 behaves as theorized. 
Whatever the cause, a GCCS project may encounter tort, nui-
sance, negligence, and/or strict liability claims. The more liti-
gious the culture of the jurisdiction, the more likely such issues 
will be raised even in circumstances where GCCS performs to 
optimal expectations.
liability fRom ReleaSe eventS
In most circumstances, these liabilities will likely result if 
there is unexpected behavior of captured CO2, such as migra-
tion offsite from the saline injection reservoir into a linked adja-
cent subsurface saline reservoir, where the pore space is located 
within a larger saline reservoir that extends to other estates. 
Theoretically, in some circumstances, CO2 could also migrate 
through new faults or fractures into an unlinked adjacent subsur-
face saline reservoir; an adjacent hydrocarbon or mineral forma-
tion; groundwater; other adjacent subsurface strata; or onto the 
surface itself.32
If a GCCS site was not selected properly, theoretically, 
captured CO2 might also react unexpectedly in the designated 
property, leading to potential liability if all surface and subsur-
face rights for the injection area had not been acquired. In those 
circumstances, CO2 might migrate into other unacquired saline, 
hydrocarbon, or other mineral formations under the designated 
property. CO2 might also migrate into other subsurface strata or 
groundwater stores under the designated property, or onto the 
unacquired surface at or near the injection point.33
While all of these possibilities might result in allegations 
of liability, the area of greatest concern would likely be from 
allegations of migration into hydrocarbon or other mineral for-
mations, groundwater,34 and onto the surface,35 rather than from 
migration within the deep saline aquifer under adjacent property. 
This is due to the likely absence of any provable legal damages 
resulting from a theoretical CO2 migration, as discussed below.
If a release of CO2 from the injection reservoir did occur for 
whatever reason, this could theoretically expose a GCCS project 
to allegations for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liabil-
ity for operation of an ultrahazardous activity. While no Califor-
nia court has addressed these issues for GCCS, analogues exist 
within other subject areas, as well as in other jurisdictions.
tReSpaSS
Trespass is the “‘unauthorized entry’ onto the land of 
another,” regardless of motive.36 A trespass may be permanent 
or continuing, with a continuing trespass constituting a series of 
separate injuries that can be discontinued or abated.37 The classi-
fication as one or the other impacts statute of limitations issues, 
as well as potential damages amounts.38
While no California court has addressed subsurface trespass 
in the GCCS context, when injecting waste fluids, “causing sub-
surface migration of fluids into a mineral estate without consent 
constitutes a trespass.”39 However, courts may not hold CO2 
injection directly analogous to waste fluid injection, and migra-
tion into a saline aquifer may not be treated the same as a migra-
tion into a mineral estate. More importantly, as discussed below, 
because deep saline aquifers have no value for mineral extrac-
tion or groundwater use, courts may find no damages.
In the event damages are found, the general measure is that 
“which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused 
thereby whether it could have been anticipated or not.”40 If a tres-
pass is permanent, all past and future damages are recoverable 
in one action.41 In instances of trespass for subsurface migra-
tion of fluids into a mineral estate, a normal measure of damages 
for trespass is the reasonable rental value of the property during 
the course of the trespass.42 However, courts have flexibility and 
award the deterioration in the market value of the mineral estate, 
the costs of disposing of the substances causing the trespass, and 
the unjust enrichment enjoyed by the injector.43
nuiSance
Under California law, a nuisance is an interference with the 
use and enjoyment of a property right.44 This interference must 
constitute unreasonable conduct that causes substantial harm.45 
As with trespass, a nuisance can be permanent or continuing.46 
If a nuisance is permanent, a party may only bring one action to 
recover all damages, including anticipated future damages.47
A plaintiff may seek either injunctive relief or damages in 
connection with a nuisance.48 The measure of damages, like 
those for trespass, is “the amount which will compensate for all 
the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have 
been anticipated or not.”49 A plaintiff may recover damages for 
annoyance, discomfort, inconvenience, and mental suffering, 
even absent physical damage.50 If a nuisance is intentional, a 
court may award punitive or exemplary damages.51 Damages 
may also consider diminution of the property value.52 If a nui-
sance is continuing and can be abated, a plaintiff may seek an 
injunction and damages accruing prior to the abatement. If the 
nuisance continues, a plaintiff may bring successive actions for 
additional damages, so long as any prior award of damages did 
not include anticipated future damages.53
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negligence
A party is liable in California for negligence for injuries 
caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care given the cir-
cumstances.54 Damages can be compensatory to “[restore] the 
plaintiff as nearly as possible to his or her former position, 
or [give] some pecuniary equivalent,” as well as punitive.55 
Although the reasonable care standard is not judicially devel-
oped, it is expected that a court will consider the public benefit 
of sequestration in imposing a duty, in addition to the traditional 
negligence considerations of foreseeability, extent of harm, and 
causation.56 This consideration will analyze the consequences to 
the public of the imposed duty, as well as the social utility of the 
activity.57 The public policy aspects of CCS are in an evolution-
ary stage. 
StRict liability
Under California law, strict liability is imposed for ultrahaz-
ardous activities (“UHA”), defined as “certain activities [that] 
create such a serious risk of danger that it is justifiable to place 
liability for the loss on the person engaging in them, regardless 
of lack of culpability.”58 Classification of UHAs differs from 
nuisance activities because UHAs are lawful and cannot be abat-
ed.59 Strict liability for UHAs is limited only to harm within the 
scope of the abnormal risk created, and applies only to the class 
of persons exposed to the abnormal risk.60
Because of these factors, a court must individually analyze 
the factual scenario for a claim to determine if the “risk created 
is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the 
circumstances . . . as to justify the imposition of strict liability 
from the harm that results . . . even though it is carried on with 
all reasonable care.”61 Because strict liability is a theory of tort 
recovery, compensatory and punitive damages are the appropri-
ate remedies, as applicable.62
Thus, the question of GCCS as a UHA is unique to each 
project. GCCS by its nature does not appear to pose an abnormal 
risk. However, as is commonly said, “bad facts make bad law.” 
If unfortunate circumstances occurred, potential exists for the 
law to evolve in an unanticipated manner.
Select conSiDeRationS impacting liability
Released CO2: The Question of Damages
Although unexpected migration of CO2 may technically 
constitute a tort, an open question exists as to proving damages. 
While no California court has directly addressed damages in 
CO2 sequestration, courts have decided the issue in the context 
of subsurface injection of fluids, which has analogues in oil, 
gas, and hazardous waste injection case law, both in California 
and in other jurisdictions. Accordingly, if no identifiable dam-
age exists, a claim for unauthorized subsurface migration may 
fail. In the controlling California case on subsurface migration, 
Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. of California, injected waste water 
ultimately migrated into plaintiff’s mineral estate, resulting in 
“widespread damage throughout a large oil, gas and mineral 
field.”63 Because this injection interfered with plaintiff’s right 
to extract commodities, the court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s award of rental value for the trespass—the market price 
for the cost of wastewater injection.64
If courts adopt this reasoning, which seems most appropri-
ate, no damages should exist absent interference with another’s 
mineral rights. Given that GCCS injects CO2 into deep saline 
reservoirs, presumed to be devoid of any extractable minerals of 
value, the resulting encroachment within the saline reservoir on 
an adjoining estate should fail for lack of damages. Similarly, if 
the injected CO2 migrates into unacquired strata on the acquired 
property containing no commodities, no damage should result.
These conclusions are consistent with the Ohio case Chance 
v. BP Chemicals, Inc.,65 which establishes the precedent oft cited 
by GCCS prognosticators that no damage exists for subsurface 
migration of materials into adjacent landowners property absent 
a reasonable and foreseeable use of the subsurface by the adja-
cent landowner.66
GCCS Permitting Probably Will Not Yield a Permit 
Shield Defense
Currently, the injection of CO2 will require a permit under 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water 
Act (“SDWA”).67 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) has recently proposed a new class of well under SDWA 
(Class VI) and minimum technical criteria for injection of 
CO2.
68 This new permit would require adherence to a number 
of regulations aimed at preventing CO2-related contamination of 
underground drinking water.69 This begs the question of whether 
permitting of GCCS projects will protect an operator from 
liability in the event of a release with a “permit shield.”70 An 
examination of SDWA reveals that operators should expect no 
such defense, as SDWA does not contain the required specific 
language providing for a permit shield defense. Even if such a 
defense was clearly articulated in the statute, courts generally 
interpret permit shields to protect a permittee only from civil 
and criminal penalties assessed through a citizen suit or govern-
ment action, and not common law claims such as trespass and 
nuisance.71
liabilitieS foR non-ReleaSe eventS
Unlike the risks of release of CO2, these liabilities represent 
possible costs to a GCCS project before initiation and/or even if 
captured CO2 remains sequestered as expected.
Environmental Permitting Challenges
In efforts to obtain appropriate permits and regulatory clear-
ance on the state and federal level, a GCCS project may face 
significant and costly litigation before getting off of the ground. 
These costs most likely will come by way of challenges to per-
mits required for compliance with SDWA and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) on the federal level, the 
California Environmental Quality Action (“CEQA”) on the state 
level, and other local regulations.
It is difficult to predict the form of a challenge to a GCCS 
project’s SDWA permitting, as EPA issued proposed rules for 
GCCS that have not yet been finalized (discussed above). In the 
interim, a challenge to a GCCS permit could come pursuant to 
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a formal EPA guidance document issued to EPA staff and all 
EPA Regions covering issuance of permits for geologic seques-
tration under the existing SDWA regulations for underground 
injection.72 While it is arguable that noncompliance with such a 
document could support some action by EPA, it is unlikely that 
a private party could avail itself of noncompliance with the guid-
ance documents.73
The more likely challenge to a CO2 injection permit would 
come directly from NEPA claims in federal court and CEQA 
claims in state court. This is a particularly perilous aspect of the 
process, as the analysis of the environmental impact of the injec-
tion plan will come under public scrutiny for the first time when 
the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), under NEPA, 
or the Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”), under CEQA, is 
prepared. Given the developing 
nature of GCCS, a project may 
be particularly vulnerable, espe-
cially in litigious jurisdictions, 
during the EIS/EIR process in the 
event that a litigious private party 
or environmental group desires to 
slow or prevent the development 
of GCCS technology and proj-
ects.74 These costs and/or delays 
are certainly possible even if an 
operator meticulously adheres to 
NEPA or CEQA requirements, such as the adequate discussion 
of alternatives and cumulative impacts, and avoidance of project 
segmentation.
Similarly, it is not unusual for the construction of a well 
to require a permit pursuant to county or city ordinances. For 
instance, under the Police Powers provisions of the California 
State Constitution and in other jurisdictions, local agencies may 
require permit conditions that have a reasonable relationship to 
the purpose of the permit.75 Thus, methods of construction, as 
long as they are consistent with the requirements of the State 
Department of Gas, Oil & Geothermal Resources, may be part 
of the local permit. A challenge to these permits would also 
likely come under CEQA.
Geologic Sequestration and Injection Versus  
Allegedly Induced Seismic Activity
A number of reported instances of seismic activity induced 
by large scale human activities exist, such as underground 
nuclear explosions and construction projects.76 Allegations of 
geothermal plant activity resulting in seismic activity during 
the 1990s in California did not apparently result in any finan-
cial awards to potential plaintiffs. In addition, in the 1960s some 
believed injected waste fluid triggered seismic activity in the 
Rocky Mountains, although this was not substantiated. How-
ever, this should not be viewed as a shield to such allegations 
in the future.
Although the depth of the target saline aquifer is generally 
substantially below the level of any seismic activity associated 
with the circumstances above, litigation risk exists because 
California is subject to notable seismic activities and no nexus 
need be proven before litigation is commenced. While the fre-
quency of seismic activity in California could provide opportu-
nities for plaintiffs to allege a nexus between GCCS activities 
and any specific seismicity, the historic background of recurrent 
seismic activity in California may make it difficult for a plaintiff 
to establish causation. If litigated, the general concepts of tort 
liability discussed above would apply.
lookIng ForwarD: The neeD For cerTaInTy
At a minimum, this survey of California law shows that 
given the unknowns, the question of litigation over a project is 
one of “when” and “on what grounds.” However, many poten-
tial GCCS operators may not view themselves as pioneers. 
While prudent contracting and 
operations, along with adequate 
insurance, typically reduce risk 
exposure, the long time horizon 
of sequestration poses unique 
liabilities and responsibilities 
that industry and current legal 
systems appear ill-equipped to 
address. But the chorus of gov-
ernment, industry, and envi-
ronmental voices emphasizing 
GCCS as a climate change solu-
tion seems to argue that allowing a protracted period for courts 
to the develop the applicable law is inconsistent with the public 
interest. Notably, the recently proposed Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act, which contains the Energy Improvement and 
Extension Act, began forcing these issues by providing GCCS 
tax incentives and requiring the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
conjunction with EPA, to establish regulations setting security 
measures to ensure CO2 remains sequestered.
77 This first step 
hopefully will evolve into a substantial and expeditious reso-
lution of these issues. Nevertheless, a number of precedents 
may provide a conceptual basis to address the unique issues of 
sequestration including post-operational issues.
Programs like the Acute Orphan Well Account, the Haz-
ardous and Idle-Deserted Well Abatement Fund, and the Meth-
ane Gas Hazards Reduction Assistance programs may prove as 
 stepping stones to addressing GCCS liability over the expected 
timeline, but they do not provide a shared solution when the 
injector, operator, or owner of the stored substance is financially 
viable.78 These programs also only involve discovery of releases 
during the operational life of a project. Further, they do not cut 
off an operator’s liability after well closure.
Other precedents may serve as more useful models, includ-
ing the Price Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act and 
the National Flood Insurance Program. The former is similar to 
an industry liability pooling plan.79 On the other hand, the latter 
guarantees insurance to at-risk communities.80 Similarly, many 
GCCS commentators have called for government assumption of 
monitoring and liability after a reasonable time, such as 10 years 
following the end of injections.81
A GCCS project may 
encounter tort, nuisance, 
negligence, and/or strict 
liability claims.
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Another important matter for consideration is granting 
operators some form of eminent domain, similar to grants by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or state public utility 
commissions for gas pipelines.82 This would presumably require 
new federal or state legislation, but would greatly reduce lia-
bility risks, project costs, and expedite development of GCCS 
(the lack of such power when it comes to alternative energy 
power lines is an analogous failure of the legal system to adapt 
to changing needs). Of course, much of the concern would dis-
sipate if the migration of CO2 is treated similarly to the state’s 
basis for water regulation and air traffic—that is, absent some 
reasonable expectation of use or actual damage, no claim lies for 
a property owner.
conclusIon
In light of the enormous potential for GCCS to be a useful 
tool in the battle against climate change, thoughtful but expedi-
tious resolution of these issues is clearly in the public interest, 
both nationally and internationally. Unfortunately, legislative 
gridlock and political partisanship have too often been part of 
recent legislative processes. However, the generally accepted 
need to aggressively address the continued massive infusion of 
CO2 into our atmosphere should provide focus and incentives to 
our leaders. Given the need to address GCCS and its associated 
legal obstacles, one can only hope lawmakers move faster than 
hydro-dynamically trapped CO2.
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human RightS anD climate change:  
Shifting the buRDen to the State?
by Anne Parsons*
*Anne Parsons is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University, Washing-
ton College of Law.
In March 2008, the United Nations Human Rights Council passed Resolution 7/23 requesting intergovernmental and international organizations to conduct “a detailed analyti-
cal study on the relationship between climate change and human 
rights.”1 Resolution 7/23 is indicative of the recent global trend 
that incorporates a human rights framework in climate change 
mitigation and adaptation policies.2 
Underlying the human rights approach to climate change is 
the notion that vulnerable populations that contributed little to 
the stocks of carbon emissions that cause global warming, should 
not have to bear the brunt of the burden in addressing global 
climate change.3 Correspondingly, protecting human rights 
will better enable individuals and communities to take steps to 
adapt on their own.4 Under a human rights framework, the state 
is traditionally the duty-bearer, and advocates of a rights-based 
approach to climate change urge governments to integrate cli-
mate change concerns into existing development policies and set 
minimum human rights thresholds around which new mitigation 
and adaptation policies can be developed.5 While the rights-
based approach to climate change raises many useful method-
ological insights, it also raises a fundamental question: how will 
states that currently lack the resources or political will to fulfill 
basic human rights tackle the problem of climate change?
The essential hope of orienting climate policy around human 
rights is that this orientation will generate moral and legal force 
within the global climate change regime.6 To start, it distin-
guishes between “perpetrators” of climate change and “victims” 
of climate change.7 This framing of the relationship has two key 
advantages from a human rights perspective. First, it highlights 
litigation as a viable mechanism for holding reluctant-to-change 
developed nations accountable to their climate change commit-
ments.8 Second, it also helps provide new impetus for wealthier 
nations to assist vulnerable states to adapt by providing resources 
and technology.9 For example, to date, few wealthy countries 
have met the agreed international aid target for adaption fund-
ing, which currently stands at 0.7% of Gross Domestic Prod-
uct.10 In contrast, one study estimated the financing needed for 
“immediate ‘climate proofing’” at between US$1.1 billion and 
US$2.2 billion for least developed countries.11 
At the national level, the logistics of implementing a rights-
based climate change policy are tricky. A rights-based approach 
to climate change takes universally accepted human rights 
norms as minimum thresholds by which to gauge the effects of 
climate change and direct adaptation funding to where it is most 
needed.12 At the same time, these thresholds ensure that the 
policies implemented by governments to address the effect of 
climate change do not themselves infringe upon human rights.13 
A recent total ban on charcoal in the West African country of 
Chad exemplifies the latter point: the government’s response 
to the pressing problem of deforestation has been widely criti-
cized as overly harsh by the public and human rights activists 
alike.14 Paradoxically, then, a human rights approach to climate 
change may be hardest to implement in the countries that need it 
most.15 If a government of a resource-poor state faces a pressing 
environmental concern, the state’s only viable option within the 
human rights framework may be to appeal to the international 
community for aid. 
Ultimately then, whether the human rights framework for 
climate change offers anything new to the states most vulnerable 
to climate change depends on those states’ ability to leverage 
this discourse in negotiations vis-à-vis the international com-
munity. This will require these states to invoke human rights 
discourses in new ways, since human rights have traditionally 
been concerned with the state-individual relationship.16 In the 
past, climate change negotiations have marginalized resource-
poor countries in need of adaptation funding.17 Resource-poor 
states may be able to invoke procedural rights (right to participa-
tion, right to information) as a means of gaining access to these 
negotiations.18 Similarly, asserting the right to development 
may help developing nations articulate their concerns about the 
impacts of climate change on their ability to protect their citi-
zens’ human rights.19 Integral to the human rights framework 
on climate change is the notion that powerful nations should 
recognize developing states’ right to actively participate in the 
development of a global strategy on climate change as both an 
ethical obligation and the only means of attaining a sustainable 
solution.
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InTroDucTIon
Over the last fifteen years, Torres Strait Islanders have successfully fought to obtain native title rights over their land. Some Islanders are now concerned that these 
rights may disappear due to the impacts of climate change. The 
very existence of Ailan Kastom (island custom) may be threat-
ened if projected sea level rise in combination with extreme 
weather events increases the frequency or severity of inundation 
and necessitates relocation from the islands.
This paper explores the legal remedies that may assist  Torres 
Strait Islanders in dealing with adaptation to climate change. 
We use the Torres Strait Islands as a case study to examine the 
question of whether it is possible 
to hold a party responsible for 
physical damage to Torres Strait 
Islands, and cultural damage to 
Islander society. The paper out-
lines several areas of law that 
could assist Torres Strait Island-
ers including native title law, 
human rights laws, tort laws, and 
environmental protection laws. 
The paper begins by briefly 
identifying what is known about 
the biophysical impacts of cli-
mate change for the  Torres Strait. 
These direct biophysical impacts 
and indirect effects from climate change are discussed in the 
context of pre-existing social and economic disadvantages found 
in these communities. We also address a variety of philosophi-
cal and legal questions regarding the fact that some Torres Strait 
communities suffer a disproportionate share of the consequences 
of climate change. As we discuss these issues we must keep in 
mind that environmental protection laws in many countries seek 
to ensure that people are held accountable for damage they cause 
to the environment. Should this be the case with greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions as it is with other pollutants? Is the rest of 
Australia obligated to assist communities in the Torres Strait 
to ensure their culture and way of life is preserved? What legal 
actions and alternatives are available to enable the Islanders to 
preserve their way of life and ensure adequate compensation 
for any harm from climate change effects? By considering a 
combination of legal strategies, as well as adaptative lifestyle 
responses including the possibility of relocation, we assess the 
ability of the Torres Strait community to react to impending cli-
mate change.
coulD litigation help toRReS StRait 
 iSlanDeRS Deal with climate impactS?
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InTernaTIonal conTexT
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 
has long acknowledged that Small Island States are dispropor-
tionately impacted by climate change due to their susceptibil-
ity to rising sea levels, storm surges, and their limited resources 
and infrastructure.1 As a response to these challenges, and 
with international support, several small Pacific Island nations 
are currently engaging in anticipatory adaptation—from hard 
engineering strategies, e.g. building sea walls, to radical social 
upheaval planning, e.g. international emigration.2 Questions of 
equity surrounding who should pay for these costs remain due 
to the recognition of Pacific Island Nations’ minimal current, 
and virtually non-existent past, 
GHG emissions. The polluter 
pays principle suggests that 
costs of adaptation should not 
exclusively be borne by these 
countries.3 
Similar concerns are now 
being raised about how climate 
change will affect the lives of 
people living on remote, low-
lying Australian islands in the 
Torres Strait. As part of the 
wealthy, industrialized nation 
Australia, the situation of 
these islands is different than 
most Small Island States. There are, however, many parallels 
between the widely reported concerns of Pacific Islanders about 
loss of land and sovereignty due to climate impacts combined 
with natural variability and changing land use, and those of the 
Torres Strait. For the first time, in 2007, the impacts of climate 
change on Islanders were specifically noted in the IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment Report.4
case sTuDy: The Torres sTraIT regIon
The Torres Strait region encompasses about forty-eight 
thousand square kilometers of open sea, comprised of a shallow 
Small Island States 
are disproportionately 
impacted by climate 
change due to  
their susceptibility to 
rising sea levels.
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continental shelf between Papua New Guinea and mainland 
Australia. Torres Strait Islanders are the lesser known of the two 
Indigenous Australian people. The majority of Islanders live on 
mainland Australia, however, approximately eight thousand peo-
ple still live on seventeen of the over 150 islands in the  Torres 
Strait region.5 There is significant inter-island cultural differ-
ence, demonstrated by language and cultural practices vary-
ing across the islands. Islander culture, or Ailan Kastom, refers 
to a distinctive Torres Strait Islander culture and way of life, 
incorporating together traditional elements of Islander beliefs 
with Christianity. This unique culture permeates all aspects of 
island life and is recognized by State and Commonwealth agen-
cies through enshrinement in the Torres Strait Islander Land Act 
1991 (Queensl.).6 
Although the impacts of climate change are already being 
felt across Australia, the legal responsibilities for climate change 
are not as clear. At present, there are no Australian laws that spe-
cifically deal with protecting communities from climate change 
impacts.7 The policy response in Australia to climate change has 
not yet addressed issues of responsibility and protection, instead 
mostly focusing on designing an emissions trading system.8 
Australia’s policy response has also ignored the need for 
climate justice. Principles of climate justice redefine climate 
change from a scientific issue to one of human rights and envi-
ronmental justice. The principles include the concept of “eco-
logical debt” which focuses 
on redressing inequalities of 
wealth, power, and access to 
the earth’s resources.9 In Aus-
tralia, climate justice initiatives 
aim to ensure that Indigenous 
Australians, who are tradition-
ally more vulnerable mem-
bers of society, are protected 
from the impacts of climate 
change.10
Public interest litigation 
has always played a key role in 
ensuring that citizens are heard 
and their rights are protected. 
The Torres Strait has a proud tradition of public interest litiga-
tion, being the home of Eddie Mabo, whose case in the High 
Court brought about the recognition of native title and the Native 
Title Act 1993 (Cth).11 
One way of ensuring that policymakers become aware 
of the need to protect the rights and interests of Torres Strait 
Islanders is to use the law to highlight these issues and to seek 
to hold both governments and corporations responsible for their 
contribution to climate impacts felt there. Litigation can focus 
public attention on a particular issue through media exposure, 
and encourage society to debate public values and the need to 
protect our environment.12 Even unsuccessful cases can expose 
weaknesses in the law and highlight the need for law reform and 
the development of the law, allowing subsequent cases to build 
on the legal arguments and scientific evidence presented.13 
Although to date there have been no Australian cases that 
have sought to address climate change by holding governments 
and corporations responsible for 
their climate impacts, there are a 
number of different laws explored 
below that could assist if Torres 
Strait Islanders wished to pursue 
the matter.14 The types of laws 
that could be used fall into two 
broad categories: laws that are 
aimed at protecting human rights 
like the Native Title Act 1993 
(Cth) and laws that are directed at 
finding persons liable for damage 
to the environment, such as tort 
laws and specific environmental 
statutes. Before these options are 
discussed in more detail, we briefly outline the projected climate 
impacts for the region.
bIophysIcal ImpacTs In The  
Torres sTraIT
No published research has yet specifically focused on bio-
physical climate impacts in the Torres Strait.15 Some climate 
change projections have, however, been calculated for a wider 
area encompassing the region.16 These reports project increases 
in average temperature, relative to the climate of 1990 for the 
Cape York region of Queensland, of 0.5–1.2°C by 2030 and 
1.0–4.2°C by 2070. The average dry-season rainfall for this 
region is projected to decrease by 1–6% by 2030 and by 2–23% 
by 2070. The average wet-season rainfall is projected to increase 
by 0–4% by 2030 and by 1–13% by 2070.17 However, it is 
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justice redefine climate 
change from a  
scientific issue to one of  
human rights and  
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possible that these ranges may underestimate the magnitudes of 
likely changes. 
Increasing sea surface temperature threatens corals, with 
regular coral bleaching anticipated just south of the Torres Strait, 
in the Great Barrier Marine Park, within one to two decades.18 
The average global sea level rise indicates increases of up to 
seventy-nine centimeters by 2100, with regional variation add-
ing five centimeters to this global average.19 
Changes in the intensity and frequency of weather and 
 climate extremes (rather than average changes) are likely to be 
a major concern for the Torres Strait. However, there are lim-
ited climate extremes data available for the region for validating 
 climate models. Future projections for Australia as a whole show 
that changes in temperature and precipitation extremes, such as 
heat waves and rainfall intensity, will increase.20 In the north-
east of Australia, tropical cyclones tend to center south of the 
 Torres Strait Islands (around latitudes of 14°–15°C south), in the 
Gulf of Carpentaria and off the northern Queensland mainland 
coast. However, even low intensity, relatively distant cyclones 
or tropical lows in the Gulf of Carpentaria can cause problems 
when they occur in conjunction with the season of prevailing 
northwest winds, during January and February, and at high tide. 
InDIrecT ImpacTs anD culTural Damage
Climate impacts, such as more extreme weather or an 
increase in the intensity of storm tides, are likely to result in 
the need for more maintenance of basic infrastructure, includ-
ing roads, culverts, jetties, airstrips, water piping, fencing, and 
sea walls.21 Such maintenance is more difficult and expensive 
for island communities than for less remote communities on 
the Australian mainland, particularly due to extra transporta-
tion costs and time involved with bringing all hardware into the 
 Torres Strait by barge or air. Finding these additional resources 
is extremely difficult with numerous reports detailing the exist-
ing extreme socio-economic disadvantage in the region.22 
Climate change will also likely impact surface and ground 
water resources, making resource management in the dry sea-
son difficult. In the past, many islands depended on fresh water 
lenses to provide drinking water, but high demand for water 
(particularly since the introduction of reticulated sewage sys-
tems) has caused supply problems for many islands.23 Rainwater 
tanks and large lined dams are used to trap and store water for 
use in the dry season on all islands with many islands already 
reaching the limits of their drinking water supply and relying on 
mobile or permanent desalination plants to meet demand.24 
Climate change also affects plant and animal biodiversity. 
Beach and mangrove areas are important habitats and nurseries 
for several significant species of marine animals. With increas-
ing sea surface temperatures and ocean acidification, the viabil-
ity of sea grass beds, which are important feeding grounds for 
turtles and dugongs and a nursery area for prawns and tropical 
rock lobster, is an area of significant concern.25 Many animals 
including turtles, dugongs, crocodiles, stingrays, and sharks 
have a significant cultural role for many Islanders. However, any 
major impacts on the lifecycles of these animals would reduce 
the availability of a nutritious source of fresh food for many 
coastal communities that traditionally hunt these animals.26 
It is likely that changes in natural systems will cause eco-
nomic, social, and psychological damage, especially if these 
impacts affect totemic fauna, e.g. turtle and dugong, other impor-
tant seafood, e.g. crayfish and turtle, or culturally important 
flora, e.g. Wongai and almond trees. Such problems are likely 
to add to difficulties of Islanders attempting to revive traditional 
gardening practices.27 
For many Torres Strait Islanders, a connection with their 
island—a place of ancestry, identity, language, livelihood, and 
community connection—is the largest determinant of their indi-
vidual and community “health.” Therefore, biophysical changes 
affecting the “health” of natural ecosystems are likely to also 
impact human systems: both individuals’ physical and psycho-
logical well-being, as well as the “health” of a community’s 
cultural cohesion. The impacts of more extreme weather events 
on sacred sites have not been researched to date, despite the 
expressed concern of several Torres Strait Islander elders and 
leaders that such impacts would have serious negative psycho-
logical effects.28 
who Is lIable For clImaTe change?
There are a number of legal responses that Islanders could 
use to protect their rights and interests from the impacts of 
climate change using the common law of torts, or by bring-
ing claims under specific statutes that protect the environment, 
native title, and human rights. As climate change litigation is a 
new phenomenon, only time will tell whether any of these areas 
of law could be successfully used to address their concerns.
human RightS lawS
As the scientific evidence indicates, climate change threat-
ens the lives, health, culture, and livelihood of many Small Island 
States and low-lying coastal communities. It is therefore neces-
sary to consider how human rights laws may provide protection 
to these communities. There are three types of laws that could be 
of assistance: native title, discrimination, or international human 
rights laws. 
Native Title 
Native title is recognized as an important form of customary 
land law for Indigenous Australians. The Native Title Act 1993 
(Cth) (“NT Act”) provides for the protection and recognition of 
native title.29 Native title rights are particularly important to the 
Torres Strait Islanders. Not only did the Mabo decision estab-
lish those rights, but all communities in the Torres Strait have 
their native title rights and interests legally recognized.30 Of the 
thirty-nine native title determinations made in Queensland as of 
July 2007, twenty-six are related to Torres Strait communities.31 
This is the opposite situation to most mainland Indigenous com-
munities which are still fighting in the Courts to have their native 
title rights recognized.32 Such claims can take ten to fifteen years 
to finalize.33 Those who hold exclusive determinations of native 
title, such as the Traditional Owners of the Mer Island group, 
obtain the right to control and manage land, similar to freehold 
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landowners. The High Court recently extended exclusive native 
title rights to the inter-tidal zone in the Northern Territory.34
One of the real risks posed by climate change is that sea 
level rise or other storm events may impact and damage land 
held by Torres Strait Islanders under the NT Act, as well as 
the rights over the sea and inter-tidal zones. Native title can-
not be extinguished except in accordance with the NT Act so 
the question is whether the NT Act effectively protects Torres 
Strait Islander’s land rights from the impacts of climate change. 
There is an argument that sea level rise is an “act” in the sense 
contemplated by and protected under the legislation. Relevantly, 
section 226 of the NT Act defines “acts that affect native title” to 
include not only positive acts such as the making of legislation 
or granting of a license, but the “creation, variation, extension, 
renewal, or extinguishment of any interest in relation to land or 
waters.” Sea level rise will extinguish certain rights and interests 
over land because it will be inundated. 
The question will be whether the flooding of land will be 
interpreted as an “act.” The act is not one undertaken by the Aus-
tralian Government, but rather by those producing GHG emis-
sions. Yet, insufficient action by the Australian Government to 
mitigate the impacts of 
those gases on Torres 
Strait Islanders native 
title rights could argu-
ably be an “act.”
One other option 
available to native title 
holders is to bring a 
compensation claim for 
the impacts of climate 
change on extinguish-
ing or impairing their 
native title rights. The 
NT Act provides for a 
regime to award com-
pensation to traditional owners for the impairment of their native 
title rights over an area of land or water.35 It could be argued that 
the failure to take steps to mitigate climate change means that 
the Commonwealth and Queensland Governments, in particular, 
have contributed to the extinguishment or impairment of native 
title rights. 
To date, there have been no successful compensation claims 
under the NT Act. This is partly because native title must be 
proved before an application for compensation can be deter-
mined under the NT Act, and native title is difficult to prove.36 
Compensation can be no more than what would result from a 
compulsory acquisition and enshrines the concept of “just 
terms.”37 Compensation would be based on market value plus 
any amount to reflect the cultural value of the land. In the case 
of the Torres Strait, the market values could be considerable. 
Therefore, Torres Strait Islanders could lodge claims for com-
pensation on the basis of the extinguishment of their rights as a 
result of climate change, which could result in significant com-
pensation payments.
Discrimination Laws
Traditionally climate change has been viewed as an envi-
ronmental, rather than a human rights issue. However there is 
an increasing recognition that climate change has severe human 
rights implications and is worsening poverty and vulnerability in 
communities least responsible for the problem.38 In the absence 
of a bill or charter of rights in Australia, Australia’s current 
human rights laws do not provide adequate protection to Torres 
Strait Islanders faced with damage to their culture and possible 
relocation as a result of climate change.39
In 2005, the Inuit, who are the Indigenous inhabitants of 
the Arctic region of North America and Greenland, brought a 
petition to the Inter American Commission of Human Rights 
(“IACHR”).40 The petition requested IACHR’s assistance in 
obtaining relief from human rights violations resulting from 
the impacts of climate change caused by the acts and omis-
sions of the United States. In particular, the petition argued that 
the United States had violated a number of rights set out in the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,41 Inter-
national Convention on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),42 
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”).43 Climate change 
is impacting and will continue to impact 
the Inuit people’s right to enjoy their 
traditional lands, to maintain their cul-
tural property, as well as their rights to 
health and life, residence, the inviolabil-
ity of their home, and right to means of 
subsistence.44 The petition has yet to be 
determined but it shows that international 
human rights are being violated by cli-
mate change and litigation is serving to 
highlight these issues.45
It is possible that Torres Strait Island-
ers could similarly bring their complaints 
to United Nations bodies. In particular, 
the UN Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”) can receive indi-
vidual complaints and actively investigate and rule upon those 
complaints.46 Some commentators have argued that this system 
is the oldest, most utilized, and most authoritative within the 
UN regime.47 While the UN Human Rights Committee cannot 
make binding decisions, its recommendations can highlight the 
 problem and place moral and political pressure on Governments 
to act.48
Torres Strait Islanders may be able to utilize the power of 
the UNHRC and argue before the Committee that the right to 
life (article 6), freedom of movement and choice of residence 
(article 12), and prohibition of interference with privacy, family, 
and home (article 17) of the International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights have been breached. International tribunals 
have previously recognized the link between environmental 
health and the right to life.49 Similarly, international tribunals 
have recognized that harm to the environment from pollution 
can impact the right to home and family life.50 In particular, 
Torres Islanders, parallel to the Inuits, could argue that climate 
There are a number 
of legal responses that 
Islanders could use to 
protect their rights and 
interests from the impacts 
of climate change.
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change threatens the life and health of Torres Strait Islanders. 
The potential impacts are more than mosquito-borne illnesses 
and water quality issues in the islands; they also pose risks to 
basic island infrastructure such as roads, wharves, airstrips, and 
buildings.51 
Furthermore, the right to freedom of movement in article 
12 of the ICCPR also covers the situation of internally displaced 
persons who are forced to move or are restricted by environ-
mental issues.52 This may be an argument that could be used 
under Australian law to protect Torres Strait Islanders from 
being forcibly relocated. In Kruger v. Commonwealth, Justice 
Gaudron gave some support to the concept of the right to free-
dom of movement under Australian law. The Justice found that 
freedom of movement was part of the implied political commu-
nications under the that could restrict state powers, and on this 
basis laws restricting the freedom of movement of Aboriginal 
people, with no lawful purpose of protecting Aboriginal persons, 
were invalid.53 Any laws or policies that are developed to relo-
cate Torres Strait Islanders affected by climate change will need 
to be carefully considered to ensure they do not infringe on such 
protections. 
Before lodging a communication with the UN Human 
Rights Committee, an individual must have exhausted all of 
the domestic remedies available to deal with the breach of the 
ICCPR.54 Although violation of the ICCPR may be used as evi-
dence of violation of domestic law, in this case, there are no 
domestic remedies within Australia to address these breaches of 
the ICCPR. Consequently, it would be possible for Torres Strait 
Islanders to lodge such a complaint directly with the UNHRC at 
any time. 
However, domestic law may be used as a tool to address 
the fact that climate change will have a disproportionate impact 
on Torres Strait communities and other Indigenous communities 
in Northern Australia. Obviously climate change is not directly 
targeting these communities but is indirectly doing so. It is argu-
able that the Government’s failure to act to prevent the impact 
of climate change on these communities is indirectly discrim-
inatory. In particular, Australia’s failure to date to commit to 
strict emission targets is impacting disproportionately on these 
communities. 
Australia has in place laws to protect persons against indirect 
discrimination on the basis of their race.55 These laws prohibit 
policies or rules that put at a disadvantage people of a particular 
race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin more than peo-
ple of another race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin. 
Cases have often highlighted provisions that are “fair in form 
and intention but discriminatory in impact and outcome,”56 for 
example, provisions that are race neutral but affect a particular 
group disproportionately. Again, the issue here is that the prob-
lem relates to inaction rather than, in many cases, direct actions. 
Arguably the failure of Governments to introduce strong laws to 
reduce GHG emissions is indirectly discriminatory, but proving 
this at law may be more difficult.
toRt lawS 
Traditionally, tort laws are aimed at redressing harms to 
individuals and their property caused by the actions of others. 
These laws could be used by individuals to bring actions against 
large GHG emitters or Governments. Indigenous communities 
in the United States have commenced bringing cases for phys-
ical damage to their homes and culture as a result of climate 
change.57
Public Nuisance
To date most of the climate change litigation in the United 
States has used the tort of public nuisance. No such cases have 
been commenced in Australia. Nuisance focuses on interfer-
ence with the right to use and enjoy land.58 Public nuisance is 
defined as an unlawful act, the effect of which is to endanger 
the life, health, property, or comfort of the public at large.59 It 
is a defense to an action of public nuisance that the actions are 
an inevitable consequence of the conduct of work that is autho-
rized by a statute and therefore reasonable, and reasonable steps 
have been taken to prevent the nuisance. It is no defense to a 
nuisance action based on pollution for the polluter to prove that 
the environment was already polluted from another source or 
that the polluter’s individual actions were not the sole cause of 
the nuisance.60 Public nuisance is better suited to climate change 
actions than negligence because causation issues are likely to be 
less complex.
Two relevant nuisance actions have recently been consid-
ered in the United States. In Connecticut v. American Electric 
Power Co.61 the plaintiffs sought broad forms of judicial relief 
from the court to abate the “public nuisance” of “global warm-
ing” including holding the defendants liable for creating and 
contributing to a public nuisance and requiring the defendants to 
abate its contribution to the nuisance through a cap on its carbon 
dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified percent-
age each year for at least a decade. The plaintiffs argued that 
U.S. residents faced injuries to public health (heat deaths and 
respiratory illnesses), increased smog levels, damage to coastal 
resources from rising sea levels, increases in droughts and flood-
ing, and widespread loss of species and biodiversity as a result 
of the defendants’ actions.62 The state of California also sued a 
number of automobile manufacturers for public nuisance, seek-
ing monetary damages in connection with global warming.63
Both cases were dismissed by the District Court and are 
currently on appeal.64 The Courts viewed the climate change 
argument as based on non-justiciable political questions with 
implications for the U.S. economy, foreign relations, and 
national security, partly due to the extensive nature of the rem-
edies sought in this case. In Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil, the Native 
Inuit village of Kivalina has commenced a public nuisance 
action as well as a conspiracy case against nine oil companies, 
fourteen power companies, and a coal company for damages it is 
suffering from the melting Artic ice.65 At the time of writing, the 
case has yet to be heard.
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Negligence
The most common tort is that of negligence. The essence of 
negligence is that there has been a failure to take reasonable care 
to prevent injury to others.66 To establish a case of negligence, a 
litigant has to prove that the defendant owed them a duty of care; 
that the duty of care was breached; and the breach was the cause 
of their loss or damage.67 
The scientific evidence suggests that some damage is already 
occurring to parts of the Torres Strait, and despite adequate 
observational records in this region, it is reasonable to consider 
that slow onset sea level rise will play an ever increasing role in 
raising the frequency of inundations on low-lying islands in the 
future. As noted supra, more frequent inundations from storm 
tides may also result if there is an increase in the incidence or 
frequency of tropical cyclones. Some scientists are suggesting 
that they may soon be able to judge the role climate change is 
playing in these extreme weather events.68
There is an argument that Governments at all levels owe 
a duty of care to protect the land and culture of Torres Strait 
Islanders, by acting to prevent harm to communities from cli-
mate change, and are therefore liable for the damage to those 
communities.69 The High Court in Australia has suggested that 
the degree of vulnerability of those who depend on the proper 
exercise by the authority of its power may be owed a duty of 
care.70 If a duty of care could be established, it may also be pos-
sible to apply such an argument to large emitters of greenhouse 
gases.
The consensus among practitioners and academics seems to 
be that local Councils will owe a duty of care to landowners with 
regard to their consideration of individual development applica-
tions in coastal areas that are most at risk of climate change.71 
The amalgamated Island Council will owe a duty of care to resi-
dents when considering development applications in the coastal 
zone, as they have extensive powers to control planning, knowl-
edge of the impacts of climate change, and the community in 
which they work is extremely vulnerable to such events. There 
are provisions introduced in recent years to limit the scope of 
public authorities in negligence to circumstances where they are 
acting so unreasonably.72 Over time, as the impacts of climate 
change become more severe in some communities and areas, 
failure to prevent damage caused by climate change may come 
to be considered sufficiently unreasonable to overcome such a 
restriction.
The greatest obstacle to people seeking to establish negli-
gence is the issue of causation. Even large GHG emitters can 
argue that they have not substantially or significantly contrib-
uted to the harm suffered by a plaintiff, and their emissions are 
just a very insignificant amount in comparison to current global 
and historical emissions. The decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Massachusetts v. EPA accepted that incremental small 
steps from GHG emitters should still be regulated despite not 
being the only cause of these emissions in the global context.73 
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens stated: 
“[The EPA’s] argument rests on the erroneous assumption that 
a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be 
attacked in a federal judicial forum. Yet accepting that premise 
would doom most challenges to regulatory action.” 74
However, the tests of causation will need to evolve to deter-
mine who is liable for climate change and will depend on devel-
opments in science enabling such predictions to occur, as well 
as the courts accepting that they should determine the issues, as 
opposed to Governments.75 Some commentators have suggested 
a more suitable test for determining liability in negligence will be 
a test that asks “does climate change lead to a material increase 
in risk to persons?” instead of proving that it is a substantial 
factor in causing the damage.76 Public interest cases about cli-
mate change impacts could be fundamental in bringing about 
developments in the law of negligence to provide remedies for 
the impacts of climate change. A comparison has been made to 
asbestos or tobacco litigation, suggesting that over time the law 
will provide remedies as the effects of climate change become 
more severe.77
StatutoRy offenSeS unDeR queenSlanD 
enviRonmental pRotection legiSlation 
In Queensland, the principal law dealing with environment 
protection is the Environment Protection Act 1994 (“EP Act”).78 
In a recent paper, Dr. Chris McGrath discussed the potential for 
this legislation to be used by third parties to challenge major 
greenhouse polluters.79 One of the advantages of the EP Act 
is that it has wide standing provisions that provide significant 
opportunities for people to bring proceedings in the Queensland 
Planning and Environment Court.80 Usually parties can do so 
without facing the risks of an adverse costs order.81 The EP Act 
creates the offense of causing serious or material environmental 
harm. The notion of “environmental harm” is widely defined82 
under the legislation and, although it has not been judicially 
tested, could foreseeably encompass the emission of greenhouse 
gases and consequential climate change.83
The EP Act clarifies some of the complexities of causation 
by stating that environmental harm may be caused by an activity 
whether the harm “is a direct or indirect result of the activity,” 
or “results from the activity alone or from the combined effects 
of the activity and other activities or factors.”84 Public interest 
litigation could be brought on behalf of Torres Strait communi-
ties against a corporation operating a number of coal-fired power 
stations in Queensland for contributing to greater storm tides in 
the Torres Strait. One of the main barriers to such a case would 
be that power stations operate under particular environmental 
authorities. If the court interpreted those authorities broadly they 
may find they cover all harms that result from power stations 
operations. It is also a defense to take all reasonable and practi-
cal measures to prevent or minimize environmental harm arising 
from any activity that causes or is likely to cause environmental 
harm.85 
conclusIon
Alongside the direct biophysical impacts, such as storm 
surge inundation, it is the myriad of multiple and concomitant 
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non-climate stresses—limited availability of drinking water, 
constraints on land available to build on, and the high costs of 
living—that will be exacerbated by climate impacts on many of 
the Torres Strait Islands over the next generations. 
It is likely that the confluence of existing economic and 
social constraints with these additional climate impacts, in 
particular extreme weather events, will create the most vulner-
ability for low-lying island communities in the medium to long 
term. The lack of adaptive capacity and resources in these com-
munities is likely to be one of the key factors in reducing their 
resilience to future climate impacts. In developing resilience-
building activities, it is crucial that the socio-economic factors 
that have caused existing disadvantages in these communities be 
addressed. In the short term, built infrastructure such as roads, 
houses, water and electricity services, airstrips, and public build-
ings will need to be planned with “climate-proofing” in mind. In 
the longer term, new sources of money to pay for larger projects 
will need to be found.
Other Pacific islands are already dealing with the vexing 
issue of relocation by advancing long-term relocation strate-
gies.86 Some Islanders may want institutional support to under-
stand the ramifications of different alternative options including 
how to provide longer term “climate proofing” as well as plan-
ning for relocation off low-lying islands. Due to the expense of 
relocation and the impacts on culture in the entire Torres Strait 
region that would result even if only a couple of communities 
were to decide to relocate, significant forewarning is imperative 
to reduce associated cultural, social, and economic damage.
There are a number of ways that Torres Strait Islanders 
could exercise their legal rights to seek to address the impacts of 
climate change. Although they are unlikely to be able to mitigate 
projected impacts, they may serve as a potential source of addi-
tional funds either directly or indirectly. While any legal actions 
will be long and difficult under current laws, it is imperative that 
Governments at all levels begin to address and understand the 
issues they are facing and urgently develop strategies to protect 
Torres Strait Islanders’ rights and culture.
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iS the enDangeReD SpecieS act the Right 
place to Set u.S. climate change policy?
by Chris Logan*
*Chris Logan is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University, Washington 
College of Law.
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) was enacted in 1973 to prevent extinction of species caused by human impacts on natural ecosystems.1 On December 11, 2008, 
the Bush Administration finalized a rule change to the ESA, 
which relieves the Department of the Interior of a duty to assess 
the impact of climate change on endangered species, and further 
allows federal agencies to bypass consultation with the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) or the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice (“NMFS”) when determining whether federal actions might 
threaten protected species.2
Prior to the eleventh-hour rule changes, the ESA arguably 
allowed the consideration of climate change impacts during the 
consultation process with FWS and NMFS scientists to assess 
the potential threats to endangered species.3 Under the new rule, 
which took effect on January 15, 2009, federal agency actions 
no longer require scientific review if “the effects of such action 
[on a species] are manifested through global processes” and “are 
not capable of being measured or detected in a manner that per-
mits meaningful evaluation.”4 
The rule change has engendered fervent debate between 
those who believe that the ESA should not determine U.S. cli-
mate change policy and those who believe that the rule changes 
will further harm endangered species already threatened by 
global warming. In April 2008, President Bush stated that the 
ESA, the Clean Air Act, and the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act “were never meant to regulate global climate change.”5 
Former Secretary of the Interior, Dick Kempthorne, echoed the 
president’s sentiment after listing the polar bear as a threatened 
species under the ESA, stating, “Listing the polar bear as threat-
ened can reduce avoidable losses of polar bears. But it should 
not open the door to use the ESA to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions . . . . The ESA is not the right tool to set U.S. climate 
policy.”6 The proponents of the change argue that investments 
in wind and solar energy and clean coal technology, instead 
of federal regulations, will foster greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction.7 
Supporters of the amended ESA emphasize that the new 
rules are a narrow regulatory change which will provide clarity 
and certainty to a broad and ambiguous issue.8 Further, they con-
tend that the new regulations give FWS and NMFS scientists the 
ability to focus their resources on evaluating projects that pose a 
greater risk of harm to endangered species instead of attempting 
to evaluate hard-to-measure threats such as climate change. In 
December 2008, the Washington Post editorialized, “Where Mr. 
Kempthorne got it right is in preventing the effects of ‘global 
processes’ ([or] climate change) from triggering consultation 
‘because of the inability to separate out the effect of a specific 
Federal action from a multitude of other factors that contribute 
through global processes.’” 9 Proponents of the ESA rule-change 
believe that the direct impact on endangered species by climate 
change cannot be measured in a “meaningful” way that shows 
that the federal agency actions are directly responsible for the 
adverse effects on all species. 
On the other side, Congress and environmental groups have 
opposed the Bush Administration’s last minute amendments to 
the ESA, seeing it as a last ditch attempt to reduce ESA protec-
tions for species threatened by global warming. Bob Irvin, the 
Defenders of Wildlife Senior Vice President for Conservation 
Programs, argues that the new rule “means that consideration of 
the impacts of global warming is completely off limits,” calling 
it a narrow definition that will affect all listed species and further 
keep critical habitat from being protected from indirect effects 
resulting from federal actions.10 Environmentalists are specifi-
cally concerned about the new rule’s impact on the polar bear 
and other arctic species. Advocates construe the rule change as 
an admission by the Bush Administration that “greenhouse gas 
emissions are driving species like the polar bear to extinction.”11 
Many environmental groups see this as a final attempt by the 
Bush Administration to ensure that greenhouse gas emissions 
are not regulated or reduced.
The Obama Administration may be able to appease both 
sides of this debate. Passing a climate change statute to ensure 
that greenhouse gas emissions are reduced and regulated could 
eliminate the need to use the ESA as a vehicle for setting domes-
tic climate change policy. Such a statute would provide the 
reductions sought by environmentalists through another channel 
thus allowing the ESA to continue protecting endangered spe-
cies, as it has for over thirty years, safely distanced from the 
heated politics of climate change.
Endnotes:
As this article went to press, the Obama Administration was considering 
repealing the ESA rule change.
1 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2009).
2 Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, Final Rule, 73 
Fed. Reg. 76,272 (Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 402).
3 Endangered Species Act, supra note 1, § 1536.
Endnotes: Is the Endangered Species Act the Right Place to Set U.S. 
Climate Change Policy? continued on page 70
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InTroDucTIon
“A hundred years after we are gone and forgotten, those 
who never heard of us will be living with the results of our 
actions.” — Oliver Wendell Holmes, U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tice (1841–1935)
These words by Oliver Wendell Holmes, prophetic in light of the current threat to our planet, speak to the urgency of addressing climate change risks with both mitigation 
and adaptation measures for the benefit of unborn generations. 
An aggressive planning strategy designed with a broad scope to 
meet the needs of this century is required. The United States has 
a long tradition of long range national planning harking back 
to the 1808 Gallatin Plan, which envisioned selling federal 
lands to produce a society of independent farmers connected 
to thriving cities by a federally financed system of roads and 
canals (and later railroads) to form the United States’ produc-
tive society.1 This vision dominated the nineteenth century. One 
hundred years later, in 1908, Theodore Roosevelt’s great conser-
vation initiatives followed after the continent’s hasty develop-
ment had laid waste to many of its natural resources. Theodore 
Roosevelt’s New Nationalism established a new emphasis on 
the common good in planning and launched an effort to protect 
forests, restrain flooding, minimize soil erosion, build dams for 
hydro power and irrigation, and create a navigable inland water-
way system.2 His vision ultimately culminated in the New Deal 
programs creating rural highways, dams, electrification, and the 
national highway system, ultimately funded under President 
Eisenhower.3
Another hundred years later, the 2008 centennial year came 
and went without a new national vision of such broad scope. The 
Obama Administration may forge a parallel and equally powerful 
new national vision and implementation program, of which the 
stimulus package enacted by Congress in February of 2009 may 
play a significant part. However, faced with relative inaction at 
the federal level and serious concerns about the dire impacts of 
climate change, state, local, and municipal governments across 
the country have embarked upon local planning efforts to address 
the looming crisis without awaiting federal guidance and action. 
The breadth of this local undertaking is exemplified by the com-
mitment by over 900 U.S. mayors, who represent every state in 
the union, to strive in their own communities to meet or beat 
the Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emission reduction 
target suggested for the United States—seven percent reduction 
from 1990 levels by 2012.4
caSe StuDy: climate change aDaptation planning guiDance  
foR local goveRnmentS in the uniteD StateS
by Edna Sussman *
*Edna Sussman, esussman@SussmanADR.com, is an experienced arbitrator and 
mediator and serves on the panels of many of the leading dispute resolution insti-
tutions as well as on court mediation panels. She has had extensive experience 
related to climate change law and policy and was appointed by Mayor Bloomberg 
to serve on the New York City Panel on Climate Change and by County Executive 
Andy Spano to chair the Business Sector Committee of the Westchester County, 
N.Y. Global Warming Task Force.
This article will discuss concepts of adaptation to and miti-
gation of climate change in the context of these local initiatives. 
After introducing the concepts, it will focus on the adaptation 
initiative launched by the International Council for Local Envi-
ronmental Initiatives—Local Governments for Sustainability 
(“ICLEI”) and the implementation of that initiative by Keene, 
New Hampshire, the first U.S. community to engage in and com-
plete a comprehensive adaptation planning process. This article 
will also provide an overview of the seminal guidebook for U.S. 
communities planning for adaptation.5
aDapTaTIon or mITIgaTIon?
The principal focus of these local climate change initiatives 
to date has been on mitigation, which is the reduction of GHGs 
to avoid the most extreme projected climate change impacts. 
Communities have been slow to address adaptation, however, 
which focuses on building resiliency to the impacts of climate 
change.6 This is largely due to the fear that turning to adapta-
tion measures would divert resources from the essential need 
to mitigate by reducing GHG emissions.7 However, as achieve-
ment of the requisite reduction in global GHGs remains elusive 
and as the scientific certainty grows and provides ever more 
cautionary predictions as to climate change impacts, communi-
ties are beginning to address adaptation along with mitigation. 
Moreover, many communities have concluded that rather than 
discouraging a commitment to mitigation, calling attention to 
adaptation can actually inspire a greater commitment to mitiga-
tion as the specter of future consequences is highlighted.8 
Despite local communities’ hesitancy to embrace adaptation 
strategies, it has long been recognized as essential in countering 
the impacts of climate change and has been part of global cli-
mate commitments since the inception of the worldwide effort. 
For example, the 1992 United Nations Framework on Climate 
Change (“UNFCC”), which the United States signed, included a 
commitment to formulate and implement “measures to mitigate 
climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions . . . of all 
greenhouse gases . . . and measures to facilitate adequate adapta-
tion to climate change.”9 Despite its early inclusion, adaptation 
remained the stepsister to the discussions about mitigation at the 
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international climate change negotiations for many years. How-
ever, discussions as to how to address adaptation, particularly 
with respect to assistance to developing countries, which are 
likely to suffer the most severe damage, have become a central 
and ongoing part of the Kyoto negotiations.10
It is critical that adaptation planning commence now, as 
many of the measures necessary for adaptation require numer-
ous years of planning and implementation and call for major 
shifts by governments, businesses, and the population at large.11 
Moreover, many of the required measures serve both mitiga-
tion and adaptation objectives. The co-benefits of both energy 
and water mitigation/adaptation strategies are readily appar-
ent. For example, energy efficiency measures both mitigate 
GHGs by reducing energy demands and adapt by reducing the 
increased demand for electricity caused by projected warmer 
weather. Water conservation also mitigates by reducing energy 
demand for the electricity generation utilized in water distribu-
tion and adapts by reducing demand for projected scarce water 
resources.12 As another example, green roofs mitigate GHGs as 
they reduce energy demand and adapt by addressing projected 
increased flooding and severe storm events by absorbing more 
water on site. In addition, many adaptation measures can be 
implemented today at minimal additional expense during initial 
construction when those same measures will cost considerably 
more to retrofit in the future.13 This is an important factor which 
should be considered in current decision making.
IcleI anD keene, new hampshIre
A leader in guiding communities in their climate change 
efforts, ICLEI is working to foster adaptation planning. Founded 
in 1990, ICLEI is a membership association of local govern-
ments committed to advancing climate protection and sustain-
able development and includes 
nearly 1,000 cities world-wide, 
more than 500 of which are in the 
United States.14 In 2006, ICLEI 
members unanimously resolved 
to expand the organization’s cli-
mate protection campaign from 
strictly climate change miti-
gation to also include climate 
adaptation. Accordingly, ICLEI 
launched its Climate Resilient 
Communities (“CRC”) Program 
to assist local governments in 
enhancing community resil-
iency to the impacts and costs 
associated with projected cli-
mate change.15 
The framework for adapta-
tion work established by ICLEI 
is set forth in its adaptation milestones, a recommended series of 
steps for adaptation planning. The milestones are:
1. Conduct a Climate Resiliency Study 
2. Prioritize Areas for Action and Set Goals 
3. Develop a Climate Resilient Action Plan 
4. Implement the Plan 
5. Monitor and Reevaluate16
Keene, New Hampshire was an early participant in develop-
ing a climate action plan and has committed to meeting a GHG 
reduction goal of ten percent from 1990 levels by 2015. Keene 
was invited to be the pilot community for ICLEI’s CRC program 
and was the first ICLEI CRC community to complete Milestone 
3 with the release of its adaptation plan.17 The town of Keene was 
motivated to address adaptation as well as mitigation because 
it had been subjected to more frequent and more severe flood-
ing and had already seen changes in annual snowfall, infestation 
of non-native plant and animal species, an increase in the total 
number of high index heat days, and more numerous poor air 
quality days.18 Tourism, a major 
source of income in New Hamp-
shire, relies on several sources—
snow cover, fall foliage, and cold 
water fishing19—all of which 
would be adversely impacted by 
climate change. Health impact 
concerns were also a motivat-
ing factor.20 Moreover, Keene 
was developing a new compre-
hensive plan and a new capital 
plan including stormwater and 
road infrastructure. The adapta-
tion plan was to be incorporated 
into this planning process and 
used to make land use decisions 
to identify capital improvement 
projects, and to establish funding 
priorities.21
The effort, led and supported by the dedicated town plan-
ning staff, commenced with the creation of a CRC committee. 
Over the course of eighteen months the CRC committee met 
and began the process of identifying Keene’s vulnerabilities 
It is critical that 
adaptation planning 
commence now, as 
many of the measures 
necessary for adaptation 
require numerous 
years of planning and 
implementation.
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to climate change. The committee concluded that the vulner-
abilities could best be grouped into three main categories, which 
overlapped somewhat: (a) the built environment, which con-
sists of man-made infrastructure such as buildings, transporta-
tion, and stormwater infrastructure; (b) the natural environment, 
which consists of naturally occurring resources such as wetlands, 
flora, and fauna; and (c) the social environment, which focuses 
on areas that impact human life such as the economy and pub-
lic health.22 The committee found that it had difficulty strictly 
separating mitigation from adaptation measures and concluded 
that the best approach was “to build adaptive capacity” with a 
“strong mitigation component.”23 
The vulnerabilities identified in Keene are illustrative of 
the wide ranging impacts of climate change in all of the cat-
egories. For the built environ-
ment, not only were buildings 
identified as being at risk from 
flooding, but road flooding and 
uneven freeze thaw cycles could 
cause roads to buckle and bridges 
to become vulnerable to failure. 
These failures in the transporta-
tion infrastructure could leave 
people stranded in the event of an 
extreme weather event and make 
delivery of emergency services 
difficult, if not impossible. Flood-
ing could compromise wastewa-
ter treatment plants, leading to 
the possibility of health related 
dangers. Energy systems could be 
disrupted in severe storm events, 
and with today’s reliance on cell 
phones, may leave members in 
the community without access to emergency notifications.24 
For the natural environment, the committee identified a 
number of areas that are vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change.25 The committee found that wetlands are vulnerable to 
damage from intense storm events and drought; the degradation 
of wetlands would decrease the efficacy of these natural systems 
to assist in stormwater filtration and flood control.26 Changes in 
temperature threaten the sugar maple and other species. Invasive 
species may drive out native plants causing dislocation of local 
animal species.27 Moreover, the local food supply is threatened 
by drought. Accordingly, the committee advised self-reliance 
because other communities from which Keene imports much of 
its food will be affected by climate change and unable to con-
tinue supply.28
For the social environment, the committee identified threats 
to the local economy, public health, and emergency services.29 
For instance, the threat to the sugar maple endangers the fall foli-
age that attracts so many tourist dollars and jeopardizes the source 
of traditional maple syrup.30 The increase in winter  temperatures 
will reduce snowfall causing a reduction in the number of tour-
ists who come to the state for skiing.31 In addition, several public 
health concerns were identified resulting from: (a) the increased 
number of poor air quality days; (b) the increased number of 
excessively hot days causing heat stress; (c) the introduction of 
new pests to the area bearing vector born diseases; and (d) flood-
ing, which can impair potable water sources and leave stagnant 
water that breeds bacteria laden runoff.32 Climate change could 
also spike demands for various aspects of emergency services 
and overwhelm available personnel, especially when routes are 
blocked and communication systems compromised by extreme 
weather events.33 
After identifying vulnerabilities and goals and targets for 
each vulnerability, the CRC committee used a set of criteria 
to set priorities by examining: (a) the sectors impacted—local 
business, environment, or community; (b) potential influence—
visibility and whether it sup-
ported existing initiatives; and 
(c) investment—availability of 
funding, the ease of implemen-
tation, the time sensitivity and 
the cost effectiveness.34 The 
Keene Adaptation Opportuni-
ties Goals and Targets, released 
as part of the adaptation plan, 
lists multiple opportunities for 
adaptation for each category 
and identifies specific goals and 
action items designed to cap-
ture each “opportunity.”35 
Since the completion of 
its climate adaptation plan, 
Keene has launched a broad 
scale public visioning effort to 
engage the community in the 
development of its new com-
prehensive plan. The hope is that the comprehensive plan will be 
informed by the work completed by the CRC committee. Exam-
ples of action items already in the process of being implemented 
include the revision of the building code, the commencement of 
a major water infrastructure project that will consider climate 
change science in watershed modeling and the development of a 
food coop by a community group which will help address food 
security in the wake of a changing climate.36 Keene is well on its 
way to beginning to meet the threat of climate change and foster 
adaptation measures. 
comprehensIve aDapTaTIon guIDance
King County, Washington, long a leader in climate change 
mitigation and adaptation activities, spearheaded a project in 
association with ICLEI and released Preparing for Climate 
Change: Guidebook for Local Regional and State Govern-
ments (“The Guidebook”), a comprehensive guidebook to assist 
communities in planning for adaptation.37 The Guidebook is 
intended to provide a road map that will enable communities to 
tailor their adaptation plans to their unique circumstances as the 
impacts of climate change vary from locale to locale. It is at the 
Energy efficiency  
measures both mitigate 
GHGs by reducing energy 
demands and adapt by 
reducing the increased 
demand for electricity 
caused by projected 
warmer weather.
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local level that climate change impacts will be felt and at which 
they can be best understood. The Guidebook sets out a series of 
steps consistent with the ICLEI adaptation milestones and offers 
practical advice to maximize success in implementation. 
The Guidebook identifies and offers advice on how to over-
come the most common barriers to action on adaptation. Those 
who have attempted to launch an adaptation initiative will rec-
ognize many of these objections: 
	 • “I don’t know how climate change will affect my com-
munity.”
	 • “Climate change action should happen at higher levels of 
government.”
	 • “I’ll deal with climate change when I see that it is hap-
pening.”
	 • “My community wants to focus only on reducing green-
house gases.”
	 • “I’ll deal with climate change when you can tell me exactly 
what I need to plan for.”
	 • “I’ll wait until I see other communities planning for climate 
change.”
	 • “I don’t have time or money to deal with climate change 
right now.”
	 • “I don’t have the resources or political support to act.”
	 • “Our operations are based on historical statistics, not future 
modeling.”38
The Guidebook further provides a detailed step-by-step 
review of the recommended process for adaptation planning: 
	 • Scope the Climate Change Impacts to Your Major Sec-
tors: This step calls for col-
lecting information about 
how climate is expected to 
change in the region with 
attention to such factors as 
temperature, precipitation, 
storm events, and seasonal 
changes, including a range 
of possible scenarios and 
an analysis of the degree of 
confidence for each predic-
tion. This effort culminates 
in a decision as to whether 
impacts are significant 
enough to begin preparing 
for climate change.39
	 • Build and Maintain Sup-
port to Prepare for Climate 
Change: This step recognizes the importance of outreach in 
building and supporting the planning effort and the central 
role of recruiting committed individuals who can also play 
an important role in implementation after the plan is devel-
oped. It is recommended that a “champion” in government 
committed to the process be identified and that the involve-
ment of the public sector, the private sector, non-profit 
organizations, and the media be sought and a preparedness 
message developed.40 
	 • Build Your Climate Change Preparedness Team: This step 
recognizes the need to coordinate activities across depart-
ments and sectors and calls for identifying leaders and a 
working team to spearhead the effort.41
	 • Identify Your Planning Areas and Sectors Relevant to Cli-
mate Change: This step calls for developing an inventory 
of planning areas associated with built, natural and human, 
systems that are of significance to the community. These 
could include water supply, wastewater treatment, land use 
planning, energy supply, public health, roads and bridges, 
forestry, agriculture, biodiversity, recreation, business, and 
emergency response.42
	 •	 Conduct a Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment: With 
this step the process of analyzing the sensitivity of each 
planning area or system to climate change begins with a 
determination of how significant the impact of climate 
change will be on each. The analysis includes, with respect 
to each planning area or system, an evaluation of the adap-
tive capacity, the ability to accommodate changes in climate 
with minimum disruption or minimum additional cost. This 
step concludes with an assessment of vulnerability, which 
combines the sensitivity and adaptability findings. Areas 
that are sensitive to climate change but less able to adapt are 
considered vulnerable.43
	 •	 Conduct a Climate Change Risk Assessment: With this step 
a traditional risk assessment analysis is performed to priori-
tize action steps. Using the vulnerability assessment results, 
an analysis is conducted of the consequence of a climate 
impact (such as the cost of a sea 
level rise). This is multiplied by 
the probability or likelihood that 
the projected impact will occur. 
As new data becomes available, 
the risk assessment may change 
over time, calling for a periodic 
reassessment.44
• Set Preparedness Goals and 
Develop Your Preparedness 
Plan: This step calls for estab-
lishing a vision for a climate 
resilient community and guid-
ing principles that will inform 
the process of setting prepared-
ness goals in the priority plan-
ning areas. This step includes 
increasing public awareness, 
increasing technical capacity to prepare for climate impacts, 
developing systematic ways to include climate change 
considerations in planning decisions, increasing adaptive 
capacity, and strengthening community partnerships. Goals 
are set, recognizing that regular reevaluations will be neces-
sary, and action steps are established and prioritized.45
	 • Implement Your Preparedness Plan: Many action steps 
can be implemented through existing tools such as zoning 
regulations, building codes, public safety rules, taxes, and 
Tourism, a major source  
of income in  
New Hampshire, relies on 
several sources all  
of which would be 
adversely impacted by 
climate change.
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tax incentives, as well as permitting, infrastructure devel-
opment, emergency management powers, and education. 
Other new tools for implementation are to be explored.46 
	 • Measure Your Progress and Update Your Plan: The devel-
opment of new resiliency measures is recommended to be 
used to assess progress. The results of these assessments 
and new information is to be used to modify assumptions 
and update the plan. Results should be shared in an open 
and transparent manner.47 
The Guidebook includes numerous checklists and charts, 
examples from communities around the world, and exten-
sive resources. It is an indispensable tool for planning for 
adaptation.
conclusIon
As the years left to accomplish the level of GHG mitigation 
the scientists advise is necessary slip away without a clear path 
to achieving the requisite targets and as actual conditions indi-
cate climate changes even more rapid and of greater magnitude 
than predicted, adaptation efforts will become an increasingly 
central aspect of planning.48 While there are gaps in the data 
available to individual communities which impede more precise 
adaptation planning, communities are nonetheless beginning to 
consider adaptation measures in their planning decisions. Such 
progress on adaptation is both essential if communities are to be 
protected from harm and smart government as adaptation mea-
sures provide opportunities for job creation and foster energy 
security for the United States.
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ideas to create a more sustainable stormwater infrastructure design). 
14 ICLEI, About ICLEI, http://www.icleiusa.org/about-iclei (last visited Feb. 
18, 2009).
15 ICLEI, Introducing ICLEI’s Climate Resilient Communities Program, http://
www.icleiusa.org/programs/climate/Climate_Adaptation (last visited Feb. 18, 
2009).
16 ICLEI, Five Milestone for Climate Adaptation Methodology, http://www.
icleiusa.org/programs/climate/Climate_Adaptation/five-milestones-for-climate-
adaptation (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
17 city of keene, new hampShiRe, aDapting to climate change: planning a 
climate ReSilient community (2007), available at http://www.ci.keene.nh.us/
planning/Keene%20Report_ICLEI_FINAL_v2.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). 
18 Id. at 6.
19 Id. at 19-21.
20 See id. at 22 (explaining that increased smog levels, poor quality air days, 
and high heat index days amplifies the risk cardiovascular and respiratory ill-
nesses and vector-borne diseases).
21 Id. at 9.
22 Id. at 11.
23 See city of keene, supra note 17, at 12.
24 Id. at 24-26.
25 Id. at 27-29.
26 Id. at 27.
27 Id. at 28.
28 See city of keene, supra note 17, at 29.
29 Id. at 29-30.
30 Id. at 29.
31 Id.
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The U.S. Southwest currently faces a water crisis that experts have projected will only get worse, due to regional effects of climate change.1 Nevada, the state 
with the fewest guaranteed water rights to the Colorado River,2 
has experienced unprecedented population growth in Las Vegas 
amidst an equally unprecedented economic boom over the past 
few decades.3 While its economy may currently be languishing,4 
population forecasts still project a significant increase in demand 
in the next several decades,5 even as water sources are projected 
to diminish and even disappear.6 This article examines the cur-
rent legislative and policy responses to climate change projec-
tions in the state of Nevada, and particularly the Las Vegas 
metropolitan area, concluding that such responses are in urgent 
need of development and expansion. 
Federal climate change legislation has been introduced in 
previous years, but none has passed.7 State legislative action in 
the region to address the potential looming crisis has been slow 
to form.8 Unlike California, Arizona and Nevada, the two other 
Lower Basin states that share the same portion of Colorado River 
water resources with California, have not adopted their own cli-
mate change plans. Arizona, however, has published a Climate 
Action Plan9 and has launched the Southwestern Climate Initia-
tive together with New Mexico.10 In contrast, Nevada’s Climate 
Action Committee only just published its report to Governor Jim 
Gibbons in 2008, recommending in part that a state action plan 
be drafted.11 
Additionally, California and Arizona are active members of 
the Western Climate Initiative, a group of U.S. governors and 
Canadian premiers “created to identify, evaluate, and implement 
. . . ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” while Nevada 
is merely an observer state.12 Nevada’s Governor has, however, 
taken a more active role as a participating member of the Western 
Governors’ Association (“WGA”), which has declared its inten-
tion to combat climate change by increasing energy efficiency 
and developing cleaner energy sources.13 WGA’s effectiveness 
will be measured by its ability to translate policy positions to 
implementation strategies. 
Fortunately, basic Nevada legislation does exist upon which 
more extensive climate change legislation could be built, includ-
ing statutes encouraging renewable energy technologies as well 
as regulating a greenhouse gas registry to counter air pollution.14 
In addition, Nevada has more traditional statutes outlining the 
state’s responsibility in governing natural resources, including 
water planning. However, no overarching legislative framework 
currently exists that incorporates these various interests with 
climate change issues. Such a broad framework would be an 
immensely useful tool to address the various causes and effects 
of climate change.
While Nevada develops the legislative capacity to govern 
water planning in a projected climate of extreme drought, the 
Southern Nevada Water Authority (“SNWA”) has taken an 
aggressive and proactive stance on finding new sources of water 
to satiate the needs of the Las Vegas metropolitan area. In 2008, 
SNWA chief Patricia Mulroy cited climate change impacts 
and lowered Colorado River water levels as impediments to a 
previously-considered system of water transfers employing 
desalination plants in California.15 One year later, Mulroy has 
proposed an even more extreme concept: to pipe floodwaters in 
to Nevada from the Mississippi River.16 The Mississippi pro-
posal is in addition to another multimillion dollar project SNWA 
is currently studying to pipe water from rural Eastern Nevada to 
Las Vegas, which has drawn much criticism from ecologists and 
rural ranchers.17 The audacity of these ideas conveys the exi-
gency of the situation and the seriousness with which officials 
are addressing future water supply. It will be interesting to see 
if such massive water pipeline proposals will be implemented 
in the future; and, if not, what long-term solutions will feed the 
growing water needs in Las Vegas and the rest of the Southwest. 
The Nevada state government and water managers clearly 
realize the severity of projected climate change impacts on the 
local water supply. Plans for a network of water pipelines are 
currently underway to provide a solution to what could be an 
extreme water shortage for Las Vegas as well as the entire U.S. 
Southwest region. However, without a comprehensive legal and 
policy framework, such piecemeal projects will not address the 
implications of climate change. Such a framework is needed to 
ensure compliance with any future federal climate change legis-
lation, and further would ensure efficient policy planning by link-
ing the causes of global warming with responses to the effects 
of localized climate change. In a time of increasing uncertainty 
regarding future water supply exacerbated by climate change, 
Nevada cannot afford a timid response to local and regional 
climate projections. Only time will tell whether Las Vegas and 
other cities in the Southwest will effectively address these issues 
before the water supply runs out. 
Endnotes:
1 Lake Mead, Key Water Source for Southwestern US, Could Be Dry By 
2021, ScienceDaily, Feb. 12, 2008, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2008/02/080212141424.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
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InTroDucTIon
With all attention fixed on the post-Kyoto negotiations for new greenhouse emissions targets it can be easy to overlook actions in the area of climate change 
adaptation. Indeed, adaptation is often regarded by environmen-
talists as an excuse for inaction on climate change that could 
exacerbate adverse environ-
mental impacts.1 While leading 
scientific bodies, like the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate 
Change (“IPCC”), agree on the 
urgent need for intervention to 
slow emissions in order to avoid 
“dangerous climate change,” 
research also confirms that some 
degree of climate change is ines-
capable.2 Working alongside 
mitigation efforts, measures to 
adapt to the resulting environ-
mental modifications are thus 
“both urgent and imperative.”3 
Within many countries the 
momentum to adapt to climate 
change is growing. Australia 
is a prominent example in this 
regard, with the importance of adaptation efforts heightened by 
scientific reports predicting severe impacts on Australia’s many 
coastal cities with sea level rise.4 This article reviews two recent, 
landmark cases in Australia which show how the courts have 
supported adaptation to climate change through their interpreta-
tion of planning laws. These cases also reveal the scope for the 
international principles of sustainable development to be trans-
lated into legal measures that seek to better prepare coastal com-
munities for the advent of climate change and its environmental 
impacts.
The aDapTaTIon ImperaTIve
Australia, like the continental United States, occupies a 
vast area of territory covered by a diverse range of ecological 
systems. To some extent, the impact of climate change on this 
environment is discernible already: Australia has experienced 
major droughts, extreme water shortages, and faces widespread 
biodiversity loss.5 In the future, additional threats are likely to be 
posed to coastal cities and towns that face problems of erosion, 
ocean surge, increased storm severity, and flooding if sea lev-
els rise significantly.6 In its latest assessment, the IPCC advises 
planning foR aDaptation to climate change:
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that “[s]ea level rise under warming is inevitable” and will “con-
tinue for many centuries after [greenhouse] concentrations have 
stabilized.”7 
Countries and regions with significant stretches of coastline 
and low-lying lands—such as Australia, the river delta areas of 
Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent, as well as many 
parts of the United States—are 
very vulnerable to the effects 
of climate change-induced sea 
level rise.8 Although future 
warming and its likely effects 
may be reduced if an effec-
tive agreement on deep emis-
sions cuts emerges from the 
current post-Kyoto negotiation 
process,9 it is becoming increas-
ingly clear that climate change 
impacts cannot be entirely pre-
vented. In this context, climate 
change mitigation, in the sense 
of “implementing policies to 
reduce [greenhouse gas] emis-
sions and enhance sinks,” will 
not be sufficient to avert serious 
environmental damage. Instead 
there is a need for adaptation “initiatives and measures to reduce 
the vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual or 
expected climate change effects.”10 
The potential for residential and other coastal development 
to be adversely affected by climate change has important ramifi-
cations for the associated responsibilities of planning authorities, 
which act as “the stewards of the coast.”11 In Australia, planning 
is primarily the responsibility of state governments pursuant to 
state planning laws and policies, although decision-making on 
approvals for individual projects is generally delegated to local 
governments.12 State governments may become directly involved 
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in the environmental assessment and approval of development 
proposals, as may the federal government in the case of major 
projects (e.g. a large-scale coastal residential development)13 
and/or ones with a likelihood of significant environmental 
impact.14 State governments also 
have responsibility for coastal 
management and planning under 
various pieces of legislation.15 
Over the longer-term, if 
planning authorities in coastal 
regions ignore the imperative of 
adapting to climate change they 
may face the risk of civil liability 
for developments approved with-
out adequate regard for future 
impacts like flooding or land ero-
sion.16 One leading Australian 
commentator describes the threat 
of litigation against local governments in such circumstances as 
“increasingly more real.”17 Indeed, local governments may be 
particularly vulnerable to litigation brought by property own-
ers affected by climate change as these bodies will generally be 
easier to identify and link to the harm suffered than the entities 
whose pollution contributed to particular impacts.18 In light of 
this, “the only sensible strategy for local governments is to start 
incorporating climate change considerations into a wide range of 
their decisions and activities.”19
clImaTe change aDapTaTIon anD  
plannIng law
Compared with greenhouse emissions mitigation that tends 
to be a focus of national and international regulation, climate 
change adaptation is a topic naturally suited to consideration at a 
more local level. For a start, the benefits of adaptation measures 
tend to be quite localized (e.g. construction of a sea wall or levee 
to reduce coastal erosion at a given beach with rising sea lev-
els). In addition, high levels of variability in the manifestation of 
impacts across different areas, even within the same country or 
region, militate in favor of tailored, local responses. As a conse-
quence, local and state governments have been at the forefront 
of climate change adaptation in Australia,20 as well as in other 
jurisdictions.21 In turn, local decision-making and policy devel-
opment with respect to climate change adaptation are beginning 
to generate institutional and organizational change outside the 
government sector amongst development agencies, property 
developers, financiers, and insurers. 
At the level of local government in Australia, many munici-
pal councils around the country have introduced, or are in the 
process of formulating, planning measures and development 
conditions designed to ensure adaptation to climate change 
impacts. These planning measures target a range of potential 
impacts, from rising sea levels and increased coastal erosion, 
to a greater frequency of cyclones and bushfires.22 Such mea-
sures may limit, quite substantially in some cases, the capacity 
of property owners to develop their land as they wish. 
For instance, the Redland Shire Council operating on the 
northeast coast of Australia in the State of Queensland has 
included a provision in its Strategic Plan that makes the “consid-
eration of sea level changes which may result from changes in 
climatic conditions” a relevant 
decision-making factor for pro-
posed urban development.23 
On this basis, the Council has 
imposed conditions on new 
developments restricting the 
areas of land that can be built on 
to those above a one in one hun-
dred year flood level.24 Similar 
development control provisions 
are appearing in some areas of 
the United States. An example 
is the Coastal Sand Dune Rules 
issued under the Maine Natural 
Resources Protection Act, which require an anticipated sea level 
rise of two feet in the next one hundred years to be considered in 
determining size, density, and location restrictions for proposed 
development.25 Some planning authorities have contemplated 
more drastic measures to adapt to climate change-induced sea 
level rise such as instituting a policy of planned retreat where 
human settlements are relocated away from the coastline.26 
Bryon Shire Council on the central eastern coast of Australia is 
one such local government that is implementing a policy of this 
kind with mixed results.27
Unsurprisingly, local adaptation measures that restrict 
development in the coastal zone have not gone unchallenged. In 
Australia, this has resulted in a number of cases coming before 
planning and environmental tribunals and courts.28 These cases 
have necessitated judicial consideration (at varying levels of 
detail) of the risks of sea level rise with climate change and the 
legal scope for adaptation measures to respond to such risks. 
The decisions contribute to a growing body of climate change 
jurisprudence in Australia dealing with the permissible nature of 
global warming mitigation and adaptation strategies taken at the 
local, state, or national level.29
clImaTe change aDapTaTIon lITIgaTIon
Two recent landmark decisions of Australian courts illus-
trate the way in which litigation through the planning system 
is shaping actions to respond to the challenge of impending cli-
mate change. The two cases originated in different coastal areas 
of Australia: the New South Wales south coast (the Walker case) 
and the low-lying South Gippsland coast in the State of Victo-
ria (the Gippsland Coastal Board case). Consequently, different 
local government and state laws were applicable in each case. 
Yet, an interesting link between the decisions is their shared 
reliance on the principles of sustainable development to inter-
pret planning laws in a way that supports the implementation of 
adaptation measures. 
In Australia, the internationally-derived concept of sus-
tainable development (known as ecologically sustainable 
Climate change  
adaptation is a topic 
naturally suited to 
consideration at a more 
local level.
39 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
develop ment or “ESD”) is a central policy goal of planning and 
environmental law requiring the integration of environmental 
considerations into development-related decision-making.30 
It is embodied in the objectives of multiple statutes spanning 
all Australian jurisdictions.31 ESD is generally underpinned in 
such legislation by a series of environmental principles whose 
function is to guide the development of specific environmental 
rules and to provide a framework for making individual deci-
sions that balance environmental and development consider-
ations. Important principles of ESD in Australia (that mirror 
international sustainable development principles)32 include the 
principle of inter- generational equity (requiring regard to be had 
to the environmental needs and interests of future generations) 
and the precautionary principle (advising caution in the face of 
scientific uncertainty over potential environmental impacts).33 
ESD and its principles thus provide a common framework for 
environmental law and decision-making in Australia, superim-
posed over the requirements of specific, local legal and policy 
requirements.
Walker caSe 
The Walker case was a judicial review action in which a 
challenge was brought to approval of a concept plan for a resi-
dential subdivision and retirement village.34 The proposed 
development was located at Sandon Point, near Wollongong 
on the coast just south of Sydney.35 The Sandon Point proposal 
attracted strong public opposition on the basis of its potential 
environmental impacts, including effects on three watercourses 
crossing the site that were prone to flooding.36 
Approval powers for the development had been transferred 
from the local authority to the New South Wales Planning Min-
ister under state legislation following the designation of the 
proposal as a “major infrastructure project.”37 The relevant leg-
islation was the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 
1979 (“EPA Act”), which under Part 3A, makes special provi-
sion for the assessment of projects designated as major infra-
structure. Pursuant to Part 3A of the EPA Act, in approving the 
concept plan the Minister was obliged to take into account an 
environmental assessment prepared by his department. In turn 
this assessment was required to identify any relevant aspect of 
“the public interest,”38 a category which has been judicially 
interpreted to encompass the principles of ESD such as inter-
generational equity and the precautionary principle.39 Accord-
ingly, one of the principal grounds for review in the Walker case 
was that the Planning Minister had failed to take into account 
principles of ESD in making his decision.40 The factual basis for 
this claim was the absence of any consideration by the Minister 
or his department of the potential for the flooding risk on the 
Sandon Point site to be exacerbated by climate change.41
Justice Biscoe of the New South Wales Land and Environ-
ment Court began by considering whether, under Part 3A of the 
EPA Act, ESD principles were a mandatory consideration in 
decision-making and, if so, whether the Minister was bound to 
consider the relevance of climate change flood risk to the devel-
opment.42 The answers to these questions turned on construction 
of the subject matter, scope, and purpose of the EPA Act. The 
court noted that the objects of the Act included the encourage-
ment of ESD as well as protection of the environment, “defined 
broadly and non-exhaustively in s[ection] 4(1) to include ‘all 
aspects of the surroundings of humans, whether affecting any 
human as an individual or in his or her social groupings.’”43 
Moreover, Justice Biscoe held:
There may be found in the subject matter, scope and 
purpose of this legislative scheme, as with nearly every 
statute conferring power to make an administrative 
decision, an implication that the decision is to be made 
on the basis of the most current material available to 
the decision-maker which has a direct bearing on the 
justice of the decision . . . . So too, in my opinion, with 
the deadly serious issue of climate change, which has 
loomed ever larger in the public and political eye for 
years.44
In the context of the project at issue, the court found that 
climate change flood risk could be described as “an aspect of 
the public interest that potentially has a direct bearing on the 
justice of the decision.”45 In Justice Biscoe’s view, therefore, 
climate change flood risk was appropriately designated as a nec-
essary consideration for environmental assessment of a flood-
constrained, coastal plan development like that under review. 
Flowing from the objective of encouraging ESD in the objects of 
the EPA Act, the consideration of climate change flood risk thus 
became a relevant, mandatory consideration for the Minister in 
deciding whether to approve the concept plan. His failure to do 
so rendered that approval void and of no effect.46
The importance of the Walker decision in the context of the 
adaptation imperative for climate change is twofold. First, the 
case illustrates how general principles of environmental law, 
such as principles of (ecologically) sustainable development, 
can be employed as a framework for importing specific consid-
erations pertinent to climate change risks into decision-making. 
The court’s reliance on ESD principles—rather than particular 
legislative or policy directives—as a basis for finding climate 
change flood risk to be a mandatory consideration in the case 
may have far-reaching ramifications “for all kinds of economic 
activities.”47 The reasoning employed in the Walker judgment 
may be applicable to many types of development potentially 
impacted by climate change. This might include developments 
that are affected by increased drought risk, decreased snowfall, 
coral bleaching, or coastal erosion.
The second major contribution made by the case is the way 
it highlights how local development assessment and approv-
als must increasingly be made in terms of a holistic and global 
context that includes global warming risks. As Justice Briscoe 
stated:
Climate change presents a risk to the survival of the 
human race and other species. Consequently, it is a 
deadly serious issue. It has been increasingly under 
public scrutiny for some years. No doubt that is because 
of global scientific support for the existence and risks 
of climate change and its anthropogenic causes.48
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Such judicial statements point to an acceptance of a global 
scale for risk assessment when it comes to considering the poten-
tial impacts of climate change, even though the focus remains on 
local measures for adaptation. This view is precipitating a change 
in thinking on the part of developers and planning authorities 
in coastal regions. For instance, following the Walker decision, 
one Australian law firm advised that in relation to future project 
applications:
[I]t is recommended that proponents and councils make 
an assumption that there is the potential for greater 
flooding or inundation than is presently the case (i.e. 
due to climate change), and that proponents should con-
sider whether any mitigation measures can be designed 
to alleviate any future flooding impacts.49 
GippslanD Coastal BoarD caSe
The wide-ranging consequences of the Walker case were 
echoed in another Australian climate change flooding case 
decided in 2008, although in this instance it was sea level rise 
rather than extreme weather events that were the cause for con-
cern. The Gippsland Coastal Board case50 has been regarded as 
a watershed decision in relation to 
coastal development adaptation 
and climate change. In its decision, 
which was based on a reappraisal 
of all the relevant scientific and 
planning evidence,51 the Victorian 
Civil and Administrative Tribu-
nal determined to refuse consent 
for residential developments in a 
low-lying coastal region.52 
The local South Gippsland 
Shire Council had previously 
approved permits for six resi-
dential developments in the Grip 
Road area of Toora, an area 
zoned for agricultural and mixed land uses.53 The grant of per-
mits was opposed by the Gippsland Coastal Board, a regional 
coastal board set up under the Victorian Coastal Management 
Act 1995.54 In its application to the Victorian Civil and Admin-
istrative Tribunal for merits review of the approvals, one of the 
principal objections raised by the Gippsland Coastal Board was 
that the proposed dwelling developments were inappropriate in 
light of projected sea level rises as a result of climate change.55 
In elaborating this argument, the Board relied on preliminary 
studies of potential sea level rise and wind surge undertaken by 
Australia’s premier scientific research organization, the Com-
monwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation.56 
The Tribunal ultimately determined to refuse approvals for 
the proposed development based on inconsistency with zoning 
and planning controls.57 Importantly also, the Tribunal applied 
the precautionary principle as a component of ESD to find that 
development consent should not be granted in view of the likeli-
hood of inundation of the land and proposed dwellings, due to 
sea level rise induced by climate change.58 
In the circumstances of the Gippsland Coastal Board deci-
sion, there were no specific provisions in the relevant planning 
laws mandating either consideration of the precautionary prin-
ciple or the potential for sea level rise. However, the Tribunal 
noted the general scientific consensus “that some level of cli-
mate change will result in extreme weather conditions beyond 
the historical record that planners and others rely on in assessing 
future potential impacts.”59 According to the Tribunal there thus 
existed “a reasonably foreseeable risk of inundation” to the land 
and proposed dwellings that was judged to be unacceptable.60 
This threat was considered an adequate basis for invocation 
of the precautionary principle notwithstanding the Tribunal’s 
acceptance that there was a degree of scientific uncertainty as to 
the level of projected sea rise on the Gippsland coast. Indeed, the 
Tribunal endorsed a precautionary approach on the issue of cli-
mate change adaptation while clearly acknowledging that “[t]he 
range of impacts may well be beyond the predictive capability 
of current assessment techniques.”61 The Tribunal also empha-
sized that for effective risk assessment, it was not acceptable to 
rely upon historical data and previous flood model predictions in 
assessing future climate change induced risks.62 
Like the Walker case be -
fore it, the Gippsland Coastal 
Board decision illustrates the 
broad potential for ESD con-
cepts to be relied upon in fash-
ioning planning approaches for 
climate change adaptation. In 
particular, adoption of a pre-
cautionary approach to evaluat-
ing the effects of potential sea 
level rise signals an important 
development where the limits 
of existing risk assessment and 
predictive capability are clearly 
acknowledged.63 The Tribu-
nal’s reasoning suggests that the necessity for precautionary 
action in coastal planning and decision-making flows from the 
general scientific consensus regarding the likelihood of inunda-
tion from rising seas as this risk is now one which is “reasonably 
foreseeable.” In this regard, one consequence of the Gippsland 
Coastal Board decision may be the routine inclusion of climate 
change considerations via the importation of ESD principles in 
decision-making and merits review under planning and environ-
ment legislation across relevant Australian jurisdictions. 
conclusIon
Cases like the Walker and Gippsland Coastal Board deci-
sions are still few and far between and the imperative for climate 
change adaptation planning and development has certainly not 
been accepted by all governments and planning authorities in 
Australia. Clear tensions remain between pressures for develop-
ment approval in coastal regions and the need to adapt to climate 
change impacts through state and local planning regimes. Nev-
ertheless, the currency of global warming issues and the firming 
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of scientific data on future impacts are encouraging many local 
governments and coastal planning authorities in Australia and 
elsewhere in the world to give serious thought to planning for and 
implementing precautionary measures to respond to expected 
effects like sea level rise and inundation. As climate change 
considerations come to be seen as relevant, if not essential, to 
environmental assessment processes, there is also the specter of 
litigation facing those governmental authorities that act without 
regard to future climate change risks.64 
The emerging trend evidenced in the Australian cases of 
Walker and Gippsland Coastal Board to consider climate change 
risks within the broader ambit of sustainable development could 
also have far-reaching significance. In Australia, as in many 
other jurisdictions, the policy and principles of sustainable 
development play an overarching, strategic role in planning and 
environmental laws. The Australian cases illustrate how general 
concepts of sustainability can be translated into specific require-
ments for planning and decision-making in areas at risk from 
the effects of climate change. The precautionary principle, in 
particular, appears well-suited as a basis for measures to ensure 
coastal development adapts to climate change over the longer-
term, at least in circumstances where there is clear supporting 
scientific evidence at the general level of climate change risks 
such as flooding or sea level rise.65 Therefore, despite the well-
acknowledged limitations of sustainable development as a guid-
ing objective for environmental law,66 it seems the concept may 
progressively be given real purchase in a practical way through 
its implementation in the evolving climate law jurisprudence.
The Australian cases on adaptation also illustrate the mul-
tiple scales relevant for actions to address climate change. Both 
the Walker case and the Gippsland Coastal Board case see cli-
mate change as a global problem but one that poses risks at the 
local as well as the global level. Although the focus of countries 
and many in the environmental community will remain (rightly) 
on preventing dangerous global warming, the law is also begin-
ning to embrace a role for local adaptation measures to prepare 
for climate change effects. This gives new meaning to the old 
environmental adage “think globally, act locally.”
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ing the Australian government is pessimistic on the prospects for international 
negotiations to achieve a comprehensive global agreement to stabilize green-
house gas emissions at safe levels). 
10 See inteRgoveRnmental panel on climate change fouRth aSSeSSment 
RepoRt, woRking gRoup iii RepoRt, annex i (Aviel Verbruggen ed., 2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-an-
nex1.pdf (outlining the definitions of mitigation and adaptation as drawn from 
the work of the IPCC). Endnotes: Planning for Adaptation to Climate Change 
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11 See Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level 
Rise, Ecosystem Loss, and Public Access along the California Coast, 34 
 ecology l. q. 533, 535 (2007).
12 Australian local governments are similar to municipal governments in the 
United States. They are not mentioned in the Australian Constitution but are 
established and given powers pursuant to state laws.
13 See, e.g., Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, No. 203, pt. 
3A (N.S.W.) [hereinafter EPA] available at http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/
viewtop/inforce/act+203+1979+FIRST+0+N; see also Environmental Effects 
Act, 1978, No. 9135 (Vict.), available at http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/ 
(select “Victorian Law Today” hyperlink, select “acts” and click E, scroll down 
to Environmental Effects Act of 1978).
14 See, e.g., Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999 
(Austl.), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/index.html (provid-
ing that federal involvement is limited to projects with likely significant impacts 
on designated “matters of national environmental significance,” e.g. endangered 
species or World Heritage properties).
15 See, e.g., Coastal Management Act, 1995 (Vict.) (establishing regional 
coastal boards, such as the Gippsland Coastal Board, discussed in the case note 
below).
16 See McDonald, supra note 3, at 134.
17 See Philippa England, Heating Up: Climate Change Law and the Evolving 
Responsibilities of Local Government, 13 loc. gov’t l. J. 209, 210 (2008).
18 See McDonald, supra note 3, at 134. 
19 England, supra note 17, at 210.
20 See, e.g., Australian Gov’t, Dep’t of the Env’t, Cities for Climate Protection 
(“CCP”) Austl., available at http://www.environment.gov.au/settlements/local/
ccp/ (noting local governments played a prominent role in the CCP Australia 
program, part of the ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability: http://www.
iclei.org).
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DiRty fuel incentiveS in the bailout bill
By Rand Robins & Janet M. Hager*
*Rand Robins and Janet M. Hager are J.D. candidates, May 2010, at American 
University, Washington College of Law.
The current dependence on oil in the United States cannot be supported in the future. The issue is how the United States will confront the growing problem of meeting its 
need for transportation fuel. One option is to develop uncon-
ventional fossil fuels derived from oil sands, oil shale, and liq-
uid coal. However, this is an option that could come at a great 
cost to the environment. The question facing Congress and the 
American people is whether, and to what extent, the govern-
ment should subsidize these environmentally devastating energy 
sources with tax incentives, direct financing, loan guarantees, or 
purchasing agreements.
The rate of consumption of oil in the United States is unsus-
tainable.1 The world uses twelve billion more barrels of oil each 
year than is discovered.2 Yet, the United States is expected to 
continue to increase its consumption of oil by forty-four per-
cent by the year 2025.3 Thus, there will not be enough supply 
to match the world’s demands for oil.4 Furthermore, the United 
States consumes eleven percent of the world’s production of 
oil, but only has three percent of the world’s oil reserves.5 This 
dependence on foreign oil threatens the country’s economy and 
national security.6 It is estimated that the oil dependence results 
in a penalty to the economy of $297 to $305 billion each year, so 
the threat to the economy is great.7 The threat to national secu-
rity is also substantial, considering that much of the oil that is 
imported into the United States comes from hostile areas of the 
world.8 
Because of these widespread problems with oil, it is not 
surprising that the United States is looking for new solutions. 
However, a transition to unconventional fossil fuels will only 
exacerbate the devastating problem of climate change. The 
threat to the global environment as a result of the continuing 
widespread use of fossil fuels is great.9 The global increase 
in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is primarily the result of 
the increase in the use of fossil fuels like oil, and potentially 
these new unconventional fuels.10 The effect of the increase of 
greenhouse gases from fossil fuels has already been felt.11 The 
sea level is rising, glaciers are decreasing, and extreme weather 
events have become more frequent.12 It is expected that the sur-
face temperature will increase by 3.2 to 7.2°F beyond levels in 
the 1990s by the end of the century.13 The United States must 
decrease, not increase, its use of fossil fuels if it is to combat the 
growing problem of climate change.14 
There is evidence that unconventional fossil fuels will not 
just maintain the status quo, but will actually increase the rate 
of emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States.15 The 
two most viable unconventional fossil fuels are synthetic crude 
oil derived from oil sand (“SCO”) and fuel made from coal liq-
uefaction (“CTL”).16 The production of these fuels emits more 
greenhouse gases than conventional oil.17 The use of SCO emits 
twenty percent more carbon dioxide than lighter crude oils.18 
The use of CTL would result in twice the emissions of con-
ventional fuel.19 Additionally, mining for oil sand is similar to 
mining coal; these operations will require the addition of roads, 
pipelines, and other infrastructure, and will displace plant and 
animal life.20
Despite the questionable nature of these unconventional 
fuels, Congress has still taken steps to promote them. The tax 
code has been modified by the recent financial bailout bill, 
enacted in October of 2008, to subsidize CTL in three ways. 
First, the code reduces the cost of constructing expensive CTL 
plants by providing tax credits for capital investment.21 Second, 
the code reduces the cost of operating dirty fuel facilities by pro-
viding tax deductions for the operating costs of oil shale and tar 
sands refineries.22 Third, the code reduces the risk that falling oil 
prices will suffocate the market for non-traditional transportation 
fuels by applying the alternative fuel credit (originally intended 
for ethanol production facilities) to coal-based facilities.23
Although advocates for these unconventional fossil fuels 
promise energy independence, economic development, and 
improving environmental impacts, there is scant evidence 
to determine the likelihood of success on any of these prom-
ises.24 Moving forward with commercialization of any of these 
unconventional fossil fuels will lock the United States into more 
dependence on carbon-based transportation fuel at a time when 
the nation should be focusing on clean forms of energy.25 Law-
makers presented with this energy legislation in the recent bail-
out bill found themselves between a rock and a hard place: to 
vote for a bill with broad public backing that also gives sup-
port to dirty fuels, or to risk their political position by voting 
against the legislation.26 In the end, lawmakers chose to support 
the bill, despite its shortcomings in energy policy.27 In future 
legislation Congress should focus its efforts on deploying clean 
fuels, clean vehicles, and sustainable patterns of growth, rather 
than  subsidizing fuels that contribute to global environmental 
problems. 
Endnotes:
1 Natural Resources Defense Council, Safe, Strong and Secure: Reducing 
America’s Oil Dependence, http://www.nrdc.org/air/transportation/aoilpolicy2.
asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
2 Id.
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new treaty amended the existing treaties of the EU by carrying 
out most of the reforms previously proposed in the rejected Euro-
pean Constitution. The Constitution, signed in October 2004 and 
ratified by eighteen Member States, was prevented from enter-
ing into force by its rejection in referenda held in France and 
the Netherlands in May and June 2005 respectively. The result-
ing ratification crisis led to a period of “reflection, clarification 
and discussion,”8 ending only 
when the European summit 
held in Brussels in June 2007 
abandoned the idea of a Euro-
pean Constitution and decided 
to replace it with a new amend-
ing treaty in the manner of pre-
vious treaties (i.e. the Single 
European Act, the Maastricht or 
Nice treaties). 
Unexpectedly, Ireland—
the only Member State to hold a 
referendum—turned its back on 
the Lisbon Treaty and voted it 
down in June 2008. This unex-
pected development prompted 
the vast majority of journal-
ists9 to prejudge the “death” of 
the Lisbon Treaty, followed by 
Václav Klaus, the president of the Czech Republic and the only 
EU leader to state that “the Lisbon project is finished.”10 How-
ever, this pessimism was not shared by other European leaders 
who, following the initial shock, initiated negotiations on how to 
bypass the Irish problem. As a matter of fact, one of the top pri-
orities of President Nicolas Sarkozy for the French Presidency 
of the EU (France took over the six-month rotating presidency 
on July 1, 2008) was to come up with a plan for somehow sal-
vaging the Lisbon Treaty.11 
The European Council met in Brussels on June 19–20, 2008 
and decided to delay any decision until the next summit in Octo-
ber 2008.12 As a result of the unexpected financial meltdown, the 
issue of the treaty was pushed to the sidelines, as Europe’s lead-
ers had far more pressing and urgent concerns to occupy their 
attention during October’s European Council summit. Decisions 
InTroDucTIon
The historic December 2008 European Council meeting in Brussels resulted inter alia in the endorsement by Euro-pean Union (“EU”) leaders of a plan to revive the Lis-
bon Treaty, following the treaty’s rejection by the Irish people 
in June 2008. Both the 2005 European Constitution and its suc-
cessor, the 2007 Lisbon or Reform Treaty,1 are aimed at improv-
ing lingering shortcomings in the 
institutional operation of the EU 
in a number of policy fields.2 To 
this end, the EU’s Member States 
had decided inter alia to appoint 
a full-time European Council 
President,3 promote a clearer and 
fairer voting system in the Coun-
cil of Ministers,4 create a more 
powerful EU High Representa-
tive for Foreign Affairs and,5 
finally, introduce majority voting 
on a number of internal security 
policy areas.6 
This article focuses exclu-
sively on the extent to which this 
new amending treaty will have 
an improving effect on the EU’s 
performance when negotiating 
in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). Authors have been unanimous 
in identifying the rotating Presidency system, the predominance 
of environment ministries in climate change negotiations, and 
the complexity of internal EU coordination, as being the three 
main causes undermining the negotiating performance of the 
EU in international climate talks. Following an analysis of the 
climate-related changes instituted by the Reform Treaty, this 
article concludes that it will not significantly improve the current 
situation, as EU leaders proved largely unwilling to weaken the 
powers of the Member States vis-à-vis the Community in that 
particular policy area.7
backgrounD
On December 13, 2007, the heads of government and state 
of the EU Member States signed the Treaty of Lisbon (also 
known as the Reform Treaty) at a summit in Lisbon, Portugal. 
Expected at the time to enter into force sometime in 2009, this 
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were postponed for the next Council meeting in December 2008, 
where European governments eventually approved a package of 
concessions to Ireland, aiming at addressing the concerns about 
sovereignty that led Irish voters to reject the Lisbon Treaty.13 It 
is of interest to note that the EU Presidency had, from the very 
outset, the firmly expressed commitment of the Irish govern-
ment to producing a plan that would facilitate a “Yes” vote in 
a future second referendum.14 These concessions were offered 
with the proviso that Ireland would ratify the Lisbon Treaty by 
October 2009. Of course, it remains to be seen whether these 
measures will be enough to convince the Irish people to endorse 
the Lisbon Treaty a second time around. In any case, at the time 
of writing, the Lisbon Treaty is far from dead and may soon be a 
reality in the lives of European citizens. It would therefore be of 
usefulness to academics, policy-makers, and all interested par-
ties to be aware in advance of what this treaty actually entails 
for Europe.
The main objectives of both the European Constitution and 
the Reform Treaty that replaced it were inter alia to establish 
simpler and clearer rules for decision-making in a continuously 
enlarging EU of (currently) twenty-seven Member States and to 
“ensure that the EU’s institutions operate in a more effective and 
efficient manner.”15 The present study focuses only on one par-
ticular policy area, investigating specifically the extent to which 
the new Reform Treaty will ensure a more effective and effi-
cient operation of the EU when negotiating in the context of the 
UNFCCC. The relevant EU climate policy literature has long 
ago identified a number of problematic features in the EU’s cli-
mate decision-making machinery and has offered possible rem-
edies. Groundbreaking as they were, European leaders proved 
unwilling to incorporate the bulk of these remedies in the 2007 
Lisbon Treaty.
crITIcIsms oF The currenT  
InsTITuTIonal seT-up
Unlike other areas, such as trade, water quality, or hazard-
ous waste disposal, where competence16 lies with the Commu-
nity, climate change is an area in which a situation of “shared 
competence” pertains. In international climate change negotia-
tions, therefore, common EU positions have been agreed upon 
in advance “by the Member States, with the participation of the 
Commission. The country holding the Presidency of the EU—a 
position that rotates every six months—coordinates the members 
and presents the EU position at the international negotiations.”17 
In other words, the Presidency, assisted by the previous and next 
Member State to hold that position (the “troika”), has assumed 
the leadership role.
There exist a number of problems that result from the EU’s 
current institutional set-up, which involves too many actors in 
the whole climate change negotiation process (currently the 
 twenty-seven Member States plus the Commission). The first 
problem is the system of the half-yearly rotating presidency. 
Authors argue/criticize that not only does it not allow for conti-
nuity in the EU’s negotiating strategy and the formulation of a 
long-term strategic perspective, but that it also results in a loss 
of “institutional memory.”18 As Van Schaik and Egenhofer note, 
“since the Presidency is changing every half year, there is a rela-
tively high chance of inconsistencies in performance and actual 
positions. This semi-annual change in leadership can also be 
a constraining factor regarding the formulation of a long-term 
strategic perspective.”19
A second complication confronting the EU during the 
course of international climate change negotiations is known 
as the “EU Bunker.” Changing positions and agreeing on new 
proposals by other international actors requires the assent of 
the majority of Member States. This, however, is very difficult 
to achieve during the course of the negotiations and it can be 
a “major source of delay and frustration, with endless co-ordi-
nation meetings and the inflexibility of Council Mandates.”20 
Investing much (precious) time in bridging internal differences 
may also result in EU Member States being practically unable 
to react to outside developments. Creatively put, the amount of 
time and diplomatic effort that is required for these intra-bloc 
negotiations often means that the EU is conducting “a confer-
ence within a conference.”21 
It is well known, for example, that in the final dramatic 
night at Kyoto the EU ministers “were still locked in inter-
nal consultations while the plenary was in session: Chairman 
Estrada gavelled through the critical text on the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (“CDM”) while EU ministers were still trying 
to establish a common position in another room.”22 When they 
informed the Chairman of their opposition to the pre-budget 
crediting of emission reductions, the decision had already been 
made and could not be reopened.23 The same situation recurred 
during the sixth Conference of Parties (“COP”) at The Hague in 
2000, when EU ministers were still debating amendments they 
wished to propose to Chairman Pronk’s compromise paper after 
amendments from all the other groups, even the much larger and 
under-resourced Group of 77 (underdeveloped countries) plus 
China (“G-77/China”), had been circulated and the final night’s 
crucial negotiations had begun.24
Finally, a third problem relates to the predominance of 
environment ministries and the under-representation of econom-
ics and trade ministries in climate change negotiations. Several 
authors agree that climate talks have somewhat “outgrown” 
the environmental ministries, as they involve not only environ-
mental but also—and increasingly so—economic, trade, devel-
opment, energy, and transport issues and concerns.25 It is thus 
felt that closer cooperation between the environment, trade, and 
economic ministries “would do more justice to the economic 
realities of climate change policy.”26 In the United States, for 
example, it is the State Department that takes the lead in the 
negotiations, with the Department of Commerce being respon-
sible for the overall coordination of the U.S. position.27 Fol-
lowing the flawed performance of the EU at The Hague COP in 
2000, the EU did try to address this issue by allowing for greater 
flexibility in the common position, strengthening the role of the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (“COREPER”), and 
having economic, trade, and foreign ministries more involved 
in the whole process.28 These changes did lead to improvements 
45 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
in the performance of the EU in COP-6bis (Bonn) and COP-7 
(Marrakech), but did not “fundamentally alter the way the EU 
position [was] formulated.”29 
suggesTIons For ImprovemenT
Commentators over the years have made a number of pro-
posals aiming at improving the EU’s operational functioning. It 
has been widely suggested, for instance, that the performance 
of the EU would improve dramatically if the Member States 
allowed the European Commission to take over the coordina-
tion of the EU negotiating position from the Presidency.30 This, 
however, is a highly unlikely future prospect, as several Mem-
ber States (i.e. the UK) are vehemently opposed to any further 
expansion of the competencies of the Commission.31 As we 
shall see, such a prospect becomes even slimmer now with the 
new Reform Treaty.
Another proposal, by Lacasta et al., involves delegating 
authority to a number of “lead countries” that would prepare, 
in close cooperation with the 
Commission, “draft common 
negotiating positions to be 
decided by the Council.”32 
Grubb and Gupta share this 
proposal, noting in turn that 
such a move would “reflect 
the nature of the EU as a 
strong intergovernmental 
rather than supranational 
institution.”33 These “lead 
countries”—or the Commis-
sion in the first case—would 
also be responsible for the 
formulation beforehand of 
commonly agreed “fall-
back” positions that would 
allow for greater EU flex-
ibility in the decisive phases 
of UNFCCC talks.34 Cur-
rently, the inflexibility of the 
Council mandates results in 
the EU having neither such fall-backs nor the necessary mecha-
nisms for coming up with them in the midst of the negotiations.35 
However, given the political and economic implications of cli-
mate change, the extent to which some Member States would be 
willing to allow for decisions to be taken for them without their 
express approval and input is subject to debate. 
Finally, regarding the issue of the predominance of environ-
ment ministries, a possible suggestion by some authors provides 
for climate policy to become part of the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (“CFSP”), thereby bringing “diplomatic 
muscle (and, hopefully, finesse) to the Community actions.”36 
Similar is one of many proposals by Van Schaik and Egen-
hofer, who propose that the Foreign Affairs Council would be 
responsible for the formulation of climate policy, thus “offering 
a possibility for more integration of the EU’s position in climate 
negotiations with other external policies of the EU.”37 In this 
case, Environment Ministers, whose expertise is deemed essen-
tial, could second their Foreign Ministers during sessions of the 
Foreign Affairs Council in which external climate policy nego-
tiating positions are debated.38 Another option in this regard 
would be for Foreign and Environment Ministers to hold joint 
meetings, for instance every half a year.39
changes InsTITuTeD by The  
reForm TreaTy
Before attempting to explain the benefits the Reform Treaty 
will have for the EU’s performance in UNFCCC negotiations, 
a symbolic comment should be made. The new treaty, in the 
amended Article 174, states that one of the aims of EU envi-
ronmental policy will be to promote “measures at [the] interna-
tional level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental 
problems, and in particular combating climate change.”40 It is 
the first time the term “climate change” appears in the text of an 
EU treaty. Provided that it 
enters into force, the Reform 
Treaty will introduce, as 
already discussed, a num-
ber of institutional changes 
meant to improve the effi-
cient running of the EU. 
How then, would this new 
treaty strengthen EU perfor-
mance in international cli-
mate change negotiations?
To begin with, the 
European Parliament (“EP”) 
will be able to veto interna-
tional agreements, including 
climate change-related ones. 
Until now, the Council only 
consulted the EP and could 
ignore its judgement if act-
ing unanimously. Pursuant 
to the Reform Treaty, the 
consent of the EP (as the 
“voice of the people”) would be required for the ratification of 
international environmental (including climate) agreements, 
enhancing therefore the democratic legitimacy of the EU.41 The 
EP might never actually vote down an international environmen-
tal agreement, but it may become more demanding and insist 
that its viewpoints on climate change issues be taken more seri-
ously into consideration.42 
Continuing on with the Presidency, the rotating system will 
remain largely the same. Even though the European Council 
will have its own President (in office for two and a half years), 
the chairmanship of the other councils, except foreign affairs, 
will continue to rotate every six months. The efficiency of the 
Presidency, however, is expected to improve significantly with 
the introduction—already in operation since 2007—of a new 
enhanced “troika-like” system, known as the “triple presidency.” 
It has been widely suggested 
. . . that the performance 
of the EU would improve 
dramatically if the Member 
States allowed the European 
Commission to take over 
the coordination of the EU 
negotiating position from  
the Presidency.
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According to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
which never came into force, the Presidency would continue to 
rotate every six months, but every eighteen months the three 
Presidencies due to hold office would negotiate a common 
agenda and work together over this one and half year period 
to accomplish its objectives, always led by the Member State 
 holding the presidency at the time. Even though the aforemen-
tioned treaty is not legally binding, the September 2006 Council 
of the European Union decided to adopt the concept of the pre-
siding trio.43 
This development will allow for greater coordination and 
continuity, as it will put an end to the practice exercised up to 
2006 of every successive Presidency re-writing the agenda every 
six months in accordance with its own priorities. In the context of 
climate politics, the new “troika-like” system will enable Mem-
ber States with a greater interest in this policy area to relieve 
smaller ones of the burden of conducting negotiations in which 
they have no actual interest. As is obvious, not all Member States 
are usually active in a particular 
policy area. In most Multilat-
eral Environmental Agreements 
(“MEAs”), less than half a dozen 
positions are likely to emerge, 
as most small Member States do 
not have a particular line to push. 
Luxemburg, for example, cannot 
employ more than a handful of 
its officials to specialize in any 
MEA when it holds the presiden-
cy.44 To give another example, 
the Presidency during 1996—one 
year prior to Kyoto’s crucial 
COP-3—had been held by Italy 
and Ireland, two countries known 
for their lack of a progressive stance on climate change. The 
position of the EU had remained practically unchanged since 
Berlin’s 1995 COP-1, and it would not have been a hyperbole 
to suggest that it had virtually stagnated.45 It is for cases such as 
this that the Reform Treaty’s new presiding Trio concept could 
prove a far more workable system. Of course, as promising as it 
may seem, only time will demonstrate the extent to which this 
new arrangement will indeed be an improvement.
A final related innovation is, as already mentioned, the 
establishment by the Reform Treaty of an EU Minister for For-
eign Affairs (the High Representative for Foreign Policy and 
Security)—merging the existing roles of High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner 
for External Affairs. The role, if any, of the High Representative 
for Foreign Policy and Security in international climate change 
negotiations is as yet unclear.46 According to Van Schaik and 
Egenhofer, involvement of the Foreign Minister in EU activities 
in the UNFCCC could “advance the integration of climate change 
with other policy areas, notably with other external policies.”47 
Such involvement, however, even if it does occur, will likely 
remain limited or auxiliary, as only officials of environment 
ministries command the immensely specialized knowledge on 
technical aspects of the climate change policy area.48 Given 
that the EU “Foreign Minister” will be mainly responsible for 
the EU’s CFSP, Environment Ministers will in all probability 
remain largely responsible for the formulation of the EU’s posi-
tion on climate change, aided on occasion by their economic, 
trade, and foreign counterparts. In other words, the current sys-
tem is not expected to be altered significantly. 
conclusIon
To conclude, despite the explicit acknowledgement of cli-
mate change in the Reform Treaty, actual climate-related changes 
in the Treaty are limited. National governments prove to be ada-
mant in their insistence to maintain control over their energy 
policy, a key element of national security in the view of many 
sovereigns. When it comes to energy, major disparities exist 
within, between, and among the nations of the EU. Given their 
vast differences in economic development, these twenty-seven 
Member States have, in most 
cases, widely different energy 
matrices, greenhouse gas emis-
sion, and energy consumption 
patterns. Internal EU negotia-
tions for agreeing a common cli-
mate policy, therefore, are quite 
strenuous and time-consuming, 
as different Member States are 
more willing and/or capable 
to reduce their emissions than 
others.49 Closely related to this 
is the Euro-scepticism of some 
Member States (e.g. the United 
Kingdom) who are unwilling to 
expand the competencies and 
reach of the EU’s governing bodies. The Commission’s 1990s 
proposal for an energy/carbon tax serving in this case as a prom-
inent example.50 
The extent, therefore, to which the new treaty would benefit 
the performance of the EU in UNFCCC negotiations is likely 
narrow. Contrary to expectations, the Reform Treaty does not 
sufficiently address any of the three problems affecting the nego-
tiating ability of the EU tentatively outlined earlier. The “EU 
bunker” will continue to afflict the EU, as will most of the prob-
lems associated with the predominance of environment minis-
tries. The same largely applies to the rotating Presidency, but in 
this case the new enhanced “troika-like” system will definitely 
result in some meaningful improvements in the current situation. 
Undoubtedly, the big question remains whether the new EU For-
eign Minister will become involved in EU climate activities and 
what will be his/her exact role. As seen, such an involvement—in 
all probability one of limited importance—can only benefit the 
EU. In any case, such a discussion is highly hypothetical and the 
questions posed will only be answered following the potential 
entry into force of the Reform Treaty in 2009 or 2010. Several 
authors have advocated a reform of EU institutions as the only 
The extent . . . to which  
the new treaty would 
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practical solution for dealing with the current shortcomings of 
the EU as a negotiator in policy areas of “shared competence.” 
Unfortunately, such a reform of institutions—as far as climate 
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Endnotes: European Union Coherence in UNFCCC Negotiations 
Under the New Treaty of Lisbon (Reform Treaty)
continued on page 73
change policy is concerned—was not carried out by the Reform 
Treaty, as it presented a choice not politically acceptable to the 
majority of EU Member States.
1 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, O.J. (C 306/01) opened for signature 
Dec. 13, 2007 [hereafter Reform Treaty].
2 For more information on both the Constitutional & Reform Treaties, see 
generally Sebastian Kurpas, The Treaty of Lisbon – How much ‘Constitution’ 
is left? An Overview of the Main Changes (CEPS, Policy Brief Series No.147, 
2007) available at http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1568 (last 
 visited May 30, 2008). 
3 See id. at 4 (stating “[o]n paper the European Council President only has 
limited powers of a mostly procedural nature (e.g. chairing European Council 
meetings), but much will depend on the personality that fills the position.”).
4 See Reform Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1(9c). Under the Reform Treaty, a 
measure will pass the Council of Ministers if it is backed by 55 percent of the 
member-states (currently 15 out of 27), provided they represent at least 65 
 percent of the EU’s population.
5 See Reform Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1(9b). The new post of “High Repre-
sentative for Foreign Policy and Security” is created. As things currently stand, 
the EU has both the Council’s High Representative (currently Javier Solana) 
and the Commissioner for External Action (currently Benita Ferrero-Waldner). 
As co-operation between the two foreign policy figureheads is often problem-
atic, the Reform Treaty merges the two posts. The High Representative will 
inter alia chair the meetings of EU foreign ministers, coordinate the EU’s for-
eign policy agenda, and be in charge of the EU’s external relations budget.
6 See, e.g., Reform Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1(28B). The new treaty does 
away with national vetoes in about fifty areas. The most radical shift concerns 
decisions on EU co-operation for fighting terrorism, crime, and illegal immi-
gration, or what officials refer to as Justice and Home Affairs (“JHA”). On the 
insistence of the UK, it was decided that if a dissenting country cannot reach a 
compromise with its EU partners, it is free to opt out of the measure.
7 Unlike trade or agriculture, where exclusive Community competence is 
expressly provided by the Treaty of Rome, climate change talks involves 
restricted Community competence with the EU operating “at 28”, with the 
Commission involved alongside Member States, but with the leadership role 
being taken by the Presidency.
8 Press Release, Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union, Jean-Claude Juncker states that there will be a period for reflection and 
discussion but the process to ratify the Constitutional Treaty will continue with 
no renegotiation (June 17, 2005), available at http://www.eu2005.lu/en/ 
actualites/communiques/2005/06/16jclj-ratif/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 
2009). 
9 See David Sharrock & David Charter, Irish voters sign death warrant for 
EU’s Lisbon treaty, the timeS, June 14, 2008, available at http://www. 
timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article4134077.ece (last visited Feb. 
26, 2009); Benedict Brogan, EU treaty “dead” after Irish voters reject it in 
 referendum victory for “no” campaign, the Daily mail, June 16, 2008.
10 David Pryce-Jones, Before the Revolution: Europe’s governors refuse to 
 listen to the governed, nat’l Rev., July 14, 2008, at 8.
11 See Ian Taylor, Sarkozy pledges to restore trust in EU as France takes over 
presidency, the guaRDian, July 1, 2008, at 19.
12 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council (June 20, 2008), 
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/
en/ec/101346.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
13 See Judith Crosbie, Ireland to hold second referendum, euRopeanvoice.
com, Dec.12, 2008, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/12/ireland-
to-hold-second-referendum/63417.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). “Brian 
Cowen, Ireland’s prime minister, has pledged to hold a second referendum on 
the EU’s reforming Treaty of Lisbon” but only after securing legal guarantees 
that Ireland would not lose its membership in the European Commission and its 
military neutrality, as well as certain Irish constitutional provisions. Id. 
14 John O’Brennan, Ireland’s plan to resurrect the Lisbon Treaty to be unveiled 
at the Brussels summit 1-3 (CEPS Commentary, Dec. 4, 2008) available at 
http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1763 (last visited Dec. 7, 2008).
15 Richard Whitman, No and after: options for Europe, 81 int’l aff. 673, 674 
(2005). 
16 Competence is the EU term for “powers” or, in other words, who has 
 authority to undertake negotiations and initiate policy (the Commission, the 
Member States, or both). See John Vogler, The European Union as an Actor in 
International Environmental Politics, envtl. politicS, Sept. 1999, at 24-48.
17 SebaStian obeRthüR & heRmann e. ott, the kyoto pRotocol: inteRna-
tional climate policy foR the 21St centuRy 14 (Springer 1999).
18 houSe of loRDS, the eu anD climate change 56 (House of Lords Paper 
179-I Session 2003-04).
19 Louise Van Schaik & Christian Egenhofer, Reform of the EU Institutions: 
Implications for the EU’s Performance in Climate Negotiations 4 (CEPS, 
Policy Brief Series No.40, 2003) [hereinafter Climate Negotiations] available at 
http://shop.ceps.eu/free/1060.pdf? (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). This is to a great 
extent remedied by the Council is the WPCC (called until 1999 the Ad Hoc 
Group on Climate Change), a body under the EU Environment Council, which 
prepares EU negotiation positions on various issues. Established after COP-1 
in Berlin in 1995, it is further divided into a number of expert groups that deal 
with and prepare reports (so-called “submissions”) on several technical issues 
(e.g. sinks, technology transfer, national communications, etc). It should also 
be noted that most EU submissions to the UNFCCC originate from the WPCC 
and, as mentioned above, small Member States holding the Presidency tend to 
rely extensively on the assistance and expertise of the WPCC. See Louise Van 
Schaik & Christian Egenhofer, Improving the climate: Will the new Constitu-
tion strengthen the EU’s performance in international climate negotiations?  
7-8 (CEPS, Policy Brief Series No.63, 2005) available at http://shop.ceps.eu/
BookDetail.php?item_id=1198 (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
20 See John Vogler, The External Environmental Policy of the European Union, 
yeaRbook of inteRnational co opeRation on enviRonment anD Development 
2003/2004 65, 70 (Olav Schram Stokke & Øystein B. Thommessen eds. 2003).
21 R.p. baRSton, moDeRn Diplomacy 87 (2006). 
22 Michael Grubb & Farhana Yamin, Climatic collapse at The Hague: what 
happened, why, and where do we go from here?, 77 int’l aff. 261, 274 (2001).
23 obeRthüR & ott, supra note 17, at 90.
24 Grubb & Yamin, supra note 22, at 274.
25 Climate Negotiations, supra note 19, at 3.
26 Christian Egenhofer & Jan Cornillie, Reinventing the Climate Negotiations: 
An Analysis of COP6 9 (CEPS, Policy Brief Series No.1, 2001) available at 
http://shop.ceps.eu/free/102.pdf? (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
48wInTer 2009
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President Obama’s recent budget proposal is a strong indi-cation that the current Administration will take the first real steps towards realizing a nationwide cap-and-trade 
system in the United States.1 Examining existing cap-and-trade 
systems such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(“EUETS”), the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), 
and the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme 
(“NSW Scheme”) illustrates the value of two increasingly com-
mon features that the United States should consider: auctions 
and offset mechanisms. As this article shows, these mechanisms 
can address major concerns with cap-and-trade by mitigating 
price distortion and encouraging technological advances.
The EUETS consists of thirty member states2 and targets 
carbon-fuel power plants and other industrial facilities.3 The sys-
tem has been widely criticized due its failure to prevent market 
price distortions in part because it uses an emission allocation 
distribution system which allows nations to directly distribute 
carbon allowances.4 However, in 2013 the EUETS will enter 
Phase III (it is currently in Phase II)5 which will include a shift 
from the current distribution system to an auction system.6 It 
will also implement a single allowance allocation system that 
sets common emissions caps for all member states, rather than 
the current “national allocation plans.”7
RGGI consists of ten northeastern U.S. states and targets 
carbon dioxide emissions from power plants.8 RGGI requires a 
ten percent reduction in GHG emissions from power plants by 
2018.9 Individual states sell the majority of the carbon credits 
offered through quarterly auctions.10 In addition to buying cred-
its, installations may receive allowance offsets by undertaking 
projects that reduce or sequester GHG.11
The NSW Scheme sets an emissions baseline and distributes 
certificates for power generators that reduce GHG emissions.12 
Power generators earn a certificate for each ton of emissions 
reduction through low-emission electricity generation, activities 
that reduce electricity consumption, and carbon sequestration 
through forestry.13 These generators may then sell their certifi-
cates to other generators.14 
In designing a national cap-and-trade system, U.S. lawmak-
ers should learn from these examples to avoid market distortion 
and encourage innovation. For example, an allowance auction 
could create revenue to fund targeted tax breaks to mitigate 
price distortion. The choice of allowance distribution is gener-
ally between auctions and direct distribution. In auctions, the 
government collects the price of each bid as revenue. Under a 
direct distribution system, the government gives companies car-
bon allowances, which they could potentially sell on the market 
for a profit. The EUETS illustrated the problems of a direct dis-
tribution system15 where companies do not generally pass their 
savings to the consumer.16 Instead, they collect the difference 
between the free carbon allowances and the market price as prof-
it.17 The EUETS’s Phase II leaves the value of the initial carbon 
allowances unavailable to correct potential price distortions.18 
The use of auction revenue to fund targeted tax breaks 
addresses the criticism that auctions would burden consumers 
through increased carbon prices passed on by companies.19 For 
instance, the European Commission will use the revenues from 
Phase III auctions to invest in renewable energies that compa-
nies may utilize to improve energy efficiency and address the 
impact of energy price increases to consumers.20 Effective use 
of tax policy could significantly offset the costs of investing in 
new technology or paying higher energy prices.
A U.S. cap-and-trade system should also include an offset 
mechanism, like those in RGGI and the NSW Scheme, to encour-
age investment in efficient technologies. An offset mechanism 
allows a company to earn allowances by undertaking projects 
that reduce or sequester carbon emissions.21 The offsets can act 
as subsidies when companies that earn offsets sell them on the 
market to recover some of the project costs.22 
Critics argue that an offset mechanism could increase emis-
sions if the government distributes allowances for projects that 
companies would have done even without the allowances.23 
RGGI’s offset mechanism addresses this problem by disquali-
fying projects encouraged by other government action.24 For 
instance, a company may not receive offset credits for projects 
that the law already requires or receive funding or assistance 
from other programs.25 Under the NSW Scheme’s Metered 
Baseline Method (“MBM”), the government determines base-
line energy use for each facility based on its historical energy 
use.26 To ensure that offset allowances truly reduce emissions, 
the MBM does not consider efficiency projects undertaken dur-
ing the baseline period or projects anticipated while the facility 
was collecting offset allowances.27
Examining policies and challenges of existing systems 
provides valuable, real-world lessons for implementing a cap-
and-trade program. As policymakers proceed with President 
Obama’s ambitious charge, they must create an efficient system 
that promotes the country’s best interests. As this article illus-
trates, including auctions and offset mechanisms to mitigate 
price distortions, encourage true reductions in GHG emissions, 
and support the development of efficient technology will be an 
important aspect of any national cap-and-trade program.
Endnotes: Creating a U.S. Carbon Market
 continued on page 73
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InTroDucTIon
Various scientific research has confirmed that climate change has started affecting the atmosphere and, in par-ticular, the African continent.1 International concerns 
regarding climate change are now overwhelming as various gov-
ernments of the world create policies and measures to reduce the 
carbon dioxide emissions that cause climate change. The African 
continent is likely to be severely affected by climate change if 
the warming continues2 because 
institutional capacities to com-
bat the changing weather are 
not in place.3 The irony is that 
developing African countries are 
more concerned with the issues 
of access to energy (modern 
fuels and electricity) in order to 
improve and increase industrial 
production and output, economic 
growth,4 and development,5 as 
opposed to policies that would 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
and halt climate change.6 
There is ample consensus 
that sustainable development involves an integration of environ-
mental protection and economic growth.7 Economic growth can 
still be attained through alternative energy sources as opposed 
to fossil fuels. Due to the global nature of climate change and 
the unpredictability of its likely impacts, the cooperation of all 
countries is required to successfully address it. One approach that 
should be considered in order for developing African countries 
to grow their economies by utilizing their natural resources with-
out contributing to climate change is encouraging more environ-
mentally sustainable energy sector expansion. South Africa is 
currently the first nation in Africa to utilize this approach, which 
is the primary reason it has been chosen as a case study.
While developing countries are the most vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change, they do not perceive or consider cli-
mate change as a priority or serious matter to be handled with 
levity.8 Instead, most African leaders and policy makers have 
linked the issue of energy and natural resources to poverty 
alleviation,9 which they consider the major challenge facing the 
continent.10 They have consistently invoked the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (“MDGs”) to support their positions and 
validate their actions.11
climate change, eneRgy, anD SuStainable  
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Interestingly, it is not only African leaders who believe that 
developing countries should vigorously pursue energy intensive 
economic activities. Some African pundits and their collabora-
tors have also supported this position by asserting that “whether 
climate change proves benign or harmful, attempting to control 
it through global regulation of emissions would be counterpro-
ductive” because it would not engage individuals in sustainable 
development activities that improve their quality of life.12 
There is a price to be paid 
for this inaction and lackadaisi-
cal attitude. Any major catastro-
phe from climate change would 
affect the natural resources and 
economies of African nations.13 
It might also result in “struggle 
for food, energy, and water as 
they lack resources and capac-
ity to quickly adapt.”14 These 
negative impacts may “under-
mine sustainable development, 
increase poverty, and delay 
or prevent the realization of 
the Millennium Development 
Goals.”15 This could lead to a situation where millions would be 
forced to migrate to other regions of the world.16
souTh aFrIca as a case sTuDy
South Africa, as a developing country, is the most industri-
alized within the African region. It is well endowed with natural 
resources such as coal, gold, diamonds, metals, and minerals. 
Its overall economy is chiefly dependent on energy production 
and use, with coal accounting for seventy-five percent of the fos-
sil fuel demand and ninety-one percent of electricity generation. 
The energy sector contributes approximately fifteen percent of 
gross domestic product and provides around 250,000 jobs.17 
Compared to other African countries, the South African econ-
omy is energy-intensive and the energy consumption rate is very 
high. This is mainly due to the heavy mining industries, such 
as iron and steel, cement, aluminum, etc. Furthermore, it is the 
Climate change is a grave 
threat to South Africa 
and a major obstacle 
to continued poverty 
reduction across its many 
dimensions.
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most electrified country in Africa; electricity plays a pivotal role 
in the economy and improves the quality of life of the previously 
disadvantaged majority in addition to supporting large-scale 
industrial development.18 
South Africa is fully committed to growing its economy 
through exploration and use of energy resources to meet its 
development objectives.19 When the country attained indepen-
dence in 1994, the issues of climate change and global warm-
ing were not a priority and the 
perceived “linkages between 
sustainable development and 
climate change issues were very 
weak.”20 Be that as it may, there 
has been scientific evidence that 
climate change is far more rapid 
and dangerous than thought ear-
lier.21 The government has now 
realized that climate change is a 
grave threat to South Africa and 
a major obstacle to continued 
poverty reduction across its many dimensions. This is a great 
concern that calls for a change in attitude to make the issue of 
climate change a major priority. Bearing this in mind, South 
Africa is beginning to proactively link its objectives with climate 
change priorities within a sustainable development framework.
The era oF TurnIng up The heaT In  
souTh aFrIca
Since 1994, various government policies, legislation, and 
regulations in South Africa have been primarily based on the 
development paradigm that addresses the injustices of the past 
and focuses on the provision of basic needs, equity, employment 
creation, and economic growth for all South Africans by utiliz-
ing available natural resources, in particular energy from coal. 
Consequently, the issue of integrating energy, economic growth, 
and environment has not been a major concern. This deliber-
ate oversight on the part of the government created a major bar-
rier to integrating climate change into South Africa’s vision of 
a sustainable development pathway. There has been a lack of an 
adequate policy approach to consider energy and climate change 
objectives alongside each other, as well as a lack of institutional, 
human, legal, and financial capabilities.22 Furthermore, South 
Africa’s ability to respond to concerns about climate change 
are complicated by the fact that the greater majority of South 
Africans live in varying degrees of poverty and want to increase 
their living standards, leading to increased energy use per capita 
and increased reliance on fossil fuels with high carbon dioxide 
emissions.23
This scenario had the support of the government based on 
the 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy (“1998 White Paper”).24 
The 1998 White Paper sets the main objectives of the energy 
sector in South Africa as follows: increasing access to affordable 
energy services; stimulating economic development; improv-
ing energy governance; managing energy-related environmental 
impacts; and securing supply through diversity.25 However, 
aggressive approaches to increasing access to affordable energy 
services to stimulate economic growth have been without regard 
to the environmental impacts.26
In South Africa, energy sector activities are the largest 
sources of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, accounting for 
about eighty-nine percent of the total emissions.27 More impor-
tantly, electricity is mainly supplied by Eskom, a public utility 
company, based on coal-fired 
systems; this accounts for nine-
ty-one percent of all electricity 
produced in the country, and 
there is continuous increase in 
demand.28 Increase in electricity 
supply based on coal-fired sys-
tems has lead to increased car-
bon dioxide emissions.29
As a result of the high lev-
els of energy production and 
consumption, there are high lev-
els of particulate concentrations in South Africa.30 High level of 
particulate matter results in “serious environmental and health 
problems because air quality, land, water, and forest resources 
have been severely degraded.”31 The use of coal, wood, paraf-
fin, and candles for cooking, heating, and lighting also exposes 
households to hazardous levels of indoor air pollution and the 
risk of fire. Illness and death can result.32 
The aggressive drive by the South African government 
to grow the economy by utilizing energy intensively without 
regard to the negative consequences has put South Africa at a 
crossroads. However, the government has now decided to live 
up to its responsibility by implementing drastic measures to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions to mitigate the affect of poten-
tial catastrophes on what has been gained through economic 
growth.
The era oF TurnIng Down The heaT In  
souTh aFrIca
The threat of global climate instability and its likely impacts 
on countries worldwide led to the signing and subsequent rati-
fication of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”). This was a clear indication of political will by 
governments worldwide to combat climate change. Unfortu-
nately, however, as clearly expressed in the UNFCCC, it will 
be difficult for developing countries to avoid increasing emis-
sions as they attempt to meet their needs through fossil fuel pro-
duction.33 The challenge, therefore, is to ensure that there are 
synergies between sustainable development goals and carbon 
dioxide reduction strategies in order to avoid the impact of cli-
mate change. The South African government is now heeding the 
clarion call by implementing various strategies that will lead to 
massive reduction of carbon dioxide in the country. The most 
potent of these is the synergy between achieving sustainable 
development goals within the context of climate change.
This was a clear 
indication of political will 
by governments worldwide 
to combat climate change.
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policieS to fight climate change thRough 
emiSSion ReDuction 
It must be pointed out from the outset that South Africa 
does not have emission reduction targets for the first commit-
ment period of the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, which runs from 
2008–2012, because it is not an “Annex I” country.34 Even so, 
the South African government recognizes that it needs to take 
adequate measures as one of the highest emitting of the non-
Annex I countries.35 
South Africa’s Environmental Affairs and Tourism Minis-
ter, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, described the overall approach 
to climate change mitigation and adaptation as “progressive, 
ambitious, and far-reaching” as well as focused on protecting 
South Africa from the “onslaught” of global warming.36 He 
added that the goal is for carbon 
dioxide emissions to “stop grow-
ing by 2020–2025 at the latest, 
stabilize for up to ten years, and 
then decline in absolute terms.”37 
Towards this end, the government 
has started implementing strin-
gent policies and measures and 
also enforcing the laws relating 
to environment38 and pollution.39 
This approach is now shifting the country’s development path 
to become more sustainable and should gradually reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions.40
a national agency to pRomote cDm pRoJectS
In 2005, the South Africa Department of Minerals and 
Energy created a Designated National Authority to coordinate 
CDM activities as required by the Kyoto Protocol.41 The agency 
coordinates activities to attract investors and project develop-
ers to South Africa. Shortly after the agency was established, 
it received information on four projects from the private sec-
tor, including one for the Kuyasa Low-Cost Housing Project in 
Khayelitsha, Cape Town, the first CDM project in Africa.42 This 
project includes the construction of energy-efficient houses.
a caRbon tax on buSineSSeS
One of the South African government’s most ambitious 
proposals for dealing with climate change is considering the 
passage of a carbon tax on carbon dioxide-emitting industries.43 
The policy, which some consider “the point at which the gov-
ernment began steering the economy along a more sustainable 
growth path,”44 imposes a 2 Rand cents per kilowatt-hour tax on 
non-renewable electricity sources. 45 Of South African’s many 
proposals on the table for cutting GHG emissions, a carbon tax 
could have the most significant impact.46 The carbon tax pro-
posal also includes stringent energy efficiency measures and 
would begin at 100 Rand per ton on carbon dioxide equivalent 
and increase to 250 Rand per ton by 2020.47 At the time of writ-
ing, the South African cabinet has endorsed the plan but it has 
not achieved final parliamentary approval. Nevertheless, finan-
cial officials have begun discussing an effective implementation 
framework.48
integRating eneRgy policy anD SuStainable 
Development 
Although the 1998 White Paper does not specifically refer 
to sustainable development goals or objectives, it does contain 
a number of provisions that refer to environmental, social, and 
economic aspects of energy. For instance, it states that:
Fossil fuels such as coal, uranium, liquid fuels, biomass 
and gas continue to play a central role in the socio-eco-
nomic development of our country, while simultane-
ously providing the necessary infrastructural economic 
base for the country to become an attractive host for 
foreign investments in the energy sector . . . energy pol-
icy should balance the use of natural energy resources 
with environmental considerations.49
It is in this regard that 
the government published the 
White Paper on Renewable 
Energy in 2003 (“2003 White 
Paper”)50 and established a 
long-term goal to build an 
energy industry that will offer 
a fully non-subsidized alter-
native to fossil fuels.51 This 
policy approach has been 
concretized through significant financial support for renewable 
energy research and development.52
A key challenge in the reform agenda is to make sure that 
the public benefits of sustainable development are advanced. 
The electricity industry can make a difference in the arena of 
sustainable development through underpinning sustainable 
economic growth, promoting social equity, and adopting more 
environmentally-friendly technologies. The goal is an electric-
ity industry that delivers secure, low-cost supplies that support 
industrial competitiveness; provides widened access to afford-
able services; and encourages energy efficiency, increased use 
of renewable energy technologies, and reduced emissions gen-
erally. These goals are now embedded in the on-going reform 
processes and the government has started implementing crucial 
policies that ensure reduction in emissions activities.53
eneRgy efficiency anD Renewable eneRgy
In South Africa, energy efficiency was not really an issue 
until recently; however, the situation has now changed. Stake-
holders are now aware of the need to consume energy differently. 
The CDM has mobilized several industrial players and sensitized 
them on the need to modernize energy equipment. South Africa 
has designed a Renewable Energy Strategy which sets a target of 
10,000 GWh of renewable energies by 2013 (this would amount 
to four percent of production in 2004). In addition, an energy-
saving framework by the Department of Minerals and Energy 
has set its goal to save fifteen percent by 2015. Energy effi-
ciency and renewable energies are the focus of the framework, 
a first for Africa that may serve as a model for other countries.54 
The government has started implementing policies on 
energy efficiency, which is assuredly the most effective and eco-
South Africa has designed 
a Renewable Energy 
Strategy.
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nomically advantageous means of reducing carbon dioxide emis-
sions and other pollutants from energy production. Efficiency 
measures have also drastically reduced the cost of electricity 
bills to industry and individuals. This is producing substantial 
economic benefits.55
In 2006, Environment Minister van Schalkwyk demon-
strated the energy-efficiency conversion of his home, which con-
sisted of the installation of “energy-efficient lighting, solar water 
heating, better insulation, and a range of other measures.”56 Min-
ister van Schalkwyk stressed that although government action 
draws attention to these issues, individuals in South Africa must 
also take steps to save energy in their homes.57 The Minister 
also stated that replacing one normal light bulb with a compact 
fluorescent bulb could result in savings of 18.50 South African 
Rands per year, as well as a total of 430 kilograms of coal and 
1,100 liters of water.58
There has also been an aggressive approach towards promo-
tion and production of environmentally friendly biodiesel and 
bioethanol fuels manufactured from crops such as canola, soya, 
sunflower, sugar beet, maize, sorghum, wheat, and sugarcane.59 
This will create new jobs, protect the country from volatile oil 
prices, and decrease damage to the environment.60
tRaining anD capacity Development
South African universities are beginning to focus on the spe-
cialized educational needs for climate research and CDM project 
implementation.61 Furthermore, National Research Foundation 
funds research on climate change.62 The government is currently 
investing in technology and upgrading existing institutions of 
research and education by promoting courses on engineering, 
science, agriculture, and forestry and also collaborating with 
various institutions in developed countries.63 The government 
has also started creating awareness and sensitizing entrepreneurs 
and industrial sectors to embark on research into energy-efficient 
activities.64
monitoRing foR aDaptation
South Africa has embarked on a program for Monitoring, 
Mapping and Analysis of Disaster Incidents known as MANDI-
SA.65 It is a core activity for the Disaster Mitigation for Sustain-
able Livelihoods Programme of the University of Cape Town.66 
MANDISA began as a pilot program from 1990 to 1999 in the 
Cape Town Metropolitan Area.67 The program evaluates socio-
economic and environmental risk factors that can affect the 
impacts of disasters and allows for tracking of the conditions 
that may cause disaster.68 This requires cooperation between 
several agencies, “consultation and feedback, active sourcing of 
emergency and disaster information, strategic consolidation of 
information across agencies and robust geo-referencing.”69 The 
project also includes an online database which provides informa-
tion for disaster management workers, educational institutions, 
and researchers.70
non-goveRnmental appRoacheS
In addition to government policy, other major stakeholders 
are also taking action to combat climate change in South Africa. 
Two examples are discussed below.
Clinton Climate Initiatives
In 2008, the Clinton Climate Initiative (“CCI”) committed 
funding and technical support to decrease energy consumption 
in Johannesburg.71 This prompted the city to implement energy 
efficiency measures, including the Rea Vaya bus rapid transit 
system and the energy efficiency building retrofit program.72 The 
initiative has also provided know-how, in the form of a technical 
director for project support, to assist with joint projects between 
the City of Johannesburg and CCI. Other initiatives include 
drives to reduce energy consumption in the city by promoting 
solar power and a project to convert methane gas generated by 
landfills into energy used for electricity.73
The Kuyasa Project
South Africa has successfully developed a low-cost hous-
ing project known as the Kuyasa project, the first of its kind in 
Africa and one of fewer than fifty in the world.74 It was devel-
oped by SouthSouthNorth, an international CDM non-govern-
mental organization, and Cape Town. The city has committed 
to use ten percent renewable energy sources by 2020, and have 
ten percent of households with solar water heaters by 2010.75 It 
is in recognition of this achievement that Kuyasa was awarded 
gold standard recognition by the UNFCCC, allowing it to earn 
certified emission credits. The price of these credits is calculated 
according to the amount of carbon dioxide saved.76 Some of the 
benefits of this project to South Africa are: retrofitted buildings 
are five percent warmer in winter and five percent cooler in sum-
mer, allowing a savings of up to forty percent on electricity bills; 
The government has started implementing policies  
on energy efficiency, which is assuredly the  
most effective and economically advantageous means  
of reducing carbon dioxide emissions and  
other pollutants from energy production. 
53 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
the buildings reduce localized air pollution, helping prevent 
pulmonary pneumonia, carbon monoxide poisoning, and other 
respiratory illnesses which are major sources of health hazards 
to poor people; and more importantly, a decrease in the deadly 
fires common in high-density and low-income settlements. Apart 
from the individual benefits of the program, the projects stand to 
earn carbon credits equaling nine million tons of carbon a year, 
with a value of US$253 million to the South African economy. 
The projects have crediting periods lasting until at least 2015; 
some extend until 2026.77
conclusIon
The effects of climate change are no longer limited to 
predictions; temperatures are rising, icecaps and glaciers are 
melting, and extreme weather conditions are becoming more 
frequent and more intense.78 Africa is both the continent most 
vulnerable to climate change as well as the one with the least 
capacity to adapt. For the developing continent, there exist mul-
tiple and concurrent stresses and development challenges, such 
as endemic poverty, governance and institutional dimensions, 
limited access to capital, ecosystem degradation, and complex 
disasters and conflicts. These are obstacles to reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
Realizing that economic growth, sustainable resource man-
agement, and climate change are closely connected, the exec-
utive and legislative arms of the government of South Africa 
have agreed on a progressive policy on climate change. This will 
ensure that the country reduces emissions to become a “low car-
bon” economy while also helping to limit the effects of global 
warming. South Africa should serve as an example to the other 
nations of Africa as the developing continent becomes a  stronger 
and more effective player in the fight against global climate 
change.
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In the past two decades Mongolia has experienced significant environmental changes driven both by human action and climate change. These changes have had considerable det-
rimental effects on Mongolia’s economy and people. Basic sur-
vival in this country of harsh climates requires a careful balance 
with the environment.1 Climate change, which may exacerbate 
climatic extremes, in combination with unsustainable land use 
practices, have begun to change that balance and reveal Mon-
golia’s significant environmental vulnerabilities. In response to 
these changing conditions, the Mongolian government instituted 
a number of mitigating and adaptive measures to decrease its 
 vulnerability, but without further economic diversification the 
success of these measures is limited.
mongolia: a caSe foR economic DiveRSification  
in the face of a changing climate
by Nathan Borgford-Parnell*
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Washington College of Law. He is also the founder of Valkyrie Energy LLC, a 
renewable energy development firm focusing on new and developing markets.
The combination of these effects is causing a significant dry-
ing of Mongolia’s soil.7 Desertification has become so significant 
that Mongolian dust storms are causing environmental impacts 
on countries as far away as Japan.8 As of 2002, over seventy per-
cent of Mongolia’s pastureland was considered degraded.9 This 
has led to a decrease of pasture biomass of 20–30% over the past 
twenty years.10 Livestock fodder production today is one third 
that of 1986 production numbers.11
Mongolia’s livestock live on open pastures year-round, 
making them susceptible to any severe changes in the weather, 
climate, or changes in biomass. Typically, the animals build 
up fat stores during the summer to help them get through the 
harsh Mongolian winters. However, with the decrease in pasture 
biomass it is much more difficult for the animals to build the 
reserves they need.12
Mongolia depends upon the livestock industry both for 
employment and basic food products. Almost fifty percent of 
Mongolians are employed in animal husbandry or a related 
field.13 Livestock accounts for thirty-four percent of annual gross 
production and thirty percent of Mongolia’s total exports.14 
However, pasture degradation brought on by climate change is 
only partially to blame for these changes. Institutional and eco-
nomic collapse of the Mongolian government in the early 1990s 
conspired to exacerbate the damage that climate change was 
already doing to Mongolia’s pasturelands.15
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Basic survival in this 
country of harsh climates 
requires a careful balance 
with the environment.
In more recent years, Mongolia has begun to depend upon 
its rich mineral resources to diversify its economy away from 
a dependence on the more traditional vocations of herding and 
animal husbandry. Although diversification is the key to Mon-
golia’s future, these mining operations pose additional real 
threats to Mongolia’s fragile environment and represent only 
one economic alternative to animal husbandry. Mongolia’s eco-
nomic diversification should include the development of renew-
able energy resources. Mongolia has strong, untapped wind and 
solar resources in abundance and their development may help tilt 
the environmental balancing act back towards sustainability.2
clImaTe change on The sTeppe
Climate change is making Mongolia both warmer and dri-
er.3 Over the past sixty years, Mongolia’s mean temperature 
has increased by 3.4ºF, compared to the global mean of 1ºF in 
the past century.4 Rainfall is also more infrequent and heavier, 
which is increasing erosion on already fragile pastureland.5 
Mongolia’s glaciers, which feed many of the country’s rivers, 
have decreased in flow causing approximately fifty of the coun-
try’s rivers to vanish between 2004 and 2005.6
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the fall of communiSm anD the RiSe of the heRD
In 1990, Mongolia’s peaceful transition from a communist 
regime to a democratic government signaled the dissolution of 
the central planned economy and state-subsidized systems of 
food distribution. As a result of this transition, virtually over-
night thousands of Mongolians found themselves out of work. 
Many Mongolian families, searching for a means of survival, 
turned to traditional livestock herding to fill the economic void. 
Between 1990 and 2001 the number of herding households in 
Mongolia more than doubled, from 75,000 to 185,500.16 Many 
of the new herding families had no experience in animal hus-
bandry and were unaccustomed to the careful and balanced 
nature of traditional nomadic herding.17
Prior to the 1990 transition, the communist government 
limited the number of livestock in the country to about fifteen 
million; with its dissolution and the introduction of a market 
economy livestock populations grew unchecked.18 Without 
centralized controls, livestock 
populations ballooned until 1999 
when herd populations reached 
thirty-three million, more than 
ten times the number of people 
in Mongolia.19
The meteoric increase in 
herd populations combined with 
the decrease in biomass discussed 
above left Mongolia supremely 
vulnerable to any dramatic shift 
in environmental conditions. 
This vulnerability became most 
evident between 1999 and 2002 
when Mongolia was hit with 
four historic droughts and abnormally severe winters.
mongolia’S longeSt winteR
In Mongolian dzud is a term for severe winter weather 
conditions of the type that are so extreme they can prevent ani-
mals from grazing on open pastures.20 Dzud are quite common 
in Mongolia, occurring typically once every seven years, but 
always in localized areas.21 However, between 1999 and 2002 
Mongolia experienced three dzud in sequence each covering 
approximately seventy percent of the country.22 The dzud were 
preceded by particularly dry summers where over three thou-
sand water sources, including 680 rivers and 760 lakes, literally 
disappeared, decimating the already stressed and low weight 
livestock population.23
In four years, more than eleven million adult animals died 
from the combination of extreme summer droughts and severe 
winter weather.24 The loss of so many animals was devastating 
to Mongolia’s herders as almost ten thousand families lost their 
entire herd and seventy-five percent of the remaining families 
were left with herds below maintenance levels.25 The economic 
impact of the 1999–2002 dzud is estimated at over 200 million 
U.S. dollars and dropped Gross Domestic Product growth to 
1.1% from 3.2% in 1998.26
Climate change deserves much of the blame for this tragic 
convergence of events but its effects would have been much 
more localized were it not for the unpreparedness of the Mon-
golian state. The institutions of the new Mongolian state were 
not prepared to manage the drastic increase in new herding fami-
lies, or the dramatic changes brought about by the new market 
economy. This left the government agencies unable to cope with 
rapidly changing environmental conditions and the herders with 
little to no capacity to adapt to the deteriorating environment.
new inStitutionS not up to the taSk
In 1990 the new Mongolian state dismantled the communist 
era herding collectives that had managed herd populations and 
allocated pastureland for over half a century.27 The remaining 
traditional and customary institutions for pasture management 
could not cope with the influx of new herding families, and so 
the responsibility fell to the new government.28 Stepping into 
the void, the Mongolian government passed a battery of laws 
and regulations seeking to lay 
a foundation for environmental 
protection, ease pressures on 
pastureland, and strengthen the 
capacities of herders to adapt to 
changing conditions. Between 
1990 and 2000 Mongolia passed 
more than twenty laws regulat-
ing land rights and environmen-
tal standards.29
There is little question that 
the Mongolian government 
recognized the significance of 
the problems and challenges it 
faced. The real impediment is 
not a lack of will, but institutional capacity. Overall coordination 
between the agencies and institutions tasked with environmental 
protection and pasture management was often limited.30 While 
the laws were robust, the administrative procedures for imple-
mentation had no clear guidelines for dealing with administrative 
overlaps.31 Agencies tasked with pasture management suffered 
from a significant lack of resources, both in trained personnel and 
budget.32 Nowhere was this more true than at the local level where 
small community governments were tasked with the lion’s share 
of environmental and pastureland management and oversight.33
Following the dzud, the Mongolian government, interna-
tional donors, and multilateral institutions took action to combat 
the worst effects of the disaster. In 2003 Mongolia passed the 
Law on Disaster Protection, designed to improve coordination 
between government and institutional actors within the context 
of existing environmental and pastoral management laws.34 The 
World Bank implemented the Sustainable Livelihoods Project, 
designed to improve institutional capacity for pastoral risk man-
agement, develop funds for local development, and make micro-
finance more available to rural households.35
While significant effort has been made to mitigate and pre-
vent future disasters, Mongolia has thus far only had limited 
Desertification has 
become so significant that 
Mongolian dust storms 
are causing environmental 
impacts on countries as 
far away as Japan.
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success in changing the paradigm of environmental vulnerability 
for its herding families. If any silver lining can be found from the 
1999–2002 dzud, it is the fact that tens of thousands of herders 
were forced out of the industry, 
thereby decreasing pressure on 
critically damaged pastureland. 
Unfortunately, by 2008 herd 
populations have climbed back 
to their 1999 numbers, once 
again threatening pastureland 
with extreme overgrazing.36 As 
of January 2009, 120,400 live-
stock have died from extreme 
winter temperatures in Mon-
golia, nearly a seventy percent 
increase from 2008; it remains 
to be seen whether Mongolia’s 
institutions are ready for another 
hard winter.37
conclusIons: economIc DIversIFIcaTIon,  
The key To mongolIa’s FuTure & a role  
For renewable energy
There are two general means of addressing the human vul-
nerabilities to climate change in developing countries: mitiga-
tion and adaptation.38 While the Mongolian government must 
continue its progress in institution-building and environmental 
protection to help mitigate human impact on the environment 
it must also focus on diversifying its economy away from a 
dependence on one or two industries. For Mongolia’s herders, 
economic diversification is the key to decreasing their vulnera-
bility to changing climatic conditions. Economic diversification 
is an adaptive measure that will decrease herder vulnerability 
to climate change by providing the ability to move away from 
animal-husbandry, easing pressures on the environment and 
government.
Unfortunately, the Mongolian economy has only had a lim-
ited capacity to diversify away from a dependence on herding. 
The two largest industrial sectors in Mongolia today are animal 
husbandry and mining of coal, gold and copper.39 The formal 
mining industry is Mongolia’s fastest growing industry, cur-
rently accounting for a third of Mongolia’s economy; recent sur-
veys of miners found that more than fifty-five percent are from 
families that lost their herds during the dzud and turned to min-
ing to survive.40
While mining has helped take some of the pressure off 
herders, dependence on mining will only further stress Mon-
golia’s fragile environment. However, under the right conditions 
Mongolia’s mining growth can 
be a windfall for the country, 
especially if it is used to spur 
new forms of development, par-
ticularly in the field of energy 
generation. Mongolia should 
use this opportunity to invest 
in renewable energy, particu-
larly in rural communities. As 
a nation, Mongolia has strong, 
proven wind and solar resources 
that it has yet to tap on a com-
mercial basis.41 The develop-
ment of such resources can help 
Mongolia adapt to changing 
environmental conditions, spur new industry in rural communi-
ties and help shift the country away from an exclusive depen-
dence on coal for power generation.42
Global experience has shown a strong positive correlation 
between increases of stable electricity use and economic growth 
in developing nations.43 Stable electrical distribution provides a 
strong foundation for new commercial and industrial opportuni-
ties for small communities, as well as an increase in working 
hours and productivity.44 In addition to creating a new economy 
based on domestic, clean, and unlimited resources, renewable 
energy development will create new jobs and facilitate develop-
ment in rural communities.
Development of renewable energy will also strengthen 
Mongolia’s commitment to environmental protection by 
decreasing is own generation of greenhouse gasses. As energy 
services come on-line in Mongolia’s rural communities, families 
will have a broader range of choices in securing their economic 
future. Economic diversification will strengthen local communi-
ties and local institutions, thereby improving capacity to protect 
pastureland and bringing herding practices back into equilib-
rium with the environment. While Mongolia’s actions alone 
cannot reverse the effects of climate change, giving its citizens 
the economic flexibility to adapt to those changes without over-
burdening its already fragile, harsh environment will go a long 
way towards preventing the kind of catastrophic disaster that 
occurred between 1999 and 2002.
The dzud were preceded 
by particularly dry 
summers where over 3000 
water sources, including 
680 rivers and 760 lakes, 
literally disappeared.
Endnotes: Mongolia continued on page 75
Endnotes:  Mongolia
1 See generally P. Batima et al., Observed Climate Change in Mongolia 
(AIACC, Working Paper No. 12, 2005), available at www.aiaccproject.org/
working_papers/Working%20Papers/AIACC_WP_No013.pdf (last visited  
Feb. 25, 2009).
2 woRlD wilDlife funD, oveRview of climate change iSSueS in mongolia 
(2006), available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/climate_change_issues_
mn_oct2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
3 P. Batima et al., supra note 1, at 23.
57 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
InTroDucTIon
In response to the Bali Action Plan’s calls for an expanded international response to climate change, the World Bank created a series of Climate Investment Funds (“CIFs”) to 
provide “immediate financial resources” to respond to global cli-
mate challenge.1 Since the cre-
ation of the funds last year, more 
than $6 billion has been pledged 
to CIF programs by donor coun-
tries2 and the CIFs have quickly 
become leaders in international 
climate investment, at least in 
terms dollar amount.3
The Clean Technology 
Fund (“CTF”)4 is one of the 
more advanced CIFs, and began 
providing large-scale financial 
resources for low-carbon tech-
nology projects in developing 
countries in early 2009.5 This 
article examines whether the 
CTF is an instrument through 
which donor countries can ful-
fill their international climate 
change funding obligations 
under the UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). First, background for 
answering this question is provided. Then it is argued that incon-
sistencies between the CTF and the UNFCCC should prevent 
CTF donations from fulfilling UNFCCC obligations. 
backgrounD
In response to the imminent threat of climate change, the 
international community came together at the Rio Earth Sum-
mit in 1992 to create a framework convention to combat climate 
change.6 The objective of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concen-
trations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent danger-
ous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”7 The 
UNFCCC was created to organize and coordinate efforts to fight 
climate change as well as to build political will and account-
ability. The convention’s Conference of the Parties (“CoP”) is 
the primary mechanism for the world to address climate issues 
and solutions.8 
The framework created by the convention obligates coun-
try parties to meet “common but differentiated” standards,9 a 
the woRlD bank clean technology funD: 
fRienD oR foe to the unfccc?
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compromise meant to acknowledge that industrialized nations in 
the global north are the primary cause of anthropogenic climate 
change, but that all nations have a role to play in the solution.10 
One key difference in obligations is that wealthier, developed 
nations are responsible for funding climate change initiatives 
around the globe by provid-
ing “new and additional finan-
cial resources” for developing 
countries.11 In order to facilitate 
this funding responsibility, the 
UNFCCC established the Global 
Environment Facility (“GEF”) 
as its official financial arm, 
responsible for aiding countries 
in meeting their obligations to 
the Convention.12
The Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC went into effect in 
2005.13 It is the first instrument 
produced by the UNFCCC with 
legally binding emission reduc-
tion targets and timetables.14 The 
Protocol includes flexible mar-
ket mechanisms giving parties 
multiple paths through which to 
meet their binding targets.15 One 
such path is the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”),16 
which allows investment in emission reducing projects in 
developing countries to generate “carbon emission reductions” 
(“CERs”) that can then be traded on the market to developed 
countries for use in their compliance with Kyoto.17
The market for carbon emission reduction credit trading 
grew exponentially in the two years after the Kyoto Protocol 
came into effect, reaching an estimated $30 billion.18 There 
are now at least fifty-eight carbon funds in the market,19 which 
purchase carbon credits on behalf of countries and private enti-
ties that cannot meet their Kyoto obligations through emission 
reductions alone.20
the woRlD bank 
The World Bank has played a significant role in the develop-
ment of the carbon market through its creation of the Prototype 
Carbon Fund21 and its extensive involvement in carbon emission 
The World Bank’s 
Clean Technology 
Fund . . . works by 
pooling donations from 
industrialized countries 
and investing those 
funds in carbon emission 
reducing projects in 
developing countries.
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trading.22 The Bank’s involvement in the international climate 
regime began with its prototype permit purchasing,23 and was 
solidified when it was selected to serve as the trustee for the 
UNFCCC’s financial arm, the Global Environment Facility.24 
The World Bank is considered the “pre-eminent multilat-
eral institution providing assistance to developing countries.”25 
Established in 1945 after the Bretton Woods Conference,26 the 
Bank has served as an intermediary between its powerful share-
holders, wealthy developed nations, and developing countries. In 
this role, the Bank provides financial assistance, technical assis-
tance, risk guarantees, and policy advice to public and private 
sector parties in developing countries.27 This history of develop-
ment assistance serves as a backdrop to the Bank’s involvement 
in climate change finance, focusing its efforts on development 
goals that are linked to carbon emission reduction and the transi-
tion to low carbon economies.28
the clean technology funD
The World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund is a Climate 
Investment Fund that works by pooling donations from indus-
trialized countries and investing those funds in carbon emission 
reducing projects in developing countries.29 Through the CTF, 
the Bank focuses its financial expertise on scaling-up30 proven 
low carbon technologies by expanding them to full sector scale, 
or at least demonstrating that the technologies could be expanded 
to such a wide scale.31
The Trust Fund Committee (“TFC”), the Clean Technology 
Fund’s governing body, is responsible for approving programs 
and project pipelines, establishing project criteria, determining 
what financing products will be available, and ensuring consis-
tency between CTF practices and the UNFCCC.32 The Commit-
tee is comprised of eight representatives from donor countries 
and eight from countries eligible to receive CTF financing.33 
TFC representatives are selected by consultation with the parties 
eligible to serve.34 
The CTF is structured so that Multilateral Development 
Banks (“MDBs”) work with partner countries to develop coun-
try-specific investment plans.35 These plans incorporate CTF 
financed projects and programs36 into the county’s existing 
climate change reduction strategies. Recipients of CTF funds 
can be public or private, though private recipients must demon-
strate their place within a broader public climate change plan.37 
Once developed, projects are sent to the Trust Fund Committee 
for approval, after which funds are transferred in the form of 
grants, concessional loans, and guarantees.38 Projects are exam-
ined based on established standards, including greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emission savings,39 demonstration potential,40 devel-
opment impact,41 implementation potential,42 and additional 
cost and risk premium.43
analysIs oF The clean Technology FunD
The founding document of the Clean Technology Fund 
goes to great lengths to demonstrate consistency and collabora-
tion with the UNFCCC,44 but that consistency does not extend 
far beyond rhetorical principles. This is evidenced by significant 
criticisms of the CTF’s motives, the World Bank’s record on 
climate change, the Bank’s “technology neutral” approach to 
carbon emission, and more.45 Beneath the layers of policy dis-
agreement, even the CTF founding document46 itself demon-
strates at least three areas where the CTF is inconsistent with the 
UNFCCC. First, circular language in the document absolves the 
CTF of responsibility for ensuring “new and additional” funding 
to its recipient countries. Second, measures put in place to ensure 
equitable governance of the CTF do not achieve this purpose. 
Finally, the so-called “sunset clause,” intended to prevent under-
mining of the UNFCCC process by the CTF, is drafted poorly, 
with a major loophole that allows the CTF to avoid sunset.
new anD aDDitional financial ReSouRceS  
aRe not guaRanteeD by the ctf
Article 4 of the UNFCCC lays out the commitments of the 
party countries, including paragraph 3, which requires “new 
and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs 
incurred by developing country parties in complying with their 
obligations.”47 Similarly, the Clean Technology Fund founding 
document uses the phrase “new and additional” in its princi-
ples.48 It is telling, however, that the document neglects to cite to 
the provision of the UNFCCC in which that terminology origi-
nated, despite extensive citation to other UNFCCC provisions. 
Undoubtedly, all donor countries consider their donations 
“new and additional” and intend to report their CTF donations to 
the UNFCCC as part of meeting their Article 4 commitments.49 
The CTF, however, has absolved itself of responsibility for 
ensuring that obligations are met by placing the responsibility 
on the donor country, not the CTF, to “ensure that contributions 
are new and additional resources supplementing existing [Offi-
cial Development Aid] flows otherwise available for developing 
countries.”50
Even if some of the $6 billion donated into the CIFs so far 
is new and additional, money donated to the CTF is comingled 
and combined with other sources of funding.51 This is problem-
atic because the UNFCCC reporting process requires that coun-
tries demonstrate that their individual contributions to climate 
change are new and additional.52 Under this system it will be 
difficult for a country to demonstrate this,53 and equally difficult 
for a UNFCCC body to determine whether funds are new and 
additional if they are mixed with other funding sources from the 
outset.
In the midst of confusion and disagreement over exactly 
what is new and additional funding and where the responsibility 
for it lies, it appears that the CTF has used its founding docu-
ment to pass responsibility on to its donor countries. This  creates 
a conflict; the system makes it difficult to ensure that funds are 
new and additional and demonstrates that the World Bank is 
either not prepared or not willing to meet UNFCCC standards 
for climate change financing. 
The Bank still has the opportunity to tighten up this lose 
provision by not just asking donor countries to ensure that fund-
ing is new and additional, but by requiring them to demonstrate 
that it is. In addition, the CTF could include an analysis of 
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whether or not funding is new and additional in their donation 
acceptance process, and/or incorporate new and additional status 
into the investment criteria for projects.54 This has potential to 
be complicated administratively,55 but may be required if donor 
countries are to report donations as “new and additional” to the 
UNFCCC. The CTF has multiple opportunities to ensure that 
“new and additional” funding is used, and it should do so.
equitable goveRnance iS not guaRanteeD  
by the ctf
Under the current international climate regime, each party 
has an equal vote in all UNFCCC decisions,56 ensuring that 
developed countries cannot use their superior political and finan-
cial circumstances to overpower the developing countries of the 
global south.57 In the context of financing, this was a battle hard 
fought, and won, by developing countries to ensure their equal 
say in the distribution of financial resources coming from the 
global north.58 Unfortunately, 
the CTF has demonstrated 
inconsistencies with this prin-
ciple since its creation.
The G8, an organization 
that lacks representation and 
input from developing nations,59 
made the initial request to the 
World Bank to establish the Cli-
mate Investment Funds.60 This 
means that even if developing 
countries have subsequently 
been included, they were not 
involved at the outset in deter-
mining what international body 
should house and administer the 
fund, the fund structure, or fund 
goals and objectives.
In its attempt to have equal 
representation of developing 
countries, the CTF included 
an equal number of donor and 
recipient country members on 
its governing board.61 It also 
established decision-making by consensus, allowing an unsatis-
fied board member to block decisions entirely or to abstain.62
In reality, however, the CTF governance structure does not 
involve developing countries in the decision-making process in 
a meaningful way. The consequences of this are potentially dire 
in terms of the legitimacy of CTF projects. The inconsistency 
between the CTF’s governing body and the governance princi-
ples of the UNFCCC is twofold. 
First, Membership on the Trust Fund Committee (“TFC”) 
is acquired through a “consultation” with an undefined group 
of stakeholders.63 The CTF founding document is loose in its 
instructions on the selection of Trust Fund Committee member-
ship and unclear as to how the consultation among those par-
ties should work.64 A footnote says that the “selection of donor 
country representatives is to be primarily guided by total contri-
butions to the CTF,”65 which implies less of a “consultation” and 
more of a selection process based on the highest dollar donation. 
What is more disconcerting is that no such instructions are given 
regarding the recipient country representation on the commit-
tee; the document simply instructs that a consultation will occur 
among the interested countries.66 This leaves interested coun-
tries to wonder how to ensure fair representation—or any repre-
sentation at all—on the Committee.
The first Trust Fund Committee membership selection pro-
cess took place behind closed doors at a meeting in Washing-
ton, DC in October of 2008.67 The “recipient” countries that 
will serve on the committee include Brazil, China, Egypt, India, 
Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey.68 While these countries are 
vital to solving climate change, they represent emerging eco-
nomic superpowers that are unlikely to share the concerns of a 
vast number of smaller, less developed recipient nations, which 
may now have inadequate and 
ineffective representation on the 
CTF committee.
The Trust Fund Committee 
is charged with decision making 
authority regarding which pro-
grams and projects will receive 
funding from the CTF.69 This 
vital role should be given to a 
body that equitably represents 
all parties involved.70 The cur-
rent system does not guarantee 
fairness or equity in selection 
for the Committee and is incon-
sistent with the UNFCCC’s 
principles of equity.71 
The World Bank should 
clarify the founding docu-
ment’s language that lays out 
the involved parties and defines 
“consultation.” Alternatively, the 
Bank should give more power 
to the “Partnership Forum,” a 
body established to encourage 
dialogue about the Climate Investment Funds among diverse 
interested parties.72 The role of the forum could be increases 
to something more like the UN’s Global Environment Facility 
(“GEF”) Assembly, which has some decision-making power 
over GEF activities.73 Involving more stakeholders in actual 
decision-making, beyond the current Partnership Forum role of 
“dialogue and consultation,”74 would create a model much more 
in line with the principles of the UNFCCC.75
Second, the committee is given little, if any, real power. The 
board of the World Bank maintains control over all actions of the 
bank, potentially including actions of the CTF as well.76 In addi-
tion, the MDBs maintain implementing power over CTF projects 
after the TFC approves them,77 and the CTF founding document 
provides only weak language to ensure that consistency with the 
It is vital that the UN find 
ways to make sure that 
even non-UN programs 
that are working towards 
climate change goals  
meet the necessary 
standards of quality and 
integrity in all facets of  
the their operations.
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UNFCCC is maintained outside the scope of Trust Fund Com-
mittee responsibilities.78
The Trust Fund Committee is affirmatively given some 
power over the Multilateral Development Banks that admin-
ister CTF projects: it is charged 
with “ensuring monitoring and 
periodic independent evalua-
tion of performance and finan-
cial accountability of MDBs.”79 
The CTF document also, how-
ever, specifies that MDBs “rely 
on their own policies and proce-
dures in developing and manag-
ing activities the [CTF] funds will 
finance,”80 including fiduciary 
standards and environmental and 
social safeguards.81 This structure 
implies that projects voted on by 
the Trust Fund Committee will be 
passed down to MDB boards to 
control.
The CTF should ensure separation between the CTF’s 
Trust Fund Committee and the World Bank Board by making it 
explicitly clear how the CTF’s decisions might, or might not, be 
subject to oversight from the World Bank Board and the Boards 
of the MDBs. This would bring the actual practices at the World 
Bank into compliance with the CTF’s claims of Trust Fund Com-
mittee leadership.82 In addition, the CTF founding documents 
should set firm guidelines for MDB administration of projects 
and should require MDBs to incorporate UNFCCC principles 
into their standards and into their reporting to the Trust Fund 
Committee.
the ctf SunSet clauSe DoeS not effectively 
pRevent unDeRmining of the unfccc pRoceSS
The World Bank calls the CTF an “interim measure” to 
provide funding for climate change projects during the negotia-
tions of the successor to the Kyoto Protocol.83 The Bank claims 
that the CTF’s “sunset clause”84 is sufficient to limit it to this 
temporary goal and prevent diversion from or preemption of 
UNFCCC negotiations.85 However, diversion and preemption 
are possible if the CTF operates as a parallel structure to already 
existing UNFCCC mechanisms, and in so doing creates a chan-
nel for climate related financing to bypass existing mechanisms 
and flow through the CTF instead.86 The idea of having a sun-
set for the Fund after its “interim” purpose has been served is a 
logical way to prevent this potential problem. The language of 
the actual sunset clause, however, lacks a guaranteed ending for 
the fund. A built-in loophole allows the CTF to remain opera-
tional if UNFCCC negotiations so indicate, thus rendering the 
clause ineffective and creating a strong incentive for heavy Bank 
involvement in the UN negotiations.87 
The sunset clause states that “if the outcome of the UNFCCC 
negotiations so indicates, the Trust Fund Committee . . . may 
take necessary steps to continue the operations of the CTF.”88 
On its face, then, it appears to offer up the CTF’s fate to the 
UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties, but this language is prob-
lematic. The World Bank will have strong motivation to ensure 
that the UNFCCC negotiations leave room for the CTF to con-
tinue. This motivation comes 
from the Bank’s pronounced 
desire to be at the forefront of 
climate change funding and 
carbon finance. The Bank also 
has a strong case to make—the 
CTF has already demonstrated 
interest from big league donors 
to the tune of over $6 billion,89 
a number no doubt envied by 
other players in the climate 
change field.90 
The sunset clause loop-
hole leaves room for the Bank 
to use its clout to keep the CTF 
alive.91 It is unclear that the 
CoP will be able to take strong 
enough action to counteract political pressures coming from the 
Bank and donor countries, which may be fonder of the CTF than 
more regulated UNFCCC climate funding mechanisms.92 
Indeed there are strong arguments that the CTF loophole 
should remain in place to allow the Fund to continue beyond the 
current climate negotiations. Proponents argue that World Bank 
involvement in long-term projects could create market stabil-
ity because many climate change related investments occur on 
longer timelines than the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol has 
provided for thus far.93 The CTF could offer ongoing and guar-
anteed financial support for such projects. It is also predicted that 
tens of billions more dollars will be needed to finance emission 
reducing projects if the global community is going to success-
fully combat long-term climate change.94 It may be unwise to 
remove any avenue for funding from the market until that target 
amount of investment is reached. 
These arguments, however, do not change the ineffective-
ness of the sunset clause as a tool to insulate the UNFCCC nego-
tiations and do not change the possibility that the term “interim” 
was used only to make the CTF easier for doubters to swallow. 
The sunset clause was a politically shrewd addition, couched as 
a compromise, which required little concession from the Bank.
The sunset clause leaves a gap between what the World 
Bank claims the CTF does—prevent the undermining of future 
UNFCCC negotiations—and what is likely, or even probable, to 
do in Copenhagen. Even if the UNFCCC negotiations result in 
the end of the CTF, the World Bank will ultimately have gained 
experience, capacity, and connections in climate change finance 
that will allow it to continue operations (similar to the CTF or 
otherwise) in the field. It is possible that the CTF itself will 
sunset only to be replaced by a similar program under another 
name. The World Bank has successfully placed itself at the fore-
front of climate change finance with little or no input from the 
UNFCCC.
Steps must be taken in 
good faith to address the 
inconsistencies between  
the Clean Technology 
Fund and the UN 
Framework Convention  
on Climate Change.
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conclusIon
Analyzing the Clean Technology Fund governance struc-
ture and founding documents provides a broader picture of the 
international financing of climate change solutions. It is valu-
able to the extent that it provides new ideas and new models 
for future finance structures, which will need to generate and 
invest an unprecedented amount of funding in order to meet the 
challenge that global climate change presents. Advocates may 
be hesitant to endorse and foster non-UN programs, but as the 
CTF demonstrates, major donors do not feel the same hesita-
tion. As such, it is vital that the UN find ways to make sure that 
even non-UN programs that are working towards climate change 
goals meet the necessary standards of quality and integrity in all 
facets of the their operations.
Steps must be taken in good faith to address the inconsisten-
cies between the Clean Technology Fund and the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change. Efforts can and should 
come from both sides: the World Bank and the UNFCCC. The 
World Bank must show that it can play nice when international 
“soft law”95 conventions regulate its investment targets. The UN 
must manage the reality that the CTF and CTF-like instruments 
are here to stay and will have to be dealt with within the existing 
framework. 
Ultimately, the global goal is to slow climate change before 
it causes permanent damage. Clean Technology Fund projects 
will no doubt contribute to a global reduction in GHG emissions 
and an increase in low carbon economies around the world, but 
these benefits come at a cost. The world spoke with one voice 
when it established the UNFCCC, and success in the battle to 
slow climate change requires that the voice of the UNFCCC be 
respected and maintained in the international community.
The UNFCCC secretariat continues to call for a “political 
answer” to the scientific community’s increasing knowledge on 
the threat of climate change,96 and it has been asserted that the 
2009 Copenhagen negotiations may be the last chance for this 
political answer. It is vital that the UNFCCC and those work-
ing for its success learn from the current state of climate change 
finance. In Copenhagen, the CTF’s governance structure, finan-
cial success, and environmental effectiveness will each need to 
be scrutinized and analyzed to learn more effective paths for-
ward and for the UNFCCC and to generate the political will for 
the Conference of the Parties to utilize the sunset clause freely 
and based on results, without the undue influence of politics.
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litigation upDate
Winter v. nrDC, inC.
by Natalie Dillree*
InTroDucTIon
On November 12, 2008, the Supreme Court vacated por-tions of a preliminary injunction limiting the Navy’s use of mid-frequency active (“MFA”) sonar in training 
exercises.1 Environmental organizations argued that MFA sonar 
would cause injury to marine mammals.2 Ultimately, the Court 
held that the Navy’s interest in adequately training its sailors 
outweighed the alleged irreparable injury.3 
legal backgrounD anD argumenTs
This case involves Navy MFA sonar training exercises 
performed in the waters off the coast of southern California 
(“SOCAL”).4 The Navy’s fleet faces a threat from diesel-elec-
tric submarines because they operate “almost silently” and are 
“extremely difficult to detect and track.”5 To track these sub-
marines, the Navy uses MFA sonar, “which involves emitting 
pulses of sound underwater. . . .”6 To ensure that sonar operators 
are “thoroughly skilled” in its use, the Navy conducts regular 
training exercises under “realistic conditions.”7
At least thirty-seven species of marine mammals can be 
found in the SOCAL operating area.8 The plaintiffs assert that 
“MFA sonar can cause much more serious injuries to marine 
mammals than the Navy acknowledges, including permanent 
hearing loss, decompression sickness, and major behavioral 
disruptions.”9 Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege that MFA sonar 
has been linked to “several mass strandings of marine mam-
mals” in the area. 10
Plaintiffs sued the Navy, seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief.11 The environmental groups asserted that the training 
exercises violated several federal laws, including the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).12 Under NEPA, 
an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) must be prepared 
for any “major Federal action significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment.”13 However, no EIS is required if, 
based on a shorter environmental assessment (“EA”), a federal 
agency determines that “the proposed action will not have a sig-
nificant impact on the environment.”14
In February 2007, the Navy prepared an EA that concluded 
that the SOCAL training exercise scheduled through January 
2009 “would not have a significant impact on the environment” 
and, because of this finding, did not prepare a full EIS.15 The 
Navy insisted that MFA sonar could only cause “temporary 
injury or disruption of behavioral patterns such as migration, 
feeding, surfacing and breeding.”16 
Based on the plaintiffs’ demonstration of a “possibility of 
success” on their claims under NEPA and another federal law, 
the District Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
the Navy from using MFA sonar during its training exercises.17 
The District Court further determined that there was “a ‘near 
certainty’ of irreparable injury to the environment, and that this 
injury outweighed any possible harm to the Navy.”18
The Navy appealed. The Court of Appeals held that this 
“blanket injunction” was “overbroad” and remanded to the Dis-
trict Court.19 The District Court then entered a revised prelimi-
nary injunction, imposing six restrictions on the Navy’s use of 
MFA sonar training exercises.20 
However, in a simultaneous development, the Council on 
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) allowed the Navy to adopt 
“alternative arrangements” because the injunction created a 
“significant and unreasonable risk” that Navy sailors would 
“not be able to train and be certified as fully mission capable.”21 
Therefore, the CEQ authorized the Navy to continue its training 
exercises under previously adopted mitigation measures.22
Subsequently, the Navy moved to vacate the District Court’s 
preliminary injunction with respect to two of the imposed con-
ditions.23 The District Court rejected the Navy’s motion.24 The 
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the preliminary injunc-
tion was appropriate because “the balance of hardships and 
a consideration of the public interest weighed in favor of the 
plaintiffs.”25 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.26 
holDIngs
The Supreme Court vacated the portions of the  preliminary 
injunction challenged by the Navy.27 The Court concluded that 
the Ninth Circuit’s “possibility” of irreparable harm  standard 
was too lenient to warrant a preliminary injunction, stating 
that their “frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs 
*Natalie Dillree is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law.
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seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is 
likely.  .  .  .”28 Furthermore, “even if plaintiffs have shown 
 ir rep arable injury .  .  . any such injury is outweighed by the  public 
interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training. . . 
.”29 The Court further concluded that the “most serious possible 
injury” to plaintiffs would be “harm to an unknown number of 
the marine mammals that they study and observe.”30
1 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S.Ct. 365, 382 (2008).
2 Id. at 371.
3 Id. at 376.
4 Id. at 370.
5 Id.
6 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 370. 




11 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 372.
12 Id.
13 Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
14 Id., citing 40 C.F.R §§ 1508.9(a), 1508.13 (2207). 
15 Id. 
16 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 371.
17 Id. at 372.
18 Id. at 373.
19 Id. 
conclusIon
The Navy’s arguments challenged the government’s obli-
gation to adhere to environmental laws.31 Therefore, some 
environmental groups feared that an unfavorable ruling would 
essentially excuse the government from performing studies 
of the effects of their actions on the environment.32 However, 
Chief Justice Roberts evaded such broad arguments, writing 
that the majority did not mean to say that military interests will 
always trump environmental concerns.33 In addition to the deci-
sion’s narrow language, some protections for marine mammals 
are still intact, as four of the originally imposed restrictions on 
MFA sonar use remain.34
20 Id. 
21 Id. 






28 Id. at 375.
29 Id. at 376.
30 Id. at 378.
31 Jerry Markon & Juliet Eilperin, Justices Revoke Limits On Navy Use of 
Sonar, the waShington poSt, Nov. 13, 2008, at A04, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/12/AR2008111201058.





Mark Lynas, writing for National Geographic, pens his warning as if writing a travel book. The book begins with a quote from Dante, warning the reader that the 
journey they are embarking on is akin to a visit to the depths, 
where sinners atone for their misdeeds on earth. The sinners in 
this story are the emitters of carbon, however, and those who 
will atone are likely not yet born. 
While Dante’s allegorical journey takes the reader to suc-
cessive depths, Lynas’ work takes the reader on a journey of 
degrees: both authors lead the reader through a series of fright-
ening and potentially catastrophic stages. Broken into six parts, 
Lynas explains what may occur as global temperatures increase 
and the climate changes. Lynas distinguishes between the 
impacts of an average temperature increase and a mere seasonal 
rise in temperature, emphasizing the dire consequences of the 
former. While a difference of a few degrees on a day-to-day 
basis is hardly noticeable, an average annual increase of only a 
few degrees will affect global air and water circulation causing 
dramatic and dangerous impacts. 
As Lynas effectively conveys, the extent to which one or 
two degrees can affect the planet is alarming. Beginning with 
a rise of one degree, which is already occurring, Lynas takes 
the reader to places where climate impacts are already starkly 
apparent. He travels from the highest peaks, where glaciers once 
covered mountains but now are quickly receding, to the depths 
of the sea, where coral bleaching is now afflicting Australia’s 
Great Barrier Reef. 
Along with concrete examples, Lynas uses scientific mod-
els to demonstrate that multiple species face eminent extinction 
as temperatures rise. For most species, climate change means 
that habitats will shift towards the poles and to higher eleva-
tions. However, migration is not always an option; some spe-
cies cannot move to new locations fast enough to beat the rising 
heat. Other species, such as polar bears, will have no place to go. 
The overall effect described by the author is a great extinction of 
plant and animal life, caused primarily by human activity.
Lynas makes it clear that it is not certain whether even 
humans will be able to adapt fast enough to avert disaster. A 
mere two to three degree rise in temperature will lead to wider 
book Review
Six DegReeS: ouR futuRe on a hotteR planet
by Mark Lynas  
Reviewed by Matthew Padilla*
* Matthew Padilla is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law.
desertification, water shortages, crop failures, and increased 
risk of disease which may force human populations to migrate. 
Although wealthy, developed nations are better situated to adapt 
to the impacts of climate change than poor, developing coun-
tries, we will all feel the impacts of each degree. Using the fall 
of the Maya as an example, Lynas warns that even the hearti-
est civilizations may succumb to the adverse impacts of climate 
change.
Serious students of climate change may not find much new 
information in this book, which covers many of the same top-
ics Al Gore described in An Inconvenient Truth and Earth in 
the Balance. Without going into the more complicated aspects 
of climate science, Lynas describes global warming in simple 
terms enabling him to reach an audience that may otherwise shy 
away from a scientific text. Six Degrees is probably most similar 
to Tim Flannery’s The Weather Makers. However, where Flan-
nery’s book arguably offers more hopeful solutions, Six Degrees 
views those solutions through a skeptical lens. There is good 
reason for skepticism. As the book outlines the realities of a hot-
ter world, it becomes clearer and clearer that our future planet 
is likely to be drier and more desolate despite human efforts to 
reduce carbon emissions. 
At the end of Lynas’ journey, the author brings us back to 
Dante’s expedition and questions the potential for a solution to 
this harrowing problem by looking at science and psychology. 
The last chapter is dedicated to the possibility that we can solve 
the climate change crisis, but also clearly outlines the pitfalls 
and challenges that interfere with eliminating a carbon-fueled 
lifestyle. Echoing a line from Al Gore’s award-winning docu-
mentary, Lynas states that there “is nothing so difficult as trying 
to get a man to understand something when his salary depends 
on his not understanding it.” Despite the grim outlook presented 
by Six Degrees, the book is recommended for all readers con-
cerned about climate change. Lynas’ perspective is sure to send 
chills down the spine of a casual reader on an unseasonably 
warm winter day.
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